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The article investigates how rebel interdependencies shape civil war outcomes. The author argues that alliances between rebel groups will have serious repercussions on the management of conflict. By examining civil war outcomes between 1946 and 2008, the author shows that the presence of multiple groups, alliances among rebels, the cumulative capabilities of one's allies as well as the credibility and the durability of alliances shape war outcomes. Rebels have the means to avoid government defeat and continue conflict when the number of rebel groups the government has to confront simultaneously is high or when these groups cooperate against their common enemy. Findings show that while termination by peace agreement is unlikely for allied rebels, specifically for those that have enduring relationships, rebels with access to high levels of ally capabilities along with those who have credible alliance ties are likely to be the victors of war.

Whether they train police forces in Afghanistan or provide military assistance to governments in Africa that are battling rebel groups, private military and security companies (PMSCs), or corporations that provide security and military services for profit, have been present in numerous conflicts around the globe. In 1984 only one international PMSC intervened in a civil war; in 1989 there were 15 international PMSCs present in conflict zones, while from 2003 to 2019 over 120 of such companies provided services during the Iraq war. Why do international PMSCs sometimes help with conflict termination while in other cases their intervention is associated with prolonged wars? And in what ways does market competition affect PMSCs' military effectiveness?

Domestic terrorist groups, like all violent nonstate actors, compete with governments for their monopoly on violence and their legitimacy in representing the citizenry. Battle for Allegiance shows violence is neither the only nor the most effective way in which nonstate actors and governments work to achieve their goals. As much as nonviolent strategies are a rarely considered piece of the puzzle, the role of the audience is another crucial piece often downplayed in the literature. Many studies emphasize the interactions between the government and the terrorist group at the expense of the constituency, but the constituency is the common cluster for both actors to gain legitimacy and to demand its allegiance. In fact, the competition between the two actors goes far beyond who is superior in terms of military force and tactics. The hardest battles are fought over the allegiance of the citizens. Using a multimethod approach based on exclusive interviews and focus groups from Turkey and large N original data from around the world, Seden Akcinaroglu and Efe Tokdemir present the first systematic empirical analysis of the ways in which terrorist groups, the government, and the citizens relate to each other in a triadic web of action. They study the nonviolent actions of terrorist groups toward their constituencies, the nonviolent actions of governments toward terrorists, and the nonviolent actions of governments toward the terrorist group's constituencies. By investigating the causes, targets, and consequences of accommodative actions, this book sheds light on an important, but generally ignored, aspect of terrorism: interactive nonviolent strategies.

Since the 1990s, private military and security companies (PMSCs) have intervened in civil wars around the globe. However, reports that such contractors have been responsible for human rights abuses have spurred the need to evaluate the industry's impact on conflicts. This book identifies two market forces that impact PMSCs' military effectiveness: local or conflict-level competition and global or industry-level competition. The book argues that competitive market pressure creates a strong monitoring system and that the company's corporate structure and external competitive environment in a given conflict help to explain the variance in accountability to clients. Including an analysis of data on international PMSCs' interventions in civil wars from 1990-2008, Seden Akcinaroglu and Elizabeth Radziszewski show the impact of competition on companies' contribution to the termination of different types of civil wars.

Why does one terrorist group employ actions that win the hearts and minds of its constituency while another resorts to tactics that alienate their support? The paper investigates terrorist groups' strategy of building reputation in their constituency/in-group population and non-constituency/out-group population. Studying all domestic terrorist groups between 1980 and 2011 with original data, we find that ethnic/religious groups and those with territorial control invest in positive reputation in their constituency as they can minimize the risks of returns. Radical groups and those with cross-border support, however, tend to build negative constituency reputation. While the former type of group has a small constituency, the latter ones can find resources across borders, which reduces their dependency on the constituency. Lastly, we find that terror groups seeking policy concessions avoid building a negative reputation in their non-constituency as this strategy enhances their chances of negotiating with the government.

We examine what leads states to accommodate enduring, international rivals in response to immediate threats. Drawing from network theory, we hypothesize that the direct and indirect ties the threatened state's rivals form with each other and with other states in the global system play a critical role in shaping crisis. A threatened state should be more likely to accommodate rivals with economic connections to other actors. These connections generate influence, through leverage or information that can lead to crisis de-escalation. A threatened state is less likely to accommodate a rival that has military alliances with other rivals because credible allies are less likely to respond to such overtures. We use network analysis and data from the post–Cold War era to support the argument, shedding light on the importance of local and global connectivity in conflict management.

Why does one terrorist group employ actions that win the hearts and minds of its constituency while another resorts to tactics that alienate their support? The paper investigates terrorist groups' strategy of building reputation in their constituency/in-group population and non-constituency/out-group population. Studying all domestic terrorist groups between 1980 and 2011 with original data, we find that ethnic/religious groups and those with territorial control invest in positive reputation in their constituency as they can minimize the risks of returns. Radical groups and those with cross-border support, however, tend to build negative constituency reputation. While the former type of group has a small constituency, the latter ones can find resources across borders, which reduces their dependency on the constituency. Lastly, we find that terror groups seeking policy concessions avoid building a negative reputation in their non-constituency as this strategy enhances their chances of negotiating with the government.

Violence against civilians is not the only tool among the arsenal of terrorists; it is only one of many. Up until now, there did not exist any quantitative data on the different strategies adopted by terror groups that measured the group's popularity or its public support. The Reputation of Terror Groups dataset (RTG) addresses this void. To understand which terror groups build different types of reputation, to analyze the consequences of reputation building and how reputation changes with and influences conflict dynamics, we need to be able to measure the loaded concept of reputation. RTG is the first systematic measure for the reputation of terror groups across countries or time. The dataset includes 443 terror groups operating across 31 years, which makes a total of 2,641 observations. The large sample size of the RTG dataset allows comparisons of popularity among groups. Additionally, the dataset adopts a multivariable approach by examining multiple aspects of both positive and negative reputation building. Another novelty of the dataset is its measure of reputation with regard to each target, mainly its constituency and target audience. The RTG data can help us come up with new and novel ways of understanding terror groups, and contribute to bridging the gap between micro- and mezzo-level studies in the literature by showing how terror groups adopt different strategies in their constituency and target audience to pursue their goals. In this article, we give an overview assessment of the RTG dataset, display some interesting trends in the data, and explain the data collection procedure, its challenges, and its limitations.

The article analyzes the impact of private military companies (PMCs) on the duration of civil wars in Africa from 1990 to 2008. We develop an "opportunity structure" theory to argue that while PMCs are profit-oriented entities, the prevalent opportunities in conflicts will determine how they behave in war zones. Empirical findings for civil wars with at least 1,000 battle deaths show that as level of competition among government-hired PMCs increases, they are more likely to deliver optimal services and help bring an end to violence. In the absence of competition, the prevalent structure creates opportunities for PMCs to underperform in order to maximize profits by staying in conflicts longer. The authors also show that swift cessation of hostilities could benefit those profit-seeking PMCs that are compensated with contracts to extract natural resources because resource extraction generates more wealth in peace time. In such cases, the prevalent opportunities in conflict create an incentive for companies to deliver optimal service and terminate hostilities. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

The article analyzes the impact of private military companies (PMCs) on the duration of civil wars in Africa from 1990 to 2008. We develop an "opportunity structure" theory to argue that while PMCs are profit-oriented entities, the prevalent opportunities in conflicts will determine how they behave in war zones. Empirical findings for civil wars with at least 1,000 battle deaths show that as level of competition among government-hired PMCs increases, they are more likely to deliver optimal services and help bring an end to violence. In the absence of competition, the prevalent structure creates opportunities for PMCs to underperform in order to maximize profits by staying in conflicts longer. The authors also show that swift cessation of hostilities could benefit those profit-seeking PMCs that are compensated with contracts to extract natural resources because resource extraction generates more wealth in peace time. In such cases, the prevalent opportunities in conflict create an incentive for companies to deliver optimal service and terminate hostilities.