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Abstract
This article focuses on how Sweden, as a member of the European Union, has acted as a broker between the conflicting justice notions of developing and developed wto members. Drawing on the author's experiences as a participating Swedish trade negotiator, the article concentrates on selected Swedish actions and measures taken between the inception of the wto in 1995 and 2008, when the latest, and probably also last, full attempt to move the Doha round to a close ended in failure. Have the measures taken contributed to a reduction of the conflicting justice notions, and if so, how has this impacted on the process and the outcome? In addition, the article examines the question of how the pursuit of justice, and the management of conflicting justice notions, can aid practitioners to set up more efficient negotiation processes which lead to higher quality and more durable outcomes.

Abstract
The informal WTO ministerial meeting in July 2008 brought the long stalled Doha Round to the verge of a breakthrough. The reason for its final failure was substantive and not related to the negotiating procedures, which previously had contributed to meager results and failures in the round. The meeting was conducted using procedures that ensured a considerable amount of trustworthiness, transparency and legitimacy, which in turn contributed to effectiveness in the process. Thus, the meeting solved many, albeit not all, outstanding issues on the path towards agreement on so-called modalities for agriculture and industrial products, which in turn would have been necessary for a final successful conclusion of the Round. The 2008 July negotiations demonstrated that complex large-scale multilateral negotiations can be handled procedurally in an acceptable and successful way. The article advances a neglected interpretation of the July meeting, and provides lessons for both future WTO negotiations and multilateral negotiations in other policy areas.

THIS ARTICLE MAKES A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES (GATS), THAT CAME INTO FORCE IN 1995, AND THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT) OF 1947. IT COMPARES REGIME CREATION UNDER AN AFTER ALLEGED US HEGEMONY AND THE ANALYSIS CONCENTRATES ON US CONSIDERATIONS. IT SHOWS THAT THE SHIFT FROM A HEGEMONIC TO A MULTIPOLAR POWER STRUCTURE HAS AFFECTED BOTH THE FORM AND CONTENT OF VATS, AS COMPARED TO GATT. A CHANGE OF EMPHASIS FORM DIFFUSE TOWARDS SPECIFIC RECIPROCITY CAN BE NOTED. THIS HAS RESULTED IN A WEAKENING OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION, AS EMBODIED IN THE RULES ON MOST-FAVORED-NATION AND NATIONAL TREATMENT.

This article deals with small industrial states in the international political economy, with emphasis on their policies under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). According to derivations from variants of hegemonic stability theory, small states are predicted to pursue mercantilist free-rider policies, i.e. implementing protection at home with impunity while enjoying free trade abroad. Since the trade policies of small industrial states are often very open, this prediction is inaccurate. The failure of the traditional theories may be explained by their neglect of the coercive nature of international leadership. Under coercive leadership small states become forced riders, i.e. they are forced to give up the mercantilist policy option. However, the systemic opportunities to free ride still affect the trade policies of small industrial states, even though more indirectly than traditionally assumed. Throughout the article, cases drawn from Swedish trade policy are used for illustrative purposes.