Suchergebnisse

Nigeria has had three programs of transition from military to civil rule in the last 13 years. Despite the enormous resources wasted on the first two programs, by Generals Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha, democracy remains a mirage in Nigeria. The demise of the two programs was not just a monumental failure on the part of the two leaders; it also vividly demonstrates the military's inability to effect a lasting transition to civil rule. In addition, the utter failure of both programs has exposed the political brinkmanship to which the military is prepared to go to subvert democracy. Babangida's brazen annulment of the June 1993 presidential election and Abacha's repressive, dictatorial, and corrupt governing style brought Nigeria closer to the edge of the precipice than any other crisis since the civil war of the 1960s.

Der Autor analysiert am Beispiel der Agila Development Association die Konfliktbewältigungskapazität einer nationalen afrikanischen Institution. Er zeigt speziell, welchen Beitrag diese Organisation bei der Deeskalation gewaltträchtiger Konflikte auf dem Gebiet des nigerianischen Bundesstaates Benue geleistet hat. (DÜI-Kör)

Nigeria has one of the most elaborate and most extensive privatization programmes in the world. This paper analyses the efforts made by the Nigerian government to expand the political constituency for privatization. It argues that the government attempted to diffuse opposition to privatization, amongst others from the Nigerian working class, which organized a vigorous campaign against the intended policy through its labour unions and the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC), by expanding the narrow circle of supporters of privatization. This attempt was made by anchoring the rationale for privatization on the basis of a moral economy. It is argued that by anchoring its privatization programme on ethical grounds, the government hoped to expand the constituency for privatization without having to enlarge the circle of beneficiaries. In other words, the government hoped that it could substitute vicarious moral satisfaction for material gains for those Nigerians who would not derive tangible benefits from the privatization programme. In this way, the circle of supporters of privatization would be enlarged without additional material costs to the State. Moral appeals failed to cultivate a wider constituency for privatization in Nigeria. Brute repressive measures against labour unions and other critics of privatization were used to make the implementation of the programme possible. (Documentatieblad/ASC Leiden)

Examines the disengagement program which allows the military to influence politics, even after it relinquishes formal control in 1992.

Fünf Aufsätze zur Analyse für Militarisierung werden kurz zusammengefaßt, um ihre Erklärungskraft für die nigerianische Militarisierung zu prüfen. Historisch plausibler ist jedoch der Biafra-Krieg auf legitimatorischer Seite und die Öleinnahmen auf materieller Seite, die im wesentlichen das Wachstum des Militärapparates ermöglichten. Eine aufschlußreiche Erläuterung logischer innerer Widersprüche des nigerianischen Militärs geben einen wenig optimistischen Ausblick. (DÜI-Sth)