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As NATO commemorated its 75th anniversary this month, the direction of the alliance's posture toward the Arctic region has been called into question. The recent accession of Sweden means that seven of eight of the world's Arctic nations fall under NATO's security umbrella, with Russia being the outlier. While some analysts see the addition of Sweden and Finland as an opportunity for NATO to "increase its footprint" and "deter Russia," the last thing the alliance needs is to scour for another avenue for confrontation with Russia. Sweden and Finland's NATO membership undoubtedly affects the alliance's influence in the Arctic. In March, over 20,000 NATO soldiers from 13 nations, including Finland, Sweden, and the United States, participated in the latest leg of the ongoing Nordic Response 2024 exercise in Norway. Additionally, over 50 frigates, submarines, and other vessels, as well as over 100 aircraft, were involved in the exercise. Ultimately, Nordic Response 2024 will involve over 90,000 troops from all 32 NATO allies. Defensive exercises are a necessary feature of NATO's newly increased Arctic presence, but the Russian threat in the Arctic should not be inflated.The Arctic served as a frontline in the confrontation between NATO and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Over several decades, Russia has revitalized Soviet-era Arctic bases, which outnumber NATO's by about a third. In recent years, Russia has launched significant investment projects and built up its military presence in the Arctic as it develops a crucial northern maritime route linking Asia and Europe. The United States only has one operational heavy icebreaker — compared to the 40 that Russia currently maintains. Irrespective of hawks sounding the alarm about Russia's supposed "militarization" and "dominance" of the Arctic, Russia retains a relative incapacity to threaten a conventional military land incursion into European Arctic territory. Moscow's military efforts in the Arctic have been mainly defensive in nature as it has established multi-layered anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities around the Kola Peninsula, a fundamental Russian interest. Such developments pose little threat to the United States and its NATO allies, especially as Russia is bogged down in Ukraine. Moreover, given that Russia's Arctic coastline is ten times longer than America's, the "icebreaker gap" is to be expected. Russia's fleet of icebreakers is primarily dedicated to escorting commercial shipping through dangerous polar seas. Otherwise, it performs the same missions as the U.S. Coast Guard: "search and rescue, anti-smuggling, oil spill response, and resupply of remote coastal communities and polar research stations." Regarding force projection capabilities, the American-dominated NATO nuclear submarine fleet outmatches the opposing Northern Fleet of the Russian navy.On top of NATO's military capabilities, the alliance's most influential member, the United States, has placed little military importance on the Arctic. Russia's inability to pose severe threats in the Arctic has led to the region appearing at the bottom of the list in the 2022 Biden-Harris National Security Strategy (NSS) overview of regional policies. In addition, the document lacks any language regarding deterring threats to Arctic allies and partners.Rather than seeing the addition of Finland and Sweden as an opportunity to increase the militarization of the Arctic, NATO should work toward utilizing working groups like the Arctic Council to forge multilateral arrangements to reduce tensions, avoid crises, and mitigate the risks of conflict through an accident or miscalculation. In February, Russia suspended annual payments to the Arctic Council until "real work resumes with the participation of all member countries." Yet, while Russia removed several listed multilateral formats from its official Arctic strategy, it kept the point of "the Arctic Council as the key regional platform coordinating international activities in the region." Thus, Russia doesn't appear poised to form an alternative platform. Tensions are high, and Arctic Council cooperation with Moscow effectively ceased after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. Despite this, the Council should refrain from pushing out the largest Arctic player and severing an essential communication channel. Deepening isolation has pushed Russia to look east for partners in the Arctic, namely China. Further ostracization will only incentivize Russia to coordinate more with Beijing in the region. Russia and NATO share an interest in maintaining peace in the Arctic region. A war in such terrain would be extremely costly and difficult for both sides. Furthermore, the Arctic Council has facilitated the improvement of marine safety in the Bering Strait, where the U.S. and Russia share a maritime border. Communication channels and shared objectives must also be kept open to keep the peace there.Amid a worsening situation in Ukraine, escalation in the Arctic region would do no favors for the United States or its NATO allies. Russia's considerable influence in the Arctic is not going to change in the near future. Therefore, taking advantage of existing channels will enable the West to signal to Russia that NATO does not intend to engage in offensive operations but is fully prepared to defend its interests.

Three Baltic foreign ministers gathered earlier this week to make the case for embracing Ukraine's maximalist war aims and pursuing a total defeat of Russia."Ukraine is not fighting for their own freedom; Ukraine is fighting instead of us," Estonian FM Margus Tsahkna proclaimed when he joined the FMs of Latvia,and Lithuania at the hawkish Hudson Institute think tank on Monday to share their perspectives on security issues in Northern Europe.The Baltic officials also argued for the continuous expansion of NATO to deter Vladimir Putin — including eventually allowing Ukraine to join the alliance—and the necessity for "American leadership" in NATO.Yet many of these talking points are detached from actual reality on the ground in Ukraine and will only perpetuate the cycle of violence in Eastern Europe.The three Baltic FMs said that Ukraine's total victory is imperative for peace in Europe and security for NATO. FM Tsahkna's eight-point plan for Ukrainian victory advocates for further sanctions on Russia, utilizing frozen Russian assets for Ukraine's reconstruction, incorporating Ukraine into both the EU and NATO, and relying on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's peace plan as the only way to preserve Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The ministers also agreed that a peace plan without Russia's total defeat would only delay inevitable future invasions from Russia. "Cutting a deal would be great for the autocrats," Latvian foreign minister Krišjānis Kariņš said as he noted that the world is actively observing the war in Ukraine. In the eyes of the Baltic FMs, only a hard power "containment" strategy can deter Vladimir Putin's imperial ambitions. "We will have this Russia problem or challenge for a long time. NATO needs to focus on how to contain them for the next twenty years with strength," Kariņš continued. Peace in Europe depends solely on the threat of force. But Ukraine's prospects of total defeat of Russia are nonexistent. Kyiv has suffered massive losses, as Russia's capture of Avdiivka last month was Russia's most considerable territorial advance since its victory in Bakhmut in May 2023. Furthermore, Ukraine is running out of troops. The Ukrainian military has faced an average personnel shortage of 25% across its brigades and is unlikely to mobilize the required number of men to match Russia's manpower advantage. Draft dodging has become rampant throughout Ukraine as thousands have fled the country. As a result, Ukraine is on the brink of a demographic catastrophe, which would imperil Ukraine's future after the war concludes.Additionally, according to the Baltic FMs, Putin has been the best salesman for NATO expansion, given that both Finland and Sweden ended their many decades of neutrality and joined the alliance. "Russia has erased the idea of a neutral zone. It's either Europe and NATO or Russia," said Kariņš. Therefore, neutrality is not an option for a post-war Ukraine since neutrality serves as a "green light" for Putin to invade as he did in Georgia in 2008. The Lithuanian foreign minister Gabrielius Landsbergis went as far as to say that "European security architecture will not be whole, secure, or safe without Ukraine."Without a hard power deterrent, countries that have remained neutral, such as Georgia and Moldova, will fall next to Putin's aggression.While the foreign ministers of the Baltic countries made several references to Putin's imperialistic tendencies, they discounted the possibility that NATO expansion fanned the flames of Russian nationalism and expansion. As Dr. Joshua Shifrinson has highlighted, "Russian nationalism and imperialism did not develop in a vacuum." Instead, NATO expansion gave Russian nationalists a cause to rally behind as it reinforced their belief that Moscow's national interests were at stake. The Baltic FMs also insisted that there is no substitute for U.S. leadership. "Without U.S. leadership, I don't think we will have a happy ending," Landsbergis asserted. While the Baltic countries are doing their part by exceeding the 2% spending guideline, the United States must work to defend the "rules-based system" created by the United States following World War II. Russia is actively posing a "direct challenge to U.S. power and authority," as FM Kariņš puts it. Thus, the war in Ukraine is not only a regional problem but a global problem. Additionally, the way of life enjoyed in NATO countries, including in the Baltics, is also under direct threat.Despite NATO's technological and military superiority to Russia, the Baltic FMs worry that Putin expects the West to be politically unprepared. Russia's economy is geared toward war, given that nearly 40% of its budget is spent on defense. Russia's regular army is also expanding, signaling Russia's refusal to end the war effort and its potential to challenge the NATO alliance. Therefore, NATO must get up to speed and unite against the Russian threat. Lastly, the Lithuanian FM proposed that NATO members should restrict themselves when referring to the Russian missile that recently briefly entered Polish airspace. "I'm a proponent of not drawing red lines for ourselves. If we say specifically that we're not going to do A, B, C and make a whole list of things we are not going to do, it sounds like an invitation for Putin to try," Landsbergis said. But adopting an aggressive strategy is not the best path forward for NATO. Expanding the member base will not make its participants safer. Finland and Sweden's ascension into NATO ended many decades of neutrality, under which both countries have become prosperous democracies. It also elongated NATO's border with Russia by 820 miles. Adding more countries to the alliance, including Ukraine, will be more of a liability than an asset.Moreover, an aggressive force posture from NATO spearheaded by the United States is unnecessary to satisfy a "containment" strategy toward Russia. Despite its ability to adapt throughout the war, Russia has still fallen far short of its maximalist aims to subjugate Ukraine as a vassal state. U.S. aims in Europe have historically been counter-hegemonic. The current realities suggest that no European state can establish itself as a regional hegemon. Thus, Russia has little to no hope of defeating NATO through conventional means. There is an alternative option. Washington and Kyiv should pursue a diplomatic path to preserve Ukraine's sovereignty while avoiding a NATO-Russia conflict. There remain reasons for Russia to come to the negotiating table, given that Moscow wants to establish a "demilitarized zone," de facto Western acquiescence to Russian control of Crimea and the Donbas, and a legitimate role to play in Europe's security order. However, Kyiv and its allies should pursue this path urgently, as Ukraine's leverage will inevitably decrease over time.

As public support for Ukraine has waned over time, and Washington's policy elites are shifting their focus more toward the conflict in Gaza, an endgame for Ukraine is desperately needed. U.S. and European officials have reportedly broached the issue of possible peace negotiations with their Ukrainian counterparts. This begs the question: What could a peace treaty between Kyiv and Moscow look like? One historical instance stands out among many as a potential model for how the Russo-Ukrainian War could end.The "Winter War," or the Soviet-Finnish War that took place from November 1939 to March 1940 (and was renewed by the Finns as allies of Germany between June 1941 and September 1944), has drawn some comparisons with the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia. After Finland rejected an ultimatum to concede a considerable portion of its territory and the Soviet signing of the 1939 Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, Joseph Stalin's Red Army invaded Finland to install a puppet Communist Finnish government and eliminate a potentially hostile presence near the Soviet Union's second city and only Baltic port of Leningrad.Similar to the initial phase of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Soviet officials predicted that Helsinki would fall to Soviet troops in as little as three days. However, despite the Soviets outnumbering the Finns in soldiers by three to one, Helsinki succeeded in holding off the Red Army for more than three months, inflicting extremely heavy casualties on the invading forces. Though Finland was eventually defeated and forced to concede about 11 percent of its territory, the Finns scored a moral victory. It is widely considered that the grit and courage of Finland's resistance convinced Stalin that incorporating Finland into the Soviet Union or turning it into a Communist client state like Poland would be more trouble than it was worth. This also contributed to Stalin's eventual agreement to sign a peace treaty with Finland in 1944 in return for a small amount of additional territory and a commitment on Helsinki's part to neutrality. Finland thus became the only part of the former Russian Empire that was not reincorporated into the Soviet Union under Lenin and Stalin.Thereafter, Finland implemented the Paasikivi-Kekkonen doctrine, which aimed to preserve Finland's survival as an independent country by maintaining a neutral foreign policy stance, while Finnish nationalism became a central ideological and political driving force in Finnish society. The Soviet Union stuck to the terms of the treaty with Finland, and during the Cold War, Finland developed as a remarkably prosperous and successful Western democracy. On this basis, after the Cold War ended, Finland was able to join the European Union in 1995 and then NATO in 2023. While "Finlandization" was considered a pejorative suggestive of accommodation, if not appeasement among Western geopoliticians during the Cold War, it turned out to be a diplomatic triumph. Finland has long had one of the world's highest per capita GDPs, scores 100% on Freedom House's Democracy Index (the United States scores 83), and Finns have long ranked as the world's happiest people. The Austrian State Treaty of 1955, which guaranteed Austrian neutrality, by which Soviet and NATO troops withdrew from the country, also ensured that Austria developed as a successful and prosperous Western democracy. Kyiv might learn from the Finnish example that surrendering some territory, though deeply painful, is still worth it if the greater part of the country thereby secures its independence and capacity for economic and political development. Hopefully, the strength of Ukrainian nationalism and the tough and united resistance of Ukrainians to Russia's invasion have also persuaded Putin, as Stalin was persuaded by Finnish resistance, that his goal of turning the whole of Ukraine into a Russian client state is impossible. This is already a great victory for Ukraine, not just in terms of Russia's initial goals but the history of the past 300 years during which Russia has dominated Ukraine.The government of Ukraine currently remains steadfast in its maximalist aims of recovering all of its internationally recognized territory, including Crimea, which was annexed by Russia in 2014. Military reality, however, suggests that this goal is extremely unlikely to be achieved and that an agreement freezing the existing battle lines may well be the best that Kyiv can hope for, at least for the present. On the other hand, if the war continues, Russia's massive advantages in manpower, industry, and weapons production could lead to far more significant Ukrainian losses — just as Finland would likely have suffered complete disaster if it had continued to fight after March 1940 or September 1944.Washington can do its part by not encouraging unrealistic war goals and thereby possibly exposing Ukraine to future disaster.Ukraine has already won in key respects. Vladimir Putin has no hope of subjugating the whole of Ukraine as a vassal state in the foreseeable future. Kyiv is moving closer to the West and could be integrated into the European Union (EU) in the future. Moreover, Moscow's actions have actually reinforced Ukrainian nationalism.As with Finland, this national unity presents the best hope for Ukrainian independence.

Central Asia, an area stretching from the Caspian Sea to Russia, China, Iran, and Afghanistan, has been firmly under Moscow's influence for several centuries due to Russian and Soviet conquest. However, as Russia has concentrated its attention and resources on the Ukraine war and China's economic engagement with Central Asia has deepened, Moscow's role in the region has diminished. Meanwhile, the region has grown in importance to the United States, first during the "Global War on Terror," when the United States established temporary bases (now closed) in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and later as a source of natural resources, including oil and gas and rare-earth minerals. The changing dynamics of Russian, Chinese, and American engagement in Central Asia raise a critical question: What combination of great power involvement and Central Asian autonomy will best advance American interests and ensure stability in the region? As the region's most populous and influential player, Uzbekistan is the key to answering this question. Recognizing this, Washington has formed a strategic partnership with Uzbekistan. Recently, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Donald Lu met with Uzbek officials last month to highlight mutual open channels of communication, aiming to boost trade and investment, specifically in energy and technology.U.S. policy toward Uzbekistan has made several missteps that compromise what could be a fruitful, limited partnership with Tashkent. The most significant of these blunders has been the relentless harping on Washington's commitment to Uzbekistan's "independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity." Support for Central Asian sovereignty implies military assistance akin to the Regional Cooperation 22 military exercise, which took place in 2022 with Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan participating. These military activities in a region with a robust Russian security presence are dangerous and unnecessary. After Washington's proper decision to withdraw from Afghanistan, not only is Central Asia's relevance to U.S. national security relatively low, but Uzbekistan's chances of being invaded by Russia are slim, as Moscow continues to face difficulties in achieving maximalist goals in Ukraine.A better strategy for Washington is to allow Russia, Central Asia's historic security guarantor, to continue to play a security role in what Vladimir Putin calls Russia's "most stable region." There is little danger that Russia, already overstretched in Ukraine, will be capable of restoring its former dominance in Central Asia. But Russia helps to maintain regional stability through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), encompassing its military allies Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, all of which host Russian military bases. Deepening U.S. military involvement in Central Asia ruins Tashkent's attempts to balance regional actors, cooperate with the West, and not be stuck in the middle of great power competition. While military exercises between the United States and Uzbekistan may seem appealing to Tashkent in the short term, such practices will inevitably raise Moscow's threat perceptions and contribute to a higher degree of great power competition in the region. Rather than Washington viewing its relationship with Tashkent as an opportunity to expand militaristic influence in Russia's backyard, Uzbekistan should be considered by the United States as a regional facilitator and convenor, as Uzbekistan has acted as such in recent years. This would improve Uzbekistan's ability to counterbalance Russian and Chinese involvement and facilitate an equilibrium between great power actors in the region. After Uzbekistan's first president, Islam Karimov, died in 2016, Uzbekistan quickly mended ties with Tajikistan and its other neighbors, removing the greatest obstacle to regional cooperation. Under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who took power in 2016, Tashkent's foreign policy has been one that has strived for regional connectivity and cooperation. It has also sought to present Central Asia as a platform for multilateral cooperation to expand the region's economic, transport, and logistics potential.The desire for Central Asia to act as a transport and logistics hub has materialized through the "Middle Corridor," a trade route that spans the Central Asian steppe, the Caspian Sea, and the Caucasus Mountains. Amid a lack of viable alternatives, the Middle Corridor will only become more relevant as the geopolitical disruption of the Russo-Ukrainian War obstructs other trade routes like the "Northern Corridor" that flows through Russia. The Middle Corridor also facilitates the transport of Chinese goods to European consumer markets.Openness with regional great powers, including Russia and China, will be critical to the success of Central Asian connectivity projects. China's incentives for such transit projects are clear as they give Beijing more significant access to Western markets. On the surface, it may appear that Russia will disapprove of alternative trade routes. Still, these routes could be useful for Moscow in the future as the Middle Corridor has turned into a North-South logistic opportunity rather than a direct challenge to the Northern Corridor, with Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan becoming critical corridors for Russia to reach international markets. Uzbekistan could continue to act as a regional facilitator to ensure openness among all parties.Unfortunately, legislation that was relevant to the Soviet Union is still inhibiting constructive cooperation with Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan, along with Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, is subject to the archaic, Soviet-era Jackson-Vanik Amendment, a law designed to punish the Soviet Union on Jewish immigration issues and other human rights. This legislation denies permanent trade relations with its targeted countries, including Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.One could argue that independent Uzbekistan should be exempt from Jackson-Vanik because Tashkent is being penalized for the actions of the Soviet Union. Since Uzbekistan's independence, it has never repressed its Jewish population. Independent Uzbekistan has allowed its Jewish population to emigrate freely to destinations like Israel and the United States. Emigration from Uzbekistan to other countries has been mainly due to better economic opportunities elsewhere rather than oppression. Uzbekistan has a vibrant Jewish population that practices its religion openly and has access to Jewish schools and synagogues in Bukhara, the historical Jewish center of Uzbekistan, where Jews have lived for more than two thousand years.Additionally, the United States continues to punish Tashkent for its human rights record despite its improvements. For decades, the government of Uzbekistan, under President Karimov, forced adults and children to pick cotton under appalling conditions during the harvest season. However, under President Mirziyoyev, these forced labor policies were abolished, and Uzbekistani cotton is now 100% free from any allegations of forced labor. Despite the United States lifting sanctions on Uzbek cotton in 2019, Uzbekistan is still punished by being included under Jackson-Vanik.The United States has a valuable opportunity to contribute to peaceful, limited cooperation and expand economic opportunities in Central Asia. Abandoning militaristic activities, focusing on the transit of goods that serve the U.S. interest while maintaining openness with regional great powers, and discarding irrelevant legislation will be conducive to a productive relationship with Uzbekistan, a regional leader for years to come.

The 35-year-long conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, a disputed enclave wedged between the two countries, appears to have been settled in Azerbaijan's favor as President Ilham Aliyev raised the country's flag over the region's former de facto capital. While officials in Azerbaijan celebrated a political victory after conducting an "anti-terrorist operation" on September 19 against Karabakh Armenian military units, more than 100,000 Armenians have since been forced to leave their homes for the neighboring Republic of Armenia. Baku's actions and threats thus far should be reason enough for Washington to end the military assistance it has provided Azerbaijan over previous decades. In fact, it should have ended assistance years ago.During the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, Washington committed to prohibiting aid to Azerbaijan through Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act. However, following Azerbaijan's pledge to cooperate with President George W. Bush's global war on terrorism following the attacks on 9/11, Congress approved a process to waive Section 907 in 2002; this has occurred each year since. From 2002 to 2020, the Departments of State and Defense (DOD) reported providing about $164 million for security assistance to the government of Azerbaijan.All waivers of Section 907 should have ended in 2020 as Azerbaijan initiated the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. Military equipment, potentially sent by Washington, is being used by Azerbaijan to satiate its territorial aspirations, not the intended purpose of supporting U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Azerbaijan also explicitly violated the condition of the waiver requiring that Baku "will not undermine or hamper ongoing efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan or be used for offensive purposes against Armenia."Secretary of State Antony Blinken has reportedly stated that the U.S. State Department will not renew a long-standing waiver for military assistance. Secretary Blinken's statement was likely the result of lawmakers who have pushed for ending this military assistance, such as Senators Gary Peters (D-Mich.) and Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), and others who have sponsored the Armenian Protection Act of 2023. This bill would effectively repeal the Section 907 waiver. Adopting such a bill would be a positive development, as Azerbaijan considers further aggression against Armenia's internationally recognized territory. Domestic rhetoric by Aliyev is most important in understanding the potential of Azerbaijani foreign policy ambitions. President Aliyev has previously threatened to use force to establish a "corridor" through southern Armenia connecting mainland Azerbaijan with the Autonomous Nakhchivan Republic. "The Zangezur Corridor is a historical necessity," Aliyev said in January 2023, "It will happen whether Armenia wants it or not." Azerbaijan and Turkey are particularly interested in linking this route with the already expansive "Middle Corridor" to directly connect the two countries rather than the current path through Georgia. Days after the offensive against Nagorno-Karabakh, Aliyev held talks with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Nakhchivan regarding the Zangezur Corridor, hinting at creating a land bridge between their two countries through Armenia. If Azerbaijan (and, by extension, Turkey) established a link by force across Armenia's territory, it would clearly violate Armenian sovereignty and territorial integrity, the exact tenets that Brussels and Washington have sought to defend in Ukraine and uphold through the so-called rules-based order. For Armenia, such a development would deprive it of a land border with Iran, one of its key regional allies and trading partners.As such, Armenia is vehemently opposed to the idea of a corridor through its territory that is not under its direct jurisdiction. Article 9 of the 2020 ceasefire statement includes a provision committing Armenia to "guarantee the security" of transportation connections between Azerbaijan's mainland and Nakhchivan. However, both sides have accused each other of violating this agreement. Additionally, the stipulation that "control over transport communication is carried out by the bodies of the Border Guard Service of the FSB of Russia" appears unlikely as Moscow did not do much of anything to stop clashes over Nagorno-Karabakh in 2022 or Azerbaijan's offensive in September 2023. As a result, Armenians have lost significant trust in Moscow's ability to provide security to Armenia despite being a mutual security partner in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).Iran also has qualms with the prospect of Azerbaijan and Turkey occupying Armenian territory and creating the Zangezur Corridor by force. Tehran has said that it opposes "geopolitical" changes in the South Caucasus. Specifically, Iran is deeply concerned about Israeli influence in Azerbaijan. Baku received high-tech drones and other weapons from Israel, which after Russia, was the second-largest arms supplier to Azerbaijan from 2011 to 2020. On top of military hardware, Tehran worries that Azerbaijan, over time, has become a hub for Israeli intelligence and surveillance. Due to Israel's military and intelligence cooperation with Azerbaijan, Iran sees this as Israel expanding its presence in the South Caucasus. On the surface, Russia may appear indifferent to the creation of a Zangezur Corridor, as Russia does not share Iran's threat perceptions of Israel. This may be shortsighted. If Azerbaijan and Turkey take the Zangezur Corridor through military means, it could spiral into a larger-scale war between Tehran and Ankara. Despite the limited interests of the United States in the South Caucasus, facilitating cooperation with Baku and Yerevan to peacefully coordinate trade routes could serve to avoid a future war on Europe's periphery.While stopping American military support will not necessarily inhibit Azerbaijan's current aggression from occurring — Israel and Turkey provide most of its military hardware — it will remove American complicity.Refusing to provide another waiver to Section 907 is the right thing to do, as Azerbaijan's use of military force clearly does not serve U.S. interests since it has led to a humanitarian crisis affecting over 100,000 Armenian civilians and could spark a middle-power conflict on the periphery of Europe. Baku will inevitably push back on this decision, but it will serve the United States well to resist external pressure and abide by consistent and fair rules and laws.

The 1897 colonial conference coincided with Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee and an outpouring of late‐Victorian imperial sentiment. Against this backdrop of imperial celebration, colonial leaders met with Secretary of State for the Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, whose own views as to the importance of imperial reform were taking shape. For the most part, while grateful for Chamberlain's interests, Australian leaders feared significant imperial reform might undermine rather than reinforce imperial unity. As a result, the conference struggled to translate pro‐imperial sentiment into tangible commitments. This article argues that the meetings between Chamberlain and colonial leaders in 1897 are worthy of examination not only because they shed light on Anglo‐Australian relations but also because they provide insight into a significant period in the history of late‐Victorian British imperialism and the development of Australian federation. Drawing on the confidential proceedings of the conference, this article offers a close reading of the key imperial issues under discussion and their resonance in contemporary Australian and imperial political discourse. Moreover, it contends that the conference debates reflected not only important issues in Anglo‐Australian affairs, but also a series of broader ambitions and limitations when it came to the campaign for imperial unity in the late‐Victorian era.