Suchergebnisse

The article explores the securitization/de-securitization processes and attitudes towards the conflict in Azerbaijan in the periods before, during, and after the 2020 conflict in Karabagh. An earlier study (Alieva and Aslanov, 2018) revealed that even under conditions of strict autocratic rule, there has been a diversification of societal attitudes depending on sets of views and ideologies - from conservative and (pre)modern to liberal and post-modern - during the "status quo" period, demonstrating de-securitization potential from civil society actors (NGOs, political opposition, independent intellectuals). The recent flare-up in Karabagh shows, however, that neither favorable attitudes towards peace among the Azerbaijani elite, nor democratic changes in Armenia automatically immunize society against military/political mobilization and securitization if they are not indicators of deeper human and political emancipation and if the grievances, such as human rights violations, ethnic cleansing, violation of international borders, and/or war crimes, are not legally redressed internationally and/or domestically. In turn, the unsustainable nature of the attempts at "top-down" de-securitization, or that from formal authority, is affected by the fact that it does not "unmake securitization's nondemocratic, exceptional and exclusionary logic" (Aradau, 2004), but rather replicates it. The official "speech acts" reflect the utilization of the external threat against domestic opponents for purposes of blame avoidance and, while calling for peaceful reconstruction, hint at the possibility of future war. Yet, even under conditions of strict autocracy, the internet and social networks provide for the silenced voices and for the multiplicity of agents challenging the monopoly on (de-)securitization of the formal authority, reinforced by the infelicities (amounting to flaws) of the post-war governance.

In 2009 Azerbaijan joined the EU's Eastern Partnership (EaP) programme, officially confirming its devotion to the once-preferred strategic foreign-policy course–-that of integration with European and Euro-Atlantic structures. However, Azerbaijan's official interest in such integration has since waned, which is reflected in the country's near-last-place position in signing the EaP agreements. In 2014, of all the areas involved, Azerbaijan has so far only signed the visa facilitation and readmission agreements. On key interests only one appears to be mutual in practice–-that of energy security. Of all EaP countries, Azerbaijan appeared to be the most capable of resisting various Russian pressures by avoiding policies provoking its powerful northern neighbour, while at the same time balancing interests and playing a strategic role in the area of EU energy security. However, this political avoidance and balancing act has been reached at the expense of increasing deviation from its key strategic path and identity as laid down by the founders of the modern nation state of Azerbaijan, resulting in a change in the nature of relations with the EU.

The 2005 parliamentary elections were a step back for Azerbaijan compared not only with the beginning of the post-Soviet era, but even with the parliament of the first "oil-boom" era a century ago. Yet as frustrating as the fraudulent elections were, they also furnished grounds for hope. For civil society, the democratic opposition, and the Azerbaijani people showed themselves capable of carrying on a tradition of peaceful dissent whose roots go back to pre-Soviet days. Opening up political space for that democracy-friendly dynamism—and not turning out sharper technocrats to serve authoritarian rulers—is the key to a better future for Azerbaijan.