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AbstractThis article considers the argument by Tim Vlandas, in this issue, that an ageing electorate may undermine democracies' ability to make the right economic choices. Vlandas suggests that the emergence of gerontocratic politics may give rise to 'gerontonomia': an economy run for the old, at the expense of younger generations and of future prosperity. However, evidence from the UK suggests a more mixed picture. Age‐based voting patterns have been consequential around single issues, not least the 2016 Brexit referendum. However, voters' interests in broad economic policy models are not easily reducible to age dynamics, and intergenerational politics are filtered through a set of normative and affective considerations beyond straightforward self‐interest. Moreover, since the rational interests of different age groups do not speak for themselves, cueing by political elites is potentially significant and may be contributing to older voters' relative tolerance of a poor economic record.

Since 1970 the United Kingdom, like the United States, has developed a "winner-take-all" political economy characterized by widening inequality and spectacular income growth at the top of the distribution. However, Britain's centralized executive branch and relatively insulated policymaking process are less amenable to the kind of "organized combat" that Hacker and Pierson describe for the United States. Britain's winner-take-all politics is better explained by the rise of political ideas favoring unfettered markets that, over time, produce a self-perpetuating structural advantage for the richest. That advantage is, in turn, justified and sustained by reference to the same ideas. Inequality growth in the United Kingdom has been primarily driven by the financialization of the economy that began under the Thatcher government and continued under New Labour. The survival of pro-finance policies through the financial crisis provides further evidence that lobbying by a weakened City of London was less decisive in shaping policy than the financial sector's continuing structural advantage and the tenacity of its supporting political consensus.

AbstractThe European Union presents a puzzle to political systems scholars: how can a developing polity, with all its attendant functional weaknesses, be rendered politically stable even through moments of a policy crisis? Building on insights from the literature on fiscal federalism, this article challenges much conventional wisdom on Europe's incompleteness. This is based on the corollary of Jonathan Rodden's concept of Hamilton's Paradox: whereas a strong centre cannot resist exploitation by states because it has the means to rescue them, a weak centre's lack of exploitable capacity may induce states to support, and even empower, it in a crisis. This article argues that in providing a contemporaneous stress-test, Covid-19 serves to expose both the pathologies of a strong-centred federation and the surprising resilience of a weak one. It highlights three polity features—powers, decision-making modes and integrity—and charts their political implications during an acute crisis. The article argues that in the EU these features incentivise cooperative 'polity maintenance' between polarised states, a feature absent in an American polity marked by rivalry between polarised parties. The article thus challenges notions that the EU's incompleteness necessarily leads it to dysfunction or that it should strive to emulate established federations.