Suchergebnisse

In the comparative political economy of rich democracies there is a long tradition of classifying countries into one of a small number of categories based on their economic institutions and policies. The most recent of these is the Varieties of Capitalism project, which posits two major clusters of nations: coordinated and liberal market economies. This classification has generated controversy. We leverage recent advances in mixture model-based clustering to see what the data say on the matter. We find that there is considerable uncertainty around the number of clusters and, barring a few cases, which country should be placed in which cluster. Moreover, when viewed over time, both the number of clusters and country membership change considerably. As a result, arguments about who has the "right" typology are misplaced. We urge caution in using these country classifications in structuring qualitative inquiry and discourage their usage as indicator variables in quantitative analysis, especially in the context of time-series cross-section data. We argue that the real value of both Esping-Andersen's work and the Varieties of Capitalism project consists of their theoretical contributions and heuristic classification of ideal types.

The item count technique (ICT-MLE) regression model for survey list experiments depends on assumptions about responses at the extremes (choosing no or all items on the list). Existing list experiment best practices aim to minimize strategic misrepresentation in ways that virtually guarantee that a tiny number of respondents appear in the extrema. Under such conditions both the "no liars" identification assumption and the computational strategy used to estimate the ICT-MLE become difficult to sustain. I report the results of Monte Carlo experiments examining the sensitivity of the ICT-MLE and simple difference-in-means estimators to survey design choices and small amounts of non-strategic respondent error. I show that, compared to the difference in means, the performance of the ICT-MLE depends on list design. Both estimators are sensitive to measurement error, but the problems are more severe for the ICT-MLE as a direct consequence of the no liars assumption. These problems become extreme as the number of treatment-group respondents choosing all the items on the list decreases. I document that such problems can arise in real-world applications, provide guidance for applied work, and suggest directions for further research.

The item count technique (ICT-MLE) regression model for survey list experiments depends on assumptions about responses at the extremes (choosing no or all items on the list). Existing list experiment best practices aim to minimize strategic misrepresentation in ways that virtually guarantee that a tiny number of respondents appear in the extrema. Under such conditions both the "no liars" identification assumption and the computational strategy used to estimate the ICT-MLE become difficult to sustain. I report the results of Monte Carlo experiments examining the sensitivity of the ICT-MLE and simple difference-in-means estimators to survey design choices and small amounts of non-strategic respondent error. I show that, compared to the difference in means, the performance of the ICT-MLE depends on list design. Both estimators are sensitive to measurement error, but the problems are more severe for the ICT-MLE as a direct consequence of the no liars assumption. These problems become extreme as the number of treatment-group respondents choosing all the items on the list decreases. I document that such problems can arise in real-world applications, provide guidance for applied work, and suggest directions for further research.

Decades of research across several disciplines have produced substantial evidence that labor unions, on balance, reduce economic disparities. But unions are complicated, multifaceted organizations straddling markets and politics. Much of their equality-promoting influence occurs through their ability to reduce class-based inequity in politics and public policy. Declining unionization across much of the developed world is eroding workers' bargaining power. Reduced economic leverage puts pressure on union solidarity and weakens labor-based political movements. Important research design problems and significant heterogeneity across unions, regions, countries, and time imply a continued need for more work.

This article uses a transactions approach to examine the ability of governments to develop and sustain negotiated solutions to major economic challenges. Where actors are embedded in long-term, repeated interaction, have long time horizons, and invest in monitoring and enforcement technologies, effective political exchange is more likely. In good transactions environments, policy bargains will be more easily renegotiated and therefore more flexible and durable. To examine the expectations the author looks to the puzzle posed by events in Australia and New Zealand, 1983-1996. Facing similar macroeconomic crises and with historically similar wage bargaining institutions and levels of union density both elect Labor governments, which then make opposite choices: A negotiated solution emerged in Australia but not in New Zealand. Relying on the secondary literature and interviews with key actors, the author finds support for the transactions approach. Findings here point to ways in which to broaden the study of so-called social pacts. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

This article uses a transactions approach to examine the ability of governments to develop and sustain negotiated solutions to major economic challenges. Where actors are embedded in long-term, repeated interaction, have long time horizons, and invest in monitoring and enforcement technologies, effective political exchange is more likely. In good transactions environments, policy bargains will be more easily renegotiated and therefore more flexible and durable. To examine the expectations the author looks to the puzzle posed by events in Australia and New Zealand, 1983-1996. Facing similar macroeconomic crises and with historically similar wage bargaining institutions and levels of union density both elect Labor governments, which then make opposite choices: A negotiated solution emerged in Australia but not in New Zealand. Relying on the secondary literature and interviews with key actors, the author finds support for the transactions approach. Findings here point to ways in which to broaden the study of so-called social pacts.

Encompassing labor movements and coordinated wage setting are central to the social democratic economic model that has proven successful among the nations of Western Europe. The coordination of wage bargaining across many unions and employers has been used to explain everything from inequality to unemployment. Yet there has been limited theoretical and quantitative empirical work exploring the determinants of bargaining coordination. I argue formally that more unequally distributed resources across unions should inhibit the centralization of strike powers in union federations. Using membership as a proxy for union resources, I find empirical evidence for this hypothesis in a panel of 15 OECD democracies, 1950–2000. I then show that the centralization of strike powers is a strong predictor of coordinated bargaining.

Formal policy agreements between governments and major peak associations -- social pacts -- are a useful way to explore issues of election-induced variation in economic policymaking. I argue that pacts are part of an electoral strategy for political parties. They are one way a party can convince voters that economic outcomes under its rule will be better than those under a challenger. I show that pacts can emerge as part of equilibrium behavior in a repeated game but only if the policymaker is sufficiently willing to work with unions. There is no reason for a pact to exist in the absence of electoral incentives. I hypothesize that pacts are more likely to be struck nearer to elections and with greater Left participation in government. Using an original dataset on social pacts in the OECD, 1974-2000, I find evidence that the onset of pacts is related to elections, partisanship, and EMU convergence pressures. Adapted from the source document.