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AbstractMigration, in general, is not a salient political issue in West Africa. However, one migration aspect that remains highly controversial and unpopular is cooperation on the deportation of undocumented emigrants with the EU and its member states. In this paper, we set out a typology of justification frames for studying how political actors in West Africa might frame their support or opposition to cooperation on deportation. We distinguished three types of justifications: identity‐related, moral, and utilitarian. While the moral (human rights) and utilitarian (political, economic, securitarian, labor) frames are rather classic justifications in migration politics and governance, our analysis shows that identity‐related ('neo‐colonial resistance' and 'neo‐colonial compliance') justification frames highlight how historical path dependencies matter in understanding the drivers of (migration) politics and governance in West Africa. This is particularly evident when the images of cuffed and shackled deportees from Europe evoke memories of dark historical pasts.

This article delves into the role of bureaucrats and administrations in the development of national migration policies in West Africa. Based upon 87 interviews conducted in Accra, Dakar, and Brussels, it argues that the process of developing migration policies in Ghana and Senegal exhibits features of "bureaucratic politics." West African bureaucracies have gained more national policy-making agency, due to the opportunities created by external funding from the European Union (EU) and the International Organization for Migration. EU funding fostered the policy expertise of local officials and provided certain administrative branches with resources to grow. In the process, bureaucracies in Ghana and Senegal have become more receptive to developing national migration policies and adapting to the EU external migration agenda. These findings add to an often-heard assumption in the literature about EU conditionality in its migration policy with non-EU countries — namely, that adaption to EU standards may be determined by not only the rewards given to foreign governments but also by the donors' ability to establish a longer-term engagement with the bureaucracy. The research also demonstrates that EU migration cooperation reinforces the typical pattern of the postcolonial state, wherein the bureaucracy is funded by the state and external donors. The article addresses a gap in research on EU migration cooperation with the Global South and acknowledges the role of domestic bureaucracies in maintaining dependent postcolonial relationships with the EU in the realm of migration governance.