Suchergebnisse

In many countries, the legal system or social norms ensure that firms are stakeholder oriented. We analyze the advantages and disadvantages of stakeholder-oriented firms that are concerned with employees and suppliers compared to shareholder-oriented firms in a model of imperfect competition. Stakeholder firms are more (less) valuable than shareholder firms when marginal cost uncertainty is greater (less) than demand uncertainty. With globalization shareholder firms and stakeholder firms often compete. We identify the circumstances where stakeholder firms are more valuable than shareholder firms and compare these mixed equilibria with the pure equilibria with stakeholder and shareholder firms only. Finally, we analyze firm financial constraints and derive implications for the capital structure of stakeholder firms.

This volume explores the measurement of economic and social progress in our societies, and proposes new frameworks to integrate economic dimensions with other aspects of human well-being. Leading economists analyse the light that the recent crisis has shed on the global economic architecture, and the policies needed to address these systemic risks.

"We develop a model where institutions form connections through swaps of projects in order to diversify their individual risk. These connections lead to two different network structures. In a clustered network groups of financial institutions hold identical portfolios and default together. In an unclustered network defaults are more dispersed. With long term finance welfare is the same in both networks. In contrast, when short term finance is used, the network structure matters. Upon the arrival of a signal about banks' future defaults, investors update their expectations of bank solvency. If their expectations are low, they do not roll over the debt and there is systemic risk in that all institutions are early liquidated. We compare investors' rollover decisions and welfare in the two networks"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site

This paper identifies two types of market failures. The first concerns a coordination problem associated with panics. The problem in analysing this type of market failure from a policy perspective is that there is no widely accepted method for selecting equilibria. The second market failure concerns the incompleteness of financial markets. The essential problem here is that the incentives to provide liquidity lead to an inefficient allocation of resources. The paper outlines three manifestations of market failure associated with liquidity provision: financial fragility, contagion and asset price bubbles. The framework developed allows some insight into the question of when the financial system acts a shock absorber and when it acts as an amplifier. Having identified when there is a market failure, the paper looks at whether there are policies that can correct the undesirable effects of such failures

Financial instability can have large adverse effects on an economy. One major cause of instability is asset price bubbles. This paper starts by considering how such bubbles can arise due to the expansion of money and credit. The ways in which subsequent financial instability occurs are then discussed. Banking crises can arise due to panics or as a result of the business cycle. Contagion and financial fragility can cause small disturbances to have large effects. Finally, policy issues are touched upon.

Traditionally, financial systems have been bank-based or market-based. The efficiency properties of these systems are compared in various dimensions. These include risk sharing, information provision, funding new industries, corporate governance, and law, finance and politics. Both systems have advantages and disadvantages. With regard to stability, both bank-based and market-based systems are subject to crises. Going forward a financial system with financial intermediaries and markets would have many advantages and few disadvantages.