Domestic conflicts over European integration: the case of Turkey
In: Conflicts in a transnational world: lessons from nations and states in transformation, S. 47-60
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In: Conflicts in a transnational world: lessons from nations and states in transformation, S. 47-60
In: UluslararasI Iliskiler, Band 2, Heft 5, S. 137-160
In: Perspectives on global development and technology: pgdt, Band 2, Heft 3-4, S. 409-429
ISSN: 1569-1500
In: Central Asian survey, Band 17, Heft 2, S. 267-284
ISSN: 1465-3354
In: Central Asian survey, Band 17, Heft 2, S. 267-284
ISSN: 0263-4937
In: Mediterranean quarterly: a journal of global issues, Band 9, Heft 1, S. 126-150
ISSN: 1047-4552
In: Orta Asya ve Kafkasya araştırmaları: Journal of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies, Band 7, Heft 14, S. 36-65
ISSN: 1306-682X
In: Orta Asya ve Kafkasya araştırmaları: Journal of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies, Band 6, Heft 12, S. 22-37
ISSN: 1306-682X
Since the 1990s, debates on a constitutional system reform in Turkey have ignited controversies over the executive structure of its parliamentary system. This article looks at the debate in terms of the interaction between institutional dynamics and politicians' choices, shaped by past institutional transformations following transitions. It is contended that institutional weaknesses underlying both the presidency and executive-legislative relations in Turkey have provided strong incentives for incumbent elites to challenge existing parliamentary norms and advocate presidential alternatives. Far from contributing to a sober diagnosis of the problems of parliamentarism, the recent constitutional amendment introducing a system of executive presidency has further divided Turkey's already polarized political and civil society.
BASE
Since the 1990s, debates on a constitutional system reform in Turkey have ignited controversies over the executive structure of its parliamentary system. This article looks at the debate in terms of the interaction between institutional dynamics and politicians' choices, shaped by past institutional transformations following transitions. It is contended that institutional weaknesses underlying both the presidency and executive-legislative relations in Turkey have provided strong incentives for incumbent elites to challenge existing parliamentary norms and advocate presidential alternatives. Far from contributing to a sober diagnosis of the problems of parliamentarism, the recent constitutional amendment introducing a system of executive presidency has further divided Turkey's already polarized political and civil society.
BASE