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The rise of militant jihadist groups is one of the greatest international security crises in the world today. In civil wars across the modern Muslim world, Islamist groups have emerged out of the ashes, surged dramatically to power, and routed their rivals on the battlefield. From North Africa to the Middle East to South Asia, these jihadist groups have seized large swaths of territory and consolidated political control over disparate ethnic and tribal communities. Out of the most broken and ungovernable places on earth, they have built radical new jihadist proto-states out of enduring anarchy. Why have these ideologically-inspired Islamists been able to build state-like polities out of enduring civil war stalemate, while so many other powerful armed groups have failed to gain similar traction? What makes jihadists win? In Jihad & Co., Aisha Ahmad argues that there are hard economic reasons behind Islamist success. By tracking the financial origins of jihadists in Afghanistan, Somalia, Pakistan, Mali, and Iraq she uncovers the secret role an important but often-overlooked class plays in bringing Islamist groups to power: the local business community. To uncover the hidden nexus between business and Islamist interests in civil war, Ahmad journeys into war-torn bazaars to meet with these jihadists and the smugglers who financed their rise to power. From the arms markets in the Pakistani border region to the street markets of Mogadishu, their stories reveal a powerful economic logic behind the rise of Islamist power in civil wars. Behind the fiery rhetoric and impassioned ideological claims is the cold hard cash of the local war economy. By bringing the reader from the mosque to the market, Ahmad explains exactly why business, far more than religion, explains the rise of militant Islamist power across the modern Muslim world.

One of the most frustrating features of modern jihadist insurgencies is their ability to endure and resurge, even after seeming defeats. What explains this jihadist resilience? In this paper, I present a new "boom–bust" economic theory for why jihadist groups can withstand serious losses, survive periods of decline, and then reclaim power. Using new evidence from Somalia, I demonstrate that jihadists learn how to adapt to fluctuations in their degree of territorial control, so that they can survive—and even thrive—during periods of decline. During a "boom" period, when jihadists enjoy a monopoly on force, they tax and govern as a proto-state. However, during a "bust," when they are pushed out of power, jihadists shift their efforts to illicit business activities and insurgent warfare. When pressure abates, they again shift back to taxing and governing as a proto-state. This cyclical and long-term approach to order-making allows jihadists to adapt to changing battlefield conditions and survive serious setbacks. Jihadists establish their proto-states to varying degrees, governing in pockets and coves wherever and whenever the opportunities present themselves. They are as orderly as they can afford to be.

In recent years, jihadists across the world have transformed their gendered violence, shocking the world by breaking from prior taboos and even celebrating abuses that they had previously prohibited. This behavior is surprising because jihadists represent a class of insurgents that are deeply bound by rules and norms. For jihadists, deviating from established Islamist doctrines is no easy feat. What then explains these sudden transformations in the rules and norms governing jihadist violence? An inductive investigation of contemporary jihadist violence in Pakistan and Nigeria reveals a new theory of jihadist normative evolution. Data from these cases show that dramatic changes in jihadist violence occur when an external trigger creates an expanded political space for jihadist entrepreneurs to do away with normative constraints on socially prohibited types of violence. As these jihadist leaders capitalize on the triggers, they are able to encourage a re-socialization process within their ranks, resulting in the erosion of previously held taboos, the adoption of proscribed behaviors, and the emergence of toxic new norms.

The security crises facing the Middle East and North Africa are among the most complex and volatile in the world today. These protracted conflicts are shaped by a range of catalysts, including state failure, environmental stress, entrenched criminal war economies, ethnic and tribal hostilities, and ideological extremism. Not only are these highly fragmented conflicts, but the multiple actors in each of these theatres also have transnational linkages that trigger contagion effects across state borders. To understand these new twenty-first century security crises, scholars and policy practitioners alike require modern analytical tools. Gone are the days when Canadian foreign policy experts could rely on classic state-based models to explain and predict global violence. To address these contemporary challenges, Canada must adopt a forward-looking approach to the Middle East and North Africa, which does not shy away from the compound and multidimensional challenges that these complex environments present.

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms constitutes the fundamental value system of our nation. The rise of anti-Muslim extremism thus presents a direct challenge to the core principles that define our liberal democracy. As our international order transforms, power polarities shift, and illiberal ideas spread across North America and Western Europe, maintaining commitment to these core Canadian values will become increasingly difficult. If our chief allies enact policies against their minority Muslim populations in the name of security, Canada will be put under pressure to do the same here at home, with devastating consequences for our democracy. Moreover, how Canada responds to the complex and multilayered crises that have gripped many parts of the modern Muslim world will have grave implications for both domestic and international security. Ideologically-motivated slogans do nothing to keep Canadians safe. It is therefore crucial that Canada continues to reject illiberal extremism and champions evidence-based international security policies, with a heavy investment in detailed ground-level analysis of these complex conflict theatres.

In civil wars across the world, certain Islamist groups have competed exceptionally well against their rivals. The conventional wisdom points to either religion or ethnic politics to explain Islamist success. These ideological and identity-based explanations, however, tend to overlook the powerful economic influence that the local business class has over civil war outcomes. Civil war can be modeled as a market for security, wherein protection must be purchased from multiple substate rackets. Using this market model, a close investigation of the Somali case reveals why and under what conditions the interests of the profit-driven business class align with those of ideologically motivated Islamist groups. Security costs are of critical importance to businesses in a civil war, and Islamists are uniquely competitive in lowering these costs. The business-Islamist alliance is therefore driven by rational, economic considerations, which can contribute to the rise of Islamist power.

For small groups fighting in multi-actor civil wars, joining a larger coalition is often a way to survive. Yet, it is not only rebel or pro-government non-state armed groups that form alliances; in many cases, jihadists have been surprisingly successful in building winning coalitions in civil wars. This is puzzling because jihadists attract fierce international opposition and are therefore very risky teams to join. Jihadists are also typically excluded from the political process, which means that they are unlikely to enjoy the spoils of a peace agreement. Why then would any local groups choose to join jihadist coalitions, rather than other rebel or pro-government coalitions in a conflict theatre? In this paper, we argue that ideology fails to explain this choice; rather, we contend that competition among rebel and pro-government coalitions inevitably produces winners and losers. Under these conditions, jihadists serve as an attractive spoiler coalition, drawing support from groups that see no chance of benefitting from an existing or future peace agreement. By offering these 'losers' a wider network and reference group, jihadists can expand their coalition base and territorial reach. By courting support from marginalized groups across ethnic and tribal lines, jihadists can create a winning coalition out of a diverse mix of losers.