Suchergebnisse

Many political scientists like institutions, in particular exog-
enous institutions, which guide and constrain actions and
allow scholars to concentrate more narrowly on behaviors
within well-defined settings. For the interest groups subfield,
institutions tend to be more mercurial than those in other
areas of American politics. For instance, fundamental aspects
of Congress may be institutionalized, but groups and lobby-
ists come and go. The environment of interests is ever
changing. Characterizing the interactions between legislators
and lobbyists is made more difficult because of the lack of
clear institutional structures that guide or constrain behav-
iors. The iron triangle concept was powerful and meaningful
because it provided at the least a loose framework for the
analysis of legislator-lobbyist interactions. Kevin Hula's new
book follows the reasoning of Hugh Heclo and William
Browne, who argue that the iron triangle concept is outdated
and inappropriate. That convenient metaphor suggested an
informal institutional structure that is simply no longer
appropriate. Without the iron triangle, what can fill the void?

In this article, the author uses probit models to test the hypothesis that the strength at the state level of a Union veterans group was correlated to legislators'votes on proposals to extend pension benefits. Results indicate that the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR), the veterans group in question, affected legislators' votes on both the Arrears Act of 1879 and the Disability Pension Act of 1890. The GAR was one of the first broadly based groups able to provide voters with an alternative, group-based linkage to their legislators. Within Congress, parties were surprisingly unorganized, allowing the GAR to strengthen its independence from strictly partisan coalitions. The author draws parallels between results here and results from other scholars' analyses of more recent group activity.

Numerous scholars view the late 1800s as a period o f considerable party influence and little group influence. I show that in the area o f pension policies for Union veterans, entrepreneurial group politics thrived in the late 1800s and rivalled party influence. A rational choice framework is used to analyze the ability of a lobbyist entrepreneur to profit from the complex interactions between Union veterans, Congress, the Pension Bureau, and the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR). I argue that lobbyist entrepreneurs operate with recognition of the opportunities for delegation from individuals to the group and from legislators to bureaus and groups. The viability of the group's linkage function depends upon the entrepreneur's abilities to master the intricacies of delegation.