Suchergebnisse

Adaptations of political actors and organizations in Asian democratic countries to the media and social media logics have been increasingly visible. This article is specified to answer the following questions of how Indonesian political parties' leaders and presidential candidates after 2004 Indonesian presidential election adapted to the news and social media logics and what drove such adaptations. Focusing on such questions, this article adopts theoretical models of mediatisation of politics formulated by Mazzoleni and Schulz, Strömbäck and Stromback and Van Aelts and extracts in-depth interview data derived from six Indonesian political parties' leaders, two political consultants and six senior journalists associated with Indonesian media using the qualitative content and thematic analyses. The findings are as follows. These political parties' leaders and presidential candidates favoured adapting to the news and social media logics when they got to deal with political issues and affairs, formulate political policies and secure their personal images in Indonesian political sphere. Such development was driven by the following factors, including establishing democratic political and media systems, increasing the roles of the media as sources of political information, escalating freedoms of Indonesian media and journalists to manage the media logic. Theoretical implications are chronicled and research recommendations are displayed.

The Internet and social media have been increasingly adopted by political entities across the globe. The consequences of such adaptations on the Indonesia's nation-state narrative and liberal democratic norms have been under-researched however. This article argues that in democratic countries, such adaptations are likely to pave the way for the emergences of disinformation order and social media algorithmic trap. Within the specific context of Indonesia's democracy, these disinformation order and social media algorithmic trap are likely to polarize political spheres and jeopardize not merely Indonesia's united nation-state narrative, but also Indonesia's liberal democratic norms that evolved since the post-reform era. To evaluate such propositions, this article adopts a desk study and selects Jakarta's 2017 Gubernatorial Election as a study case. Learning from these desk study and study case, this article proposes the following arguments. To manage the consequences of disinformation order and social media algorithmic trap on politics and democracy, we need formulate new political communication and policy research agenda based on the following dictum: who get lost by what/whom in which channel/medium and with what effects. Taking such effort may give us an opportunity to keep the current Indonesia's united nation-state narrative prevailing and liberal democratic norms flourishing.

Presidential rhetoric evolved across the globe. Knowledge regarding the ways the presidents in democratic countries, which followed the presidential government system, such as Indonesia, advanced Aristotelian rhetorical leadership models in the covid-19 pandemic era, has, however, under-developed. Selecting president Joko Widodo (Jokowi) as a study case, this work raises the following question: what types of Aristotelian rhetorical leadership models performed by Jokowi before and after semi-lock down policy (PSBB) and how did he advance such rhetorical leaderships models? Focusing on such questions, this work adopts the president's rhetorical leadership models, posited by Teten (2007) and Aristotelian rhetoric models, formulated by Gottweis (2007), as a conceptual framework. The materials posted in official Facebook pages of president Joko Widodo were extracted using the classic content and the qualitative and thematic content analyses. The findings are follows. Soon after the covid-19 pandemic outbreak took place in Indonesia, he attempted to develop the following types of rhetorical leadership, which are the identification, the authority and the directive rhetoric and the etho -logo-, and patho-centric Aristotelian rhetoric. Based on Indonesia case, this work offers the following knowledge contribution. It gives us new knowledge of 9 Aristotelian rhetorical leadership models, which are the etho-, logo- and patho-centric identification rhetoric, the etho-, logo- and patho-centric authority rhetoric and the etho-, logo- and patho-centric directive rhetoric models. Not merely the presidents, but also the local governments' leaders could adopt such rhetoric models when they want to resolve diverse issues resulting from the pandemic.

Presidential rhetoric evolved across the globe. Knowledge regarding the ways the presidents in democratic countries, which followed the presidential government system, such as Indonesia, advanced Aristotelian rhetorical leadership models in the covid-19 pandemic era, has, however, under-developed. Selecting president Joko Widodo (Jokowi) as a study case, this work raises the following question: what types of Aristotelian rhetorical leadership models performed by Jokowi before and after semi-lock down policy (PSBB) and how did he advance such rhetorical leaderships models? Focusing on such questions, this work adopts the president's rhetorical leadership models, posited by Teten (2007) and Aristotelian rhetoric models, formulated by Gottweis (2007), as a conceptual framework. The materials posted in official Facebook pages of president Joko Widodo were extracted using the classic content and the qualitative and thematic content analyses. The findings are follows. Soon after the covid-19 pandemic outbreak took place in Indonesia, he attempted to develop the following types of rhetorical leadership, which are the identification, the authority and the directive rhetoric and the etho -logo-, and patho-centric Aristotelian rhetoric. Based on Indonesia case, this work offers the following knowledge contribution. It gives us new knowledge of 9 Aristotelian rhetorical leadership models, which are the etho-, logo- and patho-centric identification rhetoric, the etho-, logo- and patho-centric authority rhetoric and the etho-, logo- and patho-centric directive rhetoric models. Not merely the presidents, but also the local governments' leaders could adopt such rhetoric models when they want to resolve diverse issues resulting from the pandemic.

Populism has been evolving across the globe. Knowledge of the ways and degree to which political actors in Asian democracy exploited anti-establishment views, secular nationalism and Islamism as ideational elements when they established populist political communication strategies for local elections has, however, been under-developed. Focusing on such issues, this work selects gubernatorial candidates who ran in Indonesia's 2018 gubernatorial elections as cases, using extracts from materials they posted on their Facebook pages. The findings are as follows. Candidates did not merely advocate anti-establishment views, but also adopted secular nationalism and Islamism as ideational-populist elements for developing populist political communication strategies. Those who exploited anti-economic elites favoured establishing secular nationalist and Islamic-based populist political communication strategies inclusively. Those who propagated anti-economic, anti-political and anti-bureaucratic elites instead greatly preferred advancing an Islamic populist political communication strategy. However, through employing such efforts, only few succeeded in these elections.

This article proposes the notion of the professional political pollster as a liberal democratic epistemic community. It examines transformations of Indonesian political pollster organisations in the last decade of the Soeharto era and in the post-Soeharto era. The findings extracted from the academic and mainstream media reports and the in-depth interview data collected from seven political pollsters associated with prominent Indonesian polling organisations are as follows. In the last decade of the Soeharto era, professional political pollsters visibly evolved but played less significant roles in Indonesian politics. As the Soeharto regime collapsed, they gradually had more substantial roles in Indonesian electoral politics and took shape as a robust and convergent liberal democratic epistemic community. After Indonesia's 2004 presidential election, most of them not only turned into political consultants but also engaged in a pollster war. This made them take shape as not only a fragile but also a divergent liberal democratic epistemic community. A set of recommendations is proposed to tackle this problem.