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Das Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Klimaschutz (BMWK) hat mit dem Vorschlag eines "mittelfristigen Brückenstrompreises" für energieintensive Unternehmen eine intensive Diskussion entfacht. Nach den Vorstellungen des …
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This paper studies the implications of an increase in the price of necessities, which disproportionally hurts the poor, for optimal income taxation. Our analyses show that, when the government is utilitarian and disutility from labor supply is linear, the optimal net nominal tax schedule is unchanged and the government expects households to supply more labor in order to secure their consumption expenditures. Quantitative analyses with convex disutility of labor supply reveal that, because of positive labor supply effects, keeping average tax rates constant suffices to optimally react to the asymmetric price shock. However, the poorest agents are expected to increase their labor supply the most. Thus, optimal income tax policy in response to asymmetric price changes does not prevent the disproportional decline in the indirect utility of poorer households.

The paper compares provision of public infrastructure via public-private partnerships (PPPs) with provision under government management. Due to soft budget constraints of government management, PPPs exert more effort and therefore have a cost advantage in building infrastructure. At the same time, hard budget constraints for PPPs introduce a bankruptcy risk and bankruptcy costs. Consequently, if bankruptcy costs are high, PPPs may be less efficient than public management, although this does not result from PPPs' higher interest costs.

The paper compares provision of public infrastructure via public-private partnerships (PPPs) with provision under government management. Due to soft budget constraints of government management, PPPs exert more effort and therefore have a cost advantage. At the same time, hard budget constraints for PPPs introduce a bankruptcy risk and bankruptcy costs. Consequently, PPPs may be less efficient, although this does not result from PPPs' higher interest costs.

This paper studies the distributional consequences of a systematic variation in expenditure shares and prices. By using European Union Household Budget Surveys and Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices data, we construct household-specific price indices and reveal the existence of a pro-rich inflation in Europe. Particularly, over the period 2001-15, the consumption bundles of the poorest deciles in 25 European countries have on average become 10.5 percentage points more expensive than those of the richest decile. We find that ignoring the differential inflation across the distribution underestimates the change in the Gini (based on consumption expenditure) by up to 0.03 points. Cross-country heterogeneity in this change is large enough to affect the ranking of the countries in inequality measures.

This paper analyzes the tax effects of the German real estate transfer tax (RETT). While the vast majority of single-family houses in Germany are owner-occupied, apartments are usually held by private and incorporated investors. For this reason, we conducted a regression analysis to determine the effects of increasing RETT on the number and the prices of transactions separately for these two market segments. Our findings suggest that increasing the RETT by 1% is associated with a decline in transactions by 0.23% for single-family houses, but with no significant effect on the prices of traded houses. Conversely, for apartments, we find no significantly negative effects on the transactions, but the price effect of the RETT tends to be negative. Finally, for vacant lots, we find even larger quantity effects than for single-family houses suggesting roughly an elasticity of -1. The results for this specific market segment indicate that the government operates near the top of a Laffer curve.

Since the mid-1990s, countries offering tax systems that facilitate international tax avoidance and evasion have been facing growing political pressure to comply with the internationally agreed standards of exchange of tax information. Using data of German investments in tax havens, we find evidence that the conclusion of a bilateral tax information exchange agreement (TIEA) is associated with fewer operations in tax havens and the number of German affiliates has on average decreased by 46% compared to a control group. This suggests that firms invest in tax havens not only for their low tax rates but also for the secrecy they offer.

Since the mid-1990s, countries offering tax systems that facilitate international tax avoidance and evasion have been facing growing political pressure to comply with the internationally agreed standards of exchange of tax information. Using data of German investments in tax havens, we find evidence that the conclusion of a bilateral tax information exchange agreement (TIEA) is associated with fewer operations in tax havens and the number of German affiliates has on average decreased by 46% compared to a control group. This suggests that firms invest in tax havens not only for their low tax rates but also for the secrecy they offer.

In its Cadbury-Schweppes decision of 12 September 2006 (C-196/04), the Court of Justice of the European Union decided that the UK controlled foreign corporation rules, which were implemented to subject low taxed passive income of foreign affiliates to UK corporate tax, implied an infringement of the freedom of establishment. Consequently, many EU countries including Germany changed their legislation. The paper discusses to which extent the ECJ ruling has impacted on the allocation of passive assets in German multinationals. Using firm level data we find evidence for an increased preference for low-tax European countries compared to non-European countries.

SUMMARYThe idea of deregulating shopping hours brings strong opposition from many groups in the society. Surprisingly, even many consumers oppose deregulation. The paper rationalizes this behavior by considering heterogeneous consumers who differ in their earnings abilities. If a majority of families has two income earners, long opening hours become essential and the regulation of shopping hours tends to be eliminated. If most families are single income households, the regulation may be imposed in order to keep prices low. Taking the repercussions on the labor supply decision into account, multiple equilibria can be explained.ZUSAMMENFASSUNGDie Liberalisierung der Ladenöffnungszeiten ruft Widerstand in verschiedenen Gesellschaftsgrup‐pen hervor. Überraschenderweise sprechen sich sogar Konsumenten oft gegen eine Liberalisierung aus. Der Aufsatz erklärt dieses Verhalten, indem auf die Heterogenität der Konsumenten hinsichtlich ihres Erwerbsverhaltens abgestellt wird. Überwiegen im politischen Entscheidungsprozess Doppelverdienerhaushalte, für die längere Öffnungszeiten wichtig sind, wird eine bestehende Regulierung tendenziell eliminiert. Falls jedoch Haushalte mit nur einem Erwerbstätigen dominieren, wird die Regulierung aufrechterhalten, urn die Konsumentenpreise niedrig zu halten. Berücksichtigt man die Rückwirkungen unterschiedlicher Regulierungen auf die Arbeitsangebots‐entscheidung, so lassen sich multiple Gleichgewichte erklären.RÉSUMÉLa libéralisation des heures d'ouverture des magasins se heurte à un mouvement d'opposition au sein de différents groupes sociaux. Surprenant est que měme des consommateurs se prononcent contre la libéralisation. Cet essai explique ce comportement en considérant l'hétérogénéité des consommateurs quant à leur possibilityé de revenus. Si les foyers, alimentés par deux salaires, pour lesquels un prolongement des heures d'ouverture est important, forment la majorité dans le processus de décision politique, on tendra àéliminer le règlement en vigueur. Par contre, au cas où les foyers avec un seul salaire dominent, on conservera le règlement pour maintenir les prix bas. Prend on en compte les effets des différents règlements sur la décision de l'offre de l'emploi, on peut ainsi mettre en évidence de multiples équilibres.

The paper looks at the determinants of fiscal adjustments as reflected in the primary surplus of countries. Our conjecture is that governments will usually find it more attractive to pursue fiscal adjustments in a situation of relatively high growth, but based on a simple stylized model of government behavior the expectation is that mainly high trust governments will be in a position to defer consolidation to years with higher growth. Overall, our analysis of a panel of European countries provides support for this expectation. The difference in fiscal policies depending on government trust levels may help explaining why better governed countries have been found to have less severe business cycles. It suggests that trust and credibility play an important role not only in monetary policy, but also in fiscal policy.

The paper looks at the determinants of fiscal adjustments as reflected in the primary surplus of countries. Our conjecture is that governments will usually find it more attractive to pursue fiscal adjustments in a situation of relatively high growth, but based on a simple stylized model of government behavior the expectation is that mainly high trust governments will be in a position to defer consolidation to years with higher growth. Overall, our analysis of a panel of European countries provides support for this expectation. The difference in fiscal policies depending on government trust levels may help explaining why better governed countries have been found to have less severe business cycles. It suggests that trust and credibility play an important role not only in monetary policy, but also in fiscal policy.