Kant sees the gradual implementation of a cosmopolitan world order as necessary for securing peace at national and international level. However, he seems to be overoptimistic about the role of states and other political institutions in securing coordination and peace. In some passages Kant claims that a just juridical framework alone, as long as it is efficiently enforced, is enough to secure a large scale coordination of individual's agency and a maximal protection of individual freedom. As I will show, other passages suggest that ethical motivation also has an important role to play in the achievement of peace and the implementation of a cosmopolitan world order. This is because good laws alone may produce "good citizens" (who do not infringe the law), but still does not make possible effective political participation and the necessary attitude required for the implementation and improvement of political institutions at national and international level. I will discuss Kant's claim that education must have a cosmopolitan character as well as the duty of states to create responsible citizens, not only at domestic but also at international level.
"This book analyses Kant's assumptions about happiness and the implications they have for his moral, political, and legal thought. It provides a "map" of the different areas in which the concept of happiness appears in his practical philosophy and examines how it relates to the main themes of his practical philosophy"--
La posesión común de la tierra fue una idea prominente en la filosofía moderna del siglo xvii. En este artículo, sostendré que Kant no sólo propuso una versión secular de la posesión común de la tierra, sino que también se diferenció de forma radical de la concepción iusnaturalista de sus predecesores. Propongo que la revisión kantiana del derecho cosmopolita se dirige al mismo problema que el derecho de necesidad de Grocio, a saber, la implausibilidad de asumir derechos adquiridos absolutos cuando esto contradice la razón por la que se introducen esos mismos derechos. Sin embargo, mientras que Grocio pretendió excusar violaciones de la propiedad privada en casos de necesidad, Kant limitó su discusión al derecho de rechazar la entrada de personas en un territorio. Muestro que para Kant, negar la ocupación del espacio que puede salvar la vida a otro ser humano que está, en principio, tan legitimado como cualquier otro a tener un derecho en la tierra está en contradicción con la justificación misma del derecho territorial de los Estados. Esto se debe a que el permiso para controlar el territorio y el derecho de los visitantes involuntarios a ser admitidos en una región están basados en el mismo fundamento legal o Rechtsgrund, a saber, la comunidad original de la tierra. ; Common possession of the earth was a prominent idea in seventeenth-century modern philosophy. In this paper I will argue that Kant not only provides a secularized version of common possession of the earth but also radically departs from the conception of his natural law theory predecessors. I argue that Kant's account of cosmopolitan right seeks to address the same problem as Grotius' right of necessity, namely the implausibility of assuming inflexible acquired rights when this would go against the rationale for introducing these rights. However, while Grotius intended to excuse violations of private property in cases of necessity, Kant restricts his discussion to the right of host peoples to reject entrants in their territory. I show that in Kant's account, to deny life-saving occupation of space to another being who is in principle just as entitled as anyone else to any place of the earth is to contradict the very justification for the territorial rights of states. This is because the permission to control territory and the right of the involuntary visitor to be admitted are based on the same legal foundation or Rechtsgrund, namely, the original community of the earth.
Abstract: This paper explores the alleged role of a conception of human nature for Kant's justification of the duty to leave the state of nature and the related right to coerce others to enter the civil condition in the Doctrine of Right (1797). I criticise the interpretation put forward by Byrd and Hruschka, according to which Kant's postulate of public right is a preventive measure based on a "presumption of badness" of human beings. Although this reading seems to be supported by § 42 of the Doctrine of Right, I shall argue that the paragraph neither offers a justification of why we have a duty to leave the state of nature, nor explains why individuals are allowed to coerce others to do so. I offer an alternative interpretation of § 42 by focusing on the difference between formal and material violations of right and argue that the rationale behind the postulate of public right is the idea that remaining in the state of nature is a formal violation of the concept of right. It is therefore not prudential reason that authorizes us to coerce others to enter the lawful condition.
"How should we act? How should the world be organised? This new anthology on Kant's practical philosophy guides the reader from the general question of the nature of reasons and rationality in Kant's philosophical system to the Kantian task of promoting justice and peace at the global level. Contributions to this volume show how the Kantian idea of reason as a source of normativity is grounded, and which implications and applications the Kantian approach might bring about. The volume covers three areas - meta-ethics, political thought and theory, and applied politics - and although these are different spheres of thought, they are interconnected in a fundamental way through Kant's account of normativity as derived from reason. The volume provides an overview of recent debates in Kant scholarship and groundbreaking new applications of Kant's theory to current affairs."--
