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Abstract: Although pervasive in our history and modern ecology, propaganda has yet to be explicitly described by social psychological science. In this paper, we propose a Fitness-Validation Model (FVM) of propagandist persuasion. This synthetic model posits that influence is proportional to the degree of fit between message characteristics (social content, prescriptive content, descriptive content, framing) and recipients' (group identity, attitudes, knowledge, cognitive makeup). Fitness on these four characteristics then shapes perceptions of thought validity regarding the message and ultimately behavior change. Thus, we propose that propaganda attempts to maximize fitness between message and recipient characteristics and self-validation in the direction of the message. From the FVM, we then derive five main pathways for propagandist persuasion and dissuasion, which we label the 5D: Deceive social intuition, Divert resistant attitudes, Disrupt information processing, Decoy reasoning, and Disturb meta-cognition. The 5D are mutually inclusive and can be seen as the "building blocks" of real-world propaganda. We discuss the implications of the FVM for media psychology and conclude the model should be used to craft more effective liberal democratic (counter)propaganda.

Along with the US, France remains among the most impacted Western countries by Islamist terrorism. To explain radicalization in the French context, researchers have emphasized the country's specificities such as colonialism and secularism (i.e. "Laïcité") as risk factors. This "French connection" thesis (FCT) proposes that France experiences abnormally high radicalization rates among its Muslim population due to a radical form of State secularism, specific approach to colonialism ("assimilationist"), and the socio-educational disparities affecting French Muslims. For the first time, we propose to closely examine FCT in light of current empirical research on the determinants of radicalization. First, we demonstrate that FCT relies on a flawed premise: domestic radicalization in France is average relative to comparable liberal democracies. We then show that FCT is not in line with current social-psychological knowledge of the determinants of radicalization (e.g. education, socio-economic disparities) and relies on conflations between confounded societal risk factors (e.g. "radical" secularism as a correlate of far-right ideology). As an alternative to FCT, we conclude that structural discrimination and the recent surge in far-right and Islamist ideologies better account for domestic radicalization in France. We also propose that French historical secularism and colorblind values may actually constitute protective factors to be further investigated.

Abstract
A vast amount of social science research has been dedicated to the study of Islamist extremism – in particular, to uncover its psychological and structural drivers. However, the recent revival of extreme-right extremism points to the need to investigate this re-emerging phenomenon. This article highlights some of the characteristics of the extremisation of Islamism in Europe in parallel with the rise of the extremisation of right-wing extremist groups. In doing so, we explore similarities between Islamist and right-wing extremist individuals and groups. The main premise of the article is that a threat-regulation approach fails to understand the role of contextual and structural factors in the political and religious extremisation of individuals. Instead, the article claims that a reciprocal-threat model can better explain extremist violence since it is based on the idea that nativist and Islamist extremist individuals/groups are mutually threatening each other.

The COVID-19 pandemic, as a global threat to humanity, is likely to instigate a variety of collective responses in the society. We examined, for the first time, whether the COVID-19 threat perception is related to attitudes towards Syrian refugees in Turkey, theorizing a dual pathway whereby pandemic-induced threat would relate to both pro- and anti-immigrant feelings. Drawing upon integrated threat theory and models of collective-threat regulation, we expected that pandemic threat would lead to more exclusionary outgroup attitudes through increased immigrant threat, whereas we argued that perceived COVID-19 threat would promote inclusionary attitudes through creating a common ingroup in the face of a global threat. Using online search volume data at the province level (Study 1, N = 81) and self-reporting measures at the individual level (Study 2, N = 294), we found that the COVID-19 threat was directly associated with more positive attitudes towards refugees (Study 1 and 2). Study 2 further revealed indirect positive (through a sense of common identity) and negative (through perceptions of immigrant threat) links between COVID-19 threat perception and outgroup attitudes. These results highlight the importance of integrating threat regulation and social identity perspectives when assessing the implications of pathogen-related threats.

Abstract. Violent extremism is rising across the globe as indicated by the growing number of attacks of terrorist organizations. It is known that violent extremism is carried out mainly by young people due to developmental and external factors. Furthermore, recent evidence suggests that ideologically motivated violence stems from threat-regulation processes aiming to restore significance, control, and certainty. Nevertheless, few studies from the threat-regulation literature have focused on youth samples and on the social-economic and political context in which radicalization processes occur. Here, we hypothesize that one driver of the surge in violent extremism might be globalization. To do so, we review the evidence that shows that globalization increases the perception of affiliative, economic, and existential threats. In return, some studies suggest that these kinds of threats promote violent extremism among youth samples. Therefore, we conclude that the threatening context generated by four decades of globalization might be a risk factor for youth extremism in the long run.

Background:Social distancing and mass quarantines were implemented worldwide in response to the current COVID-19 pandemic. Prior research has shown that such measures bear negative consequences for population mental health and well-being. Conversely, a growing body of evidence suggests that feeling positively identified with a group is associated with physical and mental health benefits.Aims:This study tested whether national identification could promote wellbeing and physical health during the COVID-19 pandemic.Method:We used survey data conducted among 67 countries ( N = 46,450).Results:Mixed-model analyses revealed that national identity was associated with wellbeing – despite adjustment on social belonging, COVID-19 perceived risk, exposure and ideology. This effect did not extend to physical health.Conclusions:These results suggest that the mere feeling of belonging to a national group may have mental health benefits. We discuss the implications of our findings within the social cure framework and their relevance for population mental health under COVID-19.

International audience ; The aim of this research is to identify what social and psychological variables may attract people to a social protest movement, namely the Yellow Vests (YVs) in France, which originated in October 2018. This analysis, albeit correlational, may nevertheless give important hints to identify in an exploratory way what causal factors could lead people (a) to become a sympathizer of the movement and (b) to become a member of that movement, and what psychosocial consequences would derive from (a) and (b). Notably, the role of conspiracy beliefs and anomie will be scrutinized because of their role in fostering non-normative political violence. In this purpose, we analyzed the results of a poll conducted on a representative sample of the French population (N = 1760). This survey explored a range of respondents' attitudes towards social issues and towards the YVs movement. Our analyses showed that adherence to the YVs movement is mainly caused by socioeconomic factors (such as educational level, economic capital) and belonging to political extremes (far left and even more far right), relying on and probably increasing distrust toward authorities and unconventional beliefs (paranormal and conspiracist). Ultimately, adherence to the movement seems triggered by the objective factor of dependency on a car and endorsement of conspiracist beliefs; whereas, simple sympathy is related to a less irrational form of accusation of authorities, low subjective economic capital, and pessimism toward the future. YVs also more often use social media and Youtube, but less often use media websites and newspapers as their first source of information.

International audience ; The aim of this research is to identify what social and psychological variables may attract people to a social protest movement, namely the Yellow Vests (YVs) in France, which originated in October 2018. This analysis, albeit correlational, may nevertheless give important hints to identify in an exploratory way what causal factors could lead people (a) to become a sympathizer of the movement and (b) to become a member of that movement, and what psychosocial consequences would derive from (a) and (b). Notably, the role of conspiracy beliefs and anomie will be scrutinized because of their role in fostering non-normative political violence. In this purpose, we analyzed the results of a poll conducted on a representative sample of the French population (N = 1760). This survey explored a range of respondents' attitudes towards social issues and towards the YVs movement. Our analyses showed that adherence to the YVs movement is mainly caused by socioeconomic factors (such as educational level, economic capital) and belonging to political extremes (far left and even more far right), relying on and probably increasing distrust toward authorities and unconventional beliefs (paranormal and conspiracist). Ultimately, adherence to the movement seems triggered by the objective factor of dependency on a car and endorsement of conspiracist beliefs; whereas, simple sympathy is related to a less irrational form of accusation of authorities, low subjective economic capital, and pessimism toward the future. YVs also more often use social media and Youtube, but less often use media websites and newspapers as their first source of information.

The aim of this research is to identify what social and psychological variables may attract people to a social protest movement, namely the Yellow Vests (YVs) in France, which originated in October 2018. This analysis, albeit correlational, may nevertheless give important hints to identify in an exploratory way what causal factors could lead people (a) to become a sympathizer of the movement and (b) to become a member of that movement, and what psychosocial consequences would derive from (a) and (b). Notably, the role of conspiracy beliefs and anomie will be scrutinized because of their role in fostering non-normative political violence. In this purpose, we analyzed the results of a poll conducted on a representative sample of the French population (N = 1760). This survey explored a range of respondents' attitudes towards social issues and towards the YVs movement. Our analyses showed that adherence to the YVs movement is mainly caused by socio-economic factors (such as educational level, economic capital) and belonging to political extremes (far left and even more far right), relying on and probably increasing distrust toward authorities and unconventional beliefs (paranormal and conspiracist). Ultimately, adherence to the movement seems triggered by the objective factor of dependency on a car and endorsement of conspiracist beliefs; whereas, simple sympathy is related to a less irrational form of accusation of authorities, low subjective economic capital, and pessimism toward the future. YVs also more often use social media and Youtube, but less often use media websites and newspapers as their first source of information.

In the current research, we examined the association between perceived economic grievances and both intentions to engage and actual engagement in antilockdown protests during the COVID-19 pandemic in high-income countries. We also investigated whether this direct association would be (a) mediated by social identification with the economically disadvantaged and (b) moderated by fatalistic beliefs about the pandemic. In Study 1, multilevel modelling based on online search data from the US ( N = 505) indicated that weekly fluctuations in searches related to economic grievances predicted the occurrence of antilockdown protests over time. In Studies 2 (Germany; N = 404) and 3 (Italy; N = 1,857), we showed that the link between perceived economic grievances and intentions to engage in antilockdown collective action was significantly mediated by social identification with people who suffered economically from the COVID-19 pandemic. Study 3 replicated the findings of Study 2 and extended it by showing the role of high (vs. low) fatalistic beliefs about the pandemic in moderating the association between perceived economic grievances and antilockdown collective action intentions. We discuss the consequences of unaddressed economic grievances for democratic functioning.

Background: Syrian refugees resettled in Turkey show a high prevalence of symptoms of mental disorders. Problem Management Plus (PM+) is an effective psychological intervention delivered by non-specialist health care providers which has shown to decrease psychological distress among people exposed to adversity. In this single-blind pilot randomised controlled trial, we examined the methodological trial procedures of Group PM+ (gPM+) among Syrian refugees with psychological distress in Istanbul,Turkey, and assessed feasibility, acceptability, perceived impact and the potential cost-effectiveness of the intervention. Methods: Refugees with psychological distress (Kessler Psychological Distress Scale, K10 > 15) and impaired psychosocial functioning (World Health Organization Disability Assessment Schedule, WHODAS 2.0> 16) were recruited from the community and randomised to either gPM+ and enhanced care as usual (E-CAU) (n = 24) or E-CAU only (n = 22). gPM+ comprised of five weekly group sessions with eight to ten participants per group. Acceptability and feasibility of the intervention were assessed through semi-structured interviews. The primary outcome at 3-month follow-up was symptoms of depression and anxiety (Hopkins Symptoms Checklist-25). Psychosocial functioning (WHODAS 2.0), symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder and self-identified problems (Psychological Outcomes Profiles, PSYCHLOPS) were included as secondary outcomes. A modified version of the Client Service Receipt Inventory was used to document changes in the costs of health service utilisation as well as productivity losses. Results: There were no barriers experienced in recruiting study participants and in randomising them into the respective study arms. Retention in gPM+ was high (75%). Qualitative analyses of the interviews with the participants showed that Syrian refugees had a positive view on the content, implementation and format of gPM+. No adverse events were reported during the implementation. The study was not powered to detect an effect. No significant difference between gPM+ and E-CAU group on primary and secondary outcome measures, or in economic impacts were found. Conclusions: gPM+ delivered by non-specialist peer providers seemed to be an acceptable, feasible and safe intervention for Syrian refugees in Turkey with elevated levels of psychological distress. This pilot RCT sets the stage for a fully powered RCT. ; European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation programme Societal Challenges

Research suggests that belief in conspiracy theories (CT) stems from basic psychological mechanisms and is linked to other belief systems (e.g., religious beliefs). While previous research has extensively examined individual and contextual variables associated with CT beliefs, it has not yet investigated the role of culture. In the current research, we tested, based on a situated cultural cognition perspective, the extent to which culture predicts CT beliefs. Using Hofstede's model of cultural values, three nation‐level analyses of data from 25, 19, and 18 countries using different measures of CT beliefs (Study 1, N = 5323; Study 2a, N = 12,255; Study 2b, N = 30,994) revealed positive associations between masculinity, collectivism, and CT beliefs. A cross‐sectional study among U.S. citizens (Study 3, N = 350), using individual‐level measures of Hofstede's values, replicated these findings. A meta‐analysis of correlations across studies corroborated the presence of positive links between CT beliefs, collectivism, r = .31, 95% CI = [.15; .47], and masculinity, r = .39, 95% CI = [.18; .59]. Our results suggest that in addition to individual differences and contextual variables, cultural factors also play an important role in shaping CT beliefs.