Suchergebnisse

What exists is possible -- Georgians and South Ossetians wage war and peace -- Practice builds theory -- People make peace -- Process shapes people-centered peacemaking -- Locals lead with global awareness -- Peacemakers adapt -- Both individuals and groups of people make peace -- Peacemaking is personal.

This book examines the theory and practice of interactive peacemaking, centering the role of people in making peace. The book presents the theory and practice of peacemaking as found in contemporary processes globally. By putting people at the center of the analysis, it outlines the possibilities of peacemaking by and for the people whose lives are touched by ongoing conflicts. While considering examples from around the world, this book specifically focuses on peacemaking in the Georgian-South Ossetian context. It tells the stories of individuals on both sides of the conflict, and explores why people choose to make peace, and how they work within their societies to encourage this. This book emphasizes theory built from practice and offers methodological guidance on learning from practice in the conflict resolution field. This book will be of much interest to students and practitioners of peacemaking, conflict resolution, South Caucasus politics and International Relations.

While a great deal of attention has been to paid to whether or not economic sanctions work, less energy has been devoted to exploring the causal mechanisms that lead to the success or failure of sanctions policies. Often, it is assumed that the population is one important source of political costs for targeted leaders, but this assumption has not been tested. Are sanctions related to an increase in antigovernment activity? How does the domestic political system of the targeted state affect the likelihood of this antigovernment behavior? The findings presented here suggest that sanctions may increase antigovernment activity, but that increase is mitigated by the domestic political structures of the target state. In autocratic targets, political violence is less likely to occur when sanctions are in place. For sanctions against autocratic states to be costly, it appears that the political costs needed to alter behavior must be generated internationally rather than domestically.

Advancements in technology coupled with the perception of diminished public tolerance for casualties have increased the prominence and popularity of aerial bombing as a coercive tool, particularly for the United States. Despite interest from policy makers and support from the public, there has been little scholarly assessment of these coercive episodes. How successful are air campaigns, and what are the prospects for the future? In this article, I focus on the factors that cause bombing campaigns to end. To explore what leads to campaign termination, I highlight the theoretical significance of the political characteristics of both the attacker and the adversary. Using competing risks duration analysis to examine both failed and successful bombing campaigns from 1917 through 1999, I find that a democratic government on either side of the coercive equation increases the likelihood of campaigns ending.

Even after seventy-five years, the UN Security Council meets nearly every day. They respond to a range of threats to international peace and security, but not all threats. Why does the Security Council take up some issues for discussion and not others? What factors shape the Council's actions, if they take any action at all? Adapting insights from legislative bargaining, this book demonstrates that the agenda-setting powers granted in the institutional rules offer less powerful Council members the opportunity to influence the content of a resolution without jeopardizing its passage. The Council also decides when to conduct public or private diplomacy. The analysis shows how external factors like international and domestic public reactions motivate grandstanding behaviors and shape resolutions. New quantitative data on meetings and outside options provide support for these claims. The book also explores the dynamics of the formal analysis in three cases: North Korean nuclear proliferation, the negotiations leading up to NATO bombing in Serbia over Kosovo, and the elected member-led process to codify the principles of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. The book argues that while the powerful veto members do have great influence over the Council, the rules of the most consequential security institution influence its policy outcomes, just as they do in any other international institution.

Why does the United Nations Security Council take up some issues for discussion and not others? What factors shape the Council's actions? With insights from legislative bargaining, this book explores the agenda-setting powers granted in the institutional rules and the international and domestic factors motivating behaviour and shaping resolutions.

This article presents new data on the behavior of the United Nations Security Council from 1994 to 2013. Which international issues does the United Nations Security Council act upon? Which issues are ignored, languishing for years on the Council's agenda? What are the characteristics of the issues that are considered by the Council and what are the characteristics of those that are overlooked? Beginning with the annual Summary Statements on matters of which the Security Council is seized, information was gathered for every agenda item that appears on the Security Council's agenda during this period. Daily data are recorded for the number of public meetings and private informal consultations held, as well as the number of resolutions (which are voted on), presidential statements (which are a product of consensus), and vetoes that occur. These data offer scholars new opportunities for testing theories of legislative behavior in international institutions, particularly on issues of peace and security, that have not been available heretofore. In this article, we introduce the data and coding processes, present trends, illustrate prospects for research that could benefit from these data and provide an empirical application.

When do leaders use repression? Leadership transitions disrupt the relationship between regime and citizens, introducing uncertainty about whether the state will use force to put down dissent. This shock to the equilibrium level of repression and dissent threatens the survival of new leaders by inviting challenges, incentivizing them to build a deterrent reputation. Investing in repression early allows a rapid re-equilibration, leading to a decrease in the probability of increased repression as a leader gains experience in office. Some leaders, therefore, have a reason to put down dissent early in their tenure to clearly establish a reputation for toughness, one that exists distinct from that of the state or the regime. These dynamics surface only for leaders that break with the prior regime. Those closely linked to the existing order can draw upon an established reputation and need not develop their own. Statistical analyses of changes in repression intensity from 1990 to 2005 reveal strong support for the argument. Breaks with the prior regime produce a short-term increase in repression, but leaders who come to power via such transitions become less likely to change the level of coercion the longer they remain in office. Leaders tied directly to the prior administration exhibit neither tendency.