Suchergebnisse

By virtually all measures, polarization in Congress has increased dramatically over the course of the past two decades. Former Democratic Congressman Tom Allen lived through this era, serving six terms in the U.S. House of Representatives. Drawing from his own experiences in the Congressional trenches, he tackles the root cause of why Democrats and Republicans arrived at a point where they barely speak to each other. In Dangerous Convictions, he shows that they now embrace fundamentally different worldviews that distill two central impulses in American history: individualism and the longing for community. He stresses throughout that while it takes two sides to polarize, one bears more blame for the divide than the other. Whereas the Democrats' emphasis on community is relatively open-ended and conditional, the Republicans' adherence to individualism has become more radical and rigid over time. In essence, Democrats are relatively pragmatic and willing to change their views if the evidence calls for it. Republicans, on the other hand, prioritize ideological goals above all else and regard facts that contradict their worldview as minor inconveniences whose importance pales in comparison to their long-term aims. The problem for the Democratic Party is that in America, the language of individualism is primary and the language of community secondary. Hence the Republican Party has a built-in rhetorical advantage. While journalists and academics have offered variations of this thesis before, Allen's deep knowledge of the political system's actual workings make Dangerous Convictions a powerfully original work on how and why Congress has become so dysfunctional

The right to property is an important part of most Commonwealth constitutions. This book examines the evolution of right to property and the changing trends in their interpretation by the courts. A number of specific issues are examined closely: • Which interests are constitutionally protected as 'property'? • When does the regulation of property amount to an acquisition of property? • Are there limits on the purposes for which states may take the property of their subjects? • What are the rules regarding compensation for property? The analysis is both practical and theoretical, and it should be useful to both academic and practising lawyers

In most of Europe, expropriation must comply with the standards set under European human rights law. Article 1 of the First Protocol ('P1-1') to the European Convention on Human Rights declares that 'every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.' The European Court of Human Rights has stated that the right would be 'largely illusory and ineffective' if it did not guarantee full compensation in all but exceptional circumstances.1It is quite clear, however, that this was not the belief of at least some of the States that had signed it when it came into force in 1954. P1-1 makes no reference to compensation. An interference must be lawful, and in the public or general interest, but there is nothing that expressly requires compensation. Nevertheless, the Court has declared that any interference with the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions must strike a ''fair balance' between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights',2and this means that expropriation without compensation that is reasonably related to the value of the property would normally violate the owner's rights under P1-1.3

Abstract
Modern state boundaries often cut through territories currently or formerly occupied by indigenous peoples. In many cases, the unmitigated application of laws on movement across the border can interfere with the rights and way of life of an indigenous group. This paper considers recent legal developments in Canada and Norway concerning cross-border rights and claims. It highlights conflicts that have emerged between constitutional principles that are regarded as fundamental within the state and norms drawn from international law, and in particular the norms set by United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. We focus on the constitutional jurisprudence on cross-border rights of indigenous peoples in Norway, and draw on the Canadian law as a means of demonstrating that the Norwegian approach is unduly restrictive. This, we argue, is primarily due to the preference of the Norwegian court for a paternalistic model of indigenous claims. We contrast this with the recent jurisprudence from the Canadian Supreme Court on cross-border claims, where the reasoning is closer to a model that gives priority to the recognition of indigenous rights, as required under the UN Declaration. The final section returns to Norway, to consider the impact of the European Convention on Human Rights ('echr') to Sami rights. The leading case is under review by the European Court of Human Rights, and accordingly the article asks whether the paternalist model will withstand the closer scrutiny against human rights standards.

AbstractPrevious research suggests that coastal housing values capitalize the quality of nearby beaches but note potential problems related to measurement errors and reverse causation due to beach replenishment. We offer the first hedonic analysis of communities not engaged in beach replenishment, obviating concern over reverse causation. Statistical evidence supports hedonic specifications that account for proximity to the shoreline, though marginal willingness to pay (WTP) varies with the specification. Using an instrumental variables approach, we find significant downward bias in ordinary least squares estimates of marginal WTP derived from the sale of vacant lots compared to two‐stage least squares estimates on the same vacant lots. Notably, we do not find evidence of the same downward bias in WTP derived from the sale of existing homes.

AbstractLeft-leaning and right-leaning governments hold opposing views on economic policy, resulting in disparities in economic behaviours and outcomes. Given this context, we explore the effect of political ideology on domestic credit using an unbalanced panel data of 29 countries from 1960 to 2014. Our empirical analysis shows that left-leaning governments reduce total domestic credit allocations. Also, we find that right-leaning governments provide more credit to the private sector, while left-leaning governments prefer to boost domestic credit to the public sector. In a further analysis, we show that political parties and their domestic credit strategies remain unchanged even during electoral periods. Our novel insights, that are robust to alternative measures, samples, and a set of econometric identifications, contribute to the literature on partisan politics and lending behaviour.