Suchergebnisse

This study discusses basic trends in articles on legislative politics in Latin America published in twelve journals between 2000 and 2010. It examines the distribution of the articles over time and by journal, the authors' institutional affiliations and patterns of collaboration, the frequency with which various countries are studied, and common approaches and topics. The articles in this set are all peer-reviewed and published in English. Adapted from the source document.

Objective. To examine the relationship between firm-level cooperation, inequality, and redistribution in 18 advanced industrialized democracies. Methods. The relationships are investigated using multiple regression analyses of institutional, political, and economic variables. Results. Multilevel models reveal that contrary to neocorporatism, firm-level cooperative ties have significant inegalitarian effects, particularly in the distribution of pretax, pretransfer market income. The effects, however, are also felt in the distribution of posttax, posttransfer income. Conclusion. By paying attention to the effect of firm-level cooperation, the study sheds new light on inequality in the OECD as a result of both market-based and nonmarket coordination. Adapted from the source document.

The literature on labor politics explains cooperation among unions, employers and state representatives in new democracies as a function of alliances between politically influential unions and left governments. This article introduces an original dataset of labor agreements in new democracies (1994—2004). Using Boolean analysis, it shows that while left governments are typically associated with more labor market regulation, they are not sufficient for social pacts to emerge in new democracies. Instead, protective labor market institutions and practices explain most instances of cooperation. Further analysis reveals this to be the case for all types of pacts analyzed.

This paper focuses on congressional politics in Chile before and after the 1973 coup. It challenges a common perspective that sees the congressional decay of the early 1970s as being caused by stringent limits on particularistic bills and by presidents with wide-ranging formal prerogatives. It presents an alternative argument that focuses on electoral competition and ideological radicalisation, derives testable implications, and provides the first empirical comparison of legislative behaviour before and after the 1973 coup. The evidence, which centres on the analysis of policy networks derived from the joint sponsorship of legislation, appears incompatible with the implications of the conventional argument. Adapted from the source document.

This article studies the effect of recent labor market reforms on industrial relations in new democracies (1994-2003). The literature on labor politics posits two channels through which labor market deregulation may relate to industrial conflict. Wage deregulation may lower wage costs, increasing industrial conflict. Employment deregulation, however, can reduce the ability of workers to act collectively. Using methods uniquely suited for panel data analysis, the study reveals a number of important findings. First, whereas labor quiescence went hand in hand with relatively modest increases in earnings in a number of established democracies, modest wage increases are generally linked with more labor militancy in new democracies. Higher wage and employment regulation minimize wage reductions, lowering the incidence of strikes. Finally, wage regulation has the largest effect on aggregate wages and consequently on the incidence of strikes and lockouts. Adapted from the source document.