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This paper re-examines the issues involved in the design of a direct tax on consumption, an idea that has received a fair degree of acceptance in the transition countries over the past decade (e.g., tax reforms in Croatia and Moldova). First we argue that on the subject of equivalence among a set of taxes, the only meaningful comparison is along the ex-ante concept of equivalence, and not ex-post. The latter as we shall see requires highly implausible, and often arbitrary, choice scenarios. We carry out the analysis in a variety of models starting with the two-period consumption-saving choice under full certainty. However, a good part of the discussion is carried out where the portfolio choice behaviour is embedded in an intertemporal savings model that has been widely discussed in the literature. We then take up more complete (and necessarily more complex) choice situations for examination. Indeed the first of two variations of the above is a model where individuals make work-leisure (for a given skill level) as well as the safe-risky asset choice. The last is of risky human capital choice, where the physical investment is restricted to a single non-risky asset. For the purposes of the paper, the models are very general, and the precise choice context is open to wider interpretations than how they are actually phrased. In spite of our preoccupation with the efficiency aspects, we are interested in other important issues of equity, and those of an administrative nature. But our remarks on the latter fronts are limited to the insight that we directly gain from the analytics.

The idea of proportional representation has been circulating for over two hundred years and is widely practiced, among other, in post-war Europe. The primary focus is to allow smaller parties, minorities and other disenfranchised groups in society systematic representation in the national legislature. This paper proposes a novel idea of jurisdictional-level proportionality specifically targeted at federal systems. Emphasising the primacy of jurisdictions (namely provinces and states) within a federation, we use data on the voting pattern in each such jurisdiction to determine the allocation of elected delegates (or electoral seats for that matter) that would be utilized in the eventual makeup of the ruling government. The proposed scheme is the simplest that we know of. All it requires is the record of all votes cast by individuals in favour of the candidate of their choice in a given constituency. Our design ensures that the mechanism encompass the governance virtues such as (a) inclusivity and stability of the elected government, (b) accountability of elected delegates and their interface with voters, and (c) and fully conform to the principle of proportionality. In the parliamentary mode, while it may tend to predict minority governments more often, it allows each major party a greater degree of freedom to forge a ruling coalition. When reviewing the US Presidential election, it appears that the outcome here may change too, typically in favour of the plurality winner of nation-wide popular votes, even though the seat arithmetic is based on proportional votes within each state in the union.

This paper focuses on the role of institutions in poverty alleviation, where both poverty and institutions are interpreted broadly. The broadening of the poverty notion is important at least from the policy perspective. Even if one were convinced that higher growth would reduce income poverty to an acceptable margin, there appears to be little concrete policy measures that one may offer so as to harness greater growth. Besides, the weight of the empirical evidence to date, if not squarely founded on the transition economies of the EEFSU region, is that reducing average poverty is not enough. Existing and possibly rising inequality would ensure that a great many would fall through the cracks, and not benefit from high growth, even if that was achievable. The non-income elements of poverty, on the other hand, are more directly open to influence by policy interventions such as the easing of micro credit and other public and private ventures in health, sanitation, literacy and numeracy fronts. Finally the modest amount of information available at our disposal indicates that the underlying strength of the institutions (economic, political and social) is possibly the single most agent of significance to bring about the alleviation of non-income poverty. There is a further possibility that the same institutional forces would also materially affect the income measure of poverty as well in a discernible fashion.

This paper focuses on the role of 'institutions' in poverty alleviation, where both poverty and institutions are interpreted broadly. The broadening of the poverty notion is important at least from the policy perspective. Even if one were convinced that higher growth would reduce income poverty to an acceptable margin, there appears to be little concrete policy measures that one may offer so as to harness greater growth. Besides, the weight of the empirical evidence to date, if not squarely founded on the transition economies of the EEFSU region, is that reducing average poverty is not enough. Existing and possibly rising inequality would ensure that a great many would fall through the cracks, and not benefit from high growth, even if that was achievable. The non-income elements of poverty, on the other hand, are more directly open to influence by policy interventions such as the easing of microcredit and other public and private ventures in health, sanitation, literacy and numeracy fronts. Finally the modest amount of information available at our disposal indicates that the underlying strength of the institutions (economic, political and social) is possibly the single most agent of significance to bring about the alleviation of non-income poverty. There is a further possibility that the same institutional forces would also materially affect the income measure of poverty as well in a discernible fashion. – institutions ; poverty reduction ; growth

The importance of capital loss offset provisions in a world of risk is well documented in the tax literature. However, the potential deadweight losses owing to imperfect offset has not been fully explored. This paper develops a framework whereby that investigation can be carried out and utilizes numerical simulations to investigate the size of potential losses. Results show that when the government and private sector are equally efficient in handling market risk, welfare losses owing to the absence of offset provisions could be substantial. Under plausible assumptions about attitudes towards risk and time preference, and with a capital income tax rate of forty percent, over sixty cents per dollar of tax revenue raised would be dissipated. In contrast, full loss offset would reduce that loss to approximately fourteen cents.