Suchergebnisse

This paper studies the relationship between political competition & the size of distributive programs with different deadweight cost functions. This is done within an extended version of Becker's [Q. J. Econ. 98 (1983)] pressure group model that allows for endogenous political participation. It is shown that distributive programs that employ inefficient means of subsidization are relatively unlikely to be contested by both taxpayers & subsidy recipients, while the opposite is true for distributive programs that employ inefficient means of taxation. In addition, it is shown that the total social cost (TSC) -- including rent-seeking expenditures -- tends to be self-limiting in the absence of competition. 2 Tables, 1 Figure, 1 Appendix, 28 References. Adapted from the source document.

The purpose of this paper is to study formation of support & opposition to redistribution. We analyze a society with two groups of citizens & a government. The government distributes income from one group to the other in response to political pressure. The interaction between the groups is modeled as a two-stage game. In stage 1, the groups decide if they want to be politically active. In stage 2, the active group or groups seek influence on the direction & size of the transfer. We demonstrate that supporters of redistribution are always politically active, but that opposition is often absent. Moreover, when opposition is absent, there is a strong tendency for underdissipation of the transfer, while political competition typically leads to overdissipation. 5 Tables, 2 Figures, 37 References. Adapted from the source document.

The purpose of this paper is to study formation of support and opposition to redistribution. We analyze a society with two groups of citizens and a government. The government distributes income from one group to the other in response to political pressure. The interaction between the groups is modeled as a two‐stage game. In stage 1, the groups decide if they want to be politically active. In stage 2, the active group or groups seek influence on the direction and size of the transfer. We demonstrate that supporters of redistribution are always politically active but that opposition is often absent. Moreover, when opposition is absent there is a strong tendency for underdissipation of the transfer, while political competition typically leads to overdissipation.