Suchergebnisse

This research concludes that the Swedish institution of Management by Objectives and Results (MBOR) has changed as a result of a top-down reform. The aim of the reform, which was to reduce the number of requests for performance information that the government makes to the central government agencies, has been successfully implemented. In analysing the national government's requests for performance information from 182 central government agencies (N=1752), this study confirms earlier claims of MBOR de-escalation. De-escalation is explained by stakeholder learning and the new policy that re-interprets performance management in terms that fit the ideals of New Public Governance. This research concludes that the size of an agency's budget has a positive effect on the total number of requests and the government's interest in quantitative performance indicators. Agency tasks that are relatively easy to measure and count have a significant positive effect on the number of government requests. Task is more important than budget size when governments decide what mix of indicators to request from a specific agency. In this respect, the Swedish government adjusts its requests for information to the agencies' tasks. The results from this study contribute to the ongoing debate on the application of performance management in a post-New Public Management setting.

A central claim of the NPM doctrine is that public sector organizations will deliver better quality and improve efficiency if managers are given more autonomy in managerial and operational decisions. At the same time the idea is to keep managers under close control, which has led to the introduction of result-control instruments. This balancing strategy is referred to as the paradox of autonomization. There is, however, still scarce knowledge on whether and how the proposed balancing techniques work. Using a unique database on Swedish government agencies this article aims to mitigate this deficiency (N=1752). A balancing strategy is mainly confirmed, since higher managerial and structural autonomy are balanced with more external results control by government. We show that governments' attempts at more managerial approaches to public service provision in reality add new ex post controls without reducing the old ones. However, policy and financial autonomy are not balanced by increased results control—these dimensions diminish when controlling for budget size. This study is an answer to a general call for more objective measures for evaluating bureaucratic autonomy

This research concludes that the Swedish institution of Management by Objectives and Results (MBOR) has changed as a result of a top-down reform. The aim of the reform,which was to reduce the number of requests for performance information that thegovernment makes to the central government agencies, has been successfully implemented. In analysing the national government's requests for performance information from 182 central government agencies (N=1752), this study confirms earlier claims of MBOR de-escalation. De-escalation is explained by stakeholder learning andthe new policy that re-interprets performance management in terms that fit the ideals of New Public Governance. This research concludes that the size of an agency's budget hasa positive effect on the total number of requests and the government's interest inquantitative performance indicators. Agency tasks that are relatively easy to measure andcount have a significant positive effect on the number of government requests. Task ismore important than budget size when governments decide what mix of indicators torequest from a specific agency. In this respect, the Swedish government adjusts its requests for information to the agencies' tasks. The results from this study contribute to the ongoing debate on the application of performance management in a post-New Public Management setting.

This research contributes to the ongoing debate on the relationship between agency autonomy and organizational interaction. A comparative design that includes agency managers in Norway and Sweden describing organizational interaction, the measures used and their perceived quality, is applied. Based on observed significant country-related effects, a main conclusion is that strong formal and organizational safeguards of agency autonomy appear to produce positive views on organizational interaction. The unusually strong and clear boundaries that underpin the autonomy of Swedish central government agencies lowers the risks of interacting with others, protecting both turf and mandate.

This research concludes that the Swedish institution of Management by Objectives and Results (MBOR) has changed as a result of a top-down reform. The aim of the reform, which was to reduce the number of requests for performance information that the government makes to the central government agencies, has been successfully implemented. In analysing the national government's requests for performance information from 182 central government agencies (N=1752), this study confirms earlier claims of MBOR de-escalation. De-escalation is explained by stakeholder learning and the new policy that re-interprets performance management in terms that fit the ideals of New Public Governance. This research concludes that the size of an agency's budget has a positive effect on the total number of requests and the government's interest in quantitative performance indicators. Agency tasks that are relatively easy to measure and count have a significant positive effect on the number of government requests. Task is more important than budget size when governments decide what mix of indicators to request from a specific agency. In this respect, the Swedish government adjusts its requests for information to the agencies' tasks. The results from this study contribute to the ongoing debate on the application of performance management in a post-New Public Management setting.

This report has been prepared for the European Commission, DGEmployment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (unit F1. ESF and FEAD Policy and Legislation EMPL-F1-UNIT@ec.europa.eu) under the Contract VC/2016/0492 " Support for developing better country knowledge on public administration and institutional capacity building" (EUPACK) , by the consortium of: ° The European Institute of Public Administration (The Netherlands), Nick Thijs - project leader ; ° Hertie School of Governance (Germany), Gerhard Hammerschmid – policy expert ; ° Ramboll Management Consulting (Denmark), Karin Attström – Monitoring & Evaluation Expert ; Support for developing better country knowledge on public administration and institutional capacity building" (EUPACK)

With New Public Management came the idea that public organizations should be led by professional managers, rather than by professionals. This has been referred to as new managerialism. This article explores how new managerialism may affect professional autonomy in a public organization that enjoys a high – and constitutionally protected – degree of organizational autonomy. A framework distinguishing between organizational and occupational professionalism is adopted, in a 10-year case study of the Swedish National Audit Office (SNAO). The study shows how the autonomy of professionals at the SNAO was highly restricted, while management control systems were continuously expanded. At the same time, SNAO performance has been reduced. For example, the SNAO has been criticized for its high overhead costs. The study presented in this article, shows the complex interplay between professionalism, new managerialism, and organizational performance. Based on the findings from this study, the article maintains that it is equally important to consider how autonomy is distributedwithinagencies, as it is to consider how autonomy is distributed between the political sphere and the administration, when trying to explain organizational performance.

Performance audit has become increasingly common in the public administration and every western democracy has today an independent National Audit Office (NAO). However, although the external requirements may be met, the functioning of these agencies may be jeopardized by internal and more subtle cultural factors relating to the role of the performance auditor. In Sweden, a new NAO called Riksrevisionen was formed in 2003, with the merger of the two former agencies for national audit. In mergers, extensive resistance often arises in the horizontal dimension running between the merging organizations. In this case, however, the horizontal resistance was soon replaced by resistance in a vertical dimension, running between the three Auditor-Generals on the one hand and the auditors on the other hand. In this paper, we attempt to explain why this opposition occurred. A five year case study of the formation of the Swedish NAO has been conducted. Internal documents have also be scrutinized, as well as employee attitude surveys. It is concluded that the status of the auditor at the Swedish NAO has been hollowed out and hierarchy has increased. It is also noted that there has been a long-lasting dispute over what kind of audits should be conducted, where the Auditor-Generals have attempted to transform the previous audit approach with an approach more similar to compliance audit. Auditors have consistently objected, but some critics have been met with sanctions. In a recent parliamentary commission the argument raised by auditors was supported and the Auditor-Generals were requested to align. The study shows how the independence of the NAO is jeopardized with the de-professionalization of auditors and it also illustrates how professional and cultural factors may harm the outcome of public sector reform.

This article analyzes civil–military relations and the issue of civilian control through the lens of new managerialism. It illustrates that the means and mechanisms applied by governments to govern the military actually shape its organization and affect its functions in ways not always acknowledged in the civil–military debate. We start by illustrating the gradual introduction of management reforms to the Swedish Armed Forces and the growing focus on audit and evaluation. The article thereafter analyzes the consequences of these managerialist trends for the most central installation of the armed forces–its headquarters. It further exemplifies how such trends affect the work of professionals at the military units. In conclusion, managerialist reforms have not only changed the structure of the organization and the relationship between core and support functions but have also placed limits on the influence of professional judgment.

This article analyzes civil–military relations and the issue of civilian control through the lens of new managerialism. It illustrates that the means and mechanisms applied by governments to govern the military actually shape its organization and affect its functions in ways not always acknowledged in the civil–military debate. We start by illustrating the gradual introduction of management reforms to the Swedish Armed Forces and the growing focus on audit and evaluation. The article thereafter analyzes the consequences of these managerialist trends for the most central installation of the armed forces–its headquarters. It further exemplifies how such trends affect the work of professionals at the military units. In conclusion, managerialist reforms have not only changed the structure of the organization and the relationship between core and support functions but have also placed limits on the influence of professional judgment. ; Governing public professions: Performance management and professional autonomy in the police and military

The purpose of this article is to analyse the effects of New Public Management (NPM) reforms on three specific professional groups. From this investigation it is clear that the assumptions inherent in the NPM reforms have resulted in a clear breach of what we theoretically refer to as the professional contract between the state and the professions. We show in this analysis that our studied professional groups have lost central aspects of their professional autonomy. We problematize the perception that an ever-increasing demand for steering and control of professionals within the public sector should be perceived as something exclusively good. In addition to the costs of monitoring, the centrally important paradox of accountability should be taken into consideration, i.e. responsible interpretation and application of external accountability demands rest on the cultivation of the virtues that support good administrative judgement, the type of judgement that is threatened by the control-schemes presented in this article. ; Demokrati och deprofessionalisering