Proportionality: constitutional rights and their limitations
In: Cambridge studies in constitutional law
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In: Cambridge studies in constitutional law
Whether examining election outcomes, the legal status of terrorism suspects, or if (or how) people can be sentenced to death, a judge in a modern democracy assumes a role that raises some of the most contentious political issues of our day. But do judges even have a role beyond deciding the disputes before them under law? What are the criteria for judging the justices who write opinions for the United States Supreme Court or constitutional courts in other democracies? These are the questions that one of the world's foremost judges and legal theorists, Aharon Barak, poses in this book. In fluen.
In: Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law, S. 53-74
In: Understanding Human Dignity, S. 361-380
In: Law & ethics of human rights, Band 4, Heft 1, S. 1-16
ISSN: 1938-2545
This essay focuses on proportionality stricto sensu as a consequential test of balancing. The basic balancing rule establishes a general criterion for deciding between the marginal benefit to the public good and the marginal limit to human rights. Based on the Israeli constitutional jurisprudence, this essay supports the adoption of a principled balancing approach that translates the basic balancing rule into a series of principled balancing tests, taking into account the importance of the rights and the type of restriction. This approach provides better guidance to the balancer (legislator, administrator, judge), restricts wide discretion in balancing, and makes the act of balancing more transparent, more structured, and more foreseeable.The advantages of proportionality stricto sensu with its three levels of abstraction are several. It stresses the need to always look for a justification of a limit on human rights; it structures the mind of the balancer; it is transparent; it creates a proper dialog between the political brunches and the judiciary, and it adds to the objectivity of judicial discretion. Proportionality stricto sensu however has it critics: some claim that it attempts to balance incommensurable items; others that balancing is irrational. The answer to the critics is that it is a common base for comparison, namely the social marginal importance and that the balancing rules—basic, principled, concrete—supply a rational basis for balancing. A democracy must entrust the judiciary—the unelected independent judiciary—to be the final decision-maker—subject to constitutional amendments—about proper ends that cannot be achieved because they are not proportionality stricto sensu.
In: Revue française de droit constitutionnel, Band 66, Heft 2, S. 227-302
In: Politica del diritto, Band 34, Heft 1, S. 3-18
ISSN: 0032-3063
In: Nuovi studi politici: rivista bimestrale, Band 33, Heft 1, S. 59-68
In: Pouvoirs: revue française d'études constitutionnelles et politiques, Heft 72, S. 17-36
ISSN: 0152-0768
In: The international & comparative law quarterly: ICLQ, Band 20, Heft 1, S. 22-57
ISSN: 1471-6895
In: The international & comparative law quarterly: ICLQ, Band 18, Heft 4, S. 847-878
ISSN: 1471-6895
In: Democracy, Citizenship, and Constitutionalism
Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- Preface to the Updated Edition -- Foreword -- Introduction -- 1. "Of All Members of the Human Family" -- 2. "Not ... a Mere Plaything" -- 3. "The Minimum Necessities of Life" -- 4. "Master of One's Fate" -- 5. "What Respect Is Due" -- 6. "The Beginning and the End of the State" -- Notes -- Index -- Acknowledgments
Human dignity is now a central feature of many modern constitutions and international documents. As a constitutional value, human dignity involves a person's free will, autonomy, and ability to write a life story within the framework of society. As a constitutional right, it gives full expression to the value of human dignity, subject to the specific demands of constitutional architecture. This analytical study of human dignity as both a constitutional value and a constitutional right adopts a legal-interpretive perspective. It explores the sources of human dignity as a legal concept, its role in constitutional documents, its content, and its scope. The analysis is augmented by examples from comparative legal experience, including chapters devoted to the role of human dignity in American, Canadian, German, South African, and Israeli constitutional law
This book presents a comprehensive theory of legal interpretation, by a leading judge and legal theorist. Currently, legal philosophers and jurists apply different theories of interpretation to constitutions, statutes, rules, wills, and contracts. Aharon Barak argues that an alternative approach--purposive interpretation--allows jurists and scholars to approach all legal texts in a similar manner while remaining sensitive to the important differences. Moreover, regardless of whether purposive interpretation amounts to a unifying theory, it would still be superior to other methods of interpr
In: Hart Studies in Comparative Public Law v. 2
27. Private Actors and Constitutional RightsPart 8: Constitutional Rights and 'State of Emergency'; 28. The National Security Constitutionand the Israeli Condition; 29. The Role of the Legislature inDetermining Legitimate Responses toSecurity Threats: The Case of Israel; 30. Of Law, Constitutions and Security; Part 9: Israel -- 'Jewish and Democratic'; 31. Jewish and Democratic:Three Zionisms and Post-Zionism; 32. A Jewish Nation-State: A Discussion inLight of the Family Reunification Case; 33. National Identity and Religion-StateRelations: Israel in Comparative Perspective.