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Considers the focus of the comparative political economy literatures, stressing the positive issues of how institutions work & why, as well as the state of current empirical estimates of their impacts. Following an introduction on the political economy of institutions that contextualized the specialized & policy-focused research arenas, attention turns to discussing how, in institutional political economy, studies have coalesced around the concepts of credibility in monetary policy & centralization & transparency in fiscal policy. Demonstrated is the salience of relating policy outcomes to economic fundamentals as well as the ideological or redistributive pursuits of political actors (eg, parties, interest groups) & the institutional policy-making context. How transparency & credibility relate is addressed along with how the study of monetary & fiscal policy institutions might be integrated. J. Zendejas

This article extends existing political-economic models to deal more rigorously with politics in countries with trade-dependent economies, and in particular with the policy consequences of oil-exporting in industrial countries. Models drawn from economics and finance show how much of Britain's recent unemployment results from North Sea oil, at first through speculation in sterling in rapidly-growing international currency markets and more recently through the balance of payments. In Norway, by contrast, speculation was deterred by a variety of policies on fixing exchange rates, and the unemployment problem contained by better-planned and executed employment subsidy programmes. These policy variations are explained by differences in available ideas, institutions and, ultimately, structural characteristics.

THIS ARTICLE EXTENDS EXISTING POLITICAL-ECONOMIC MODELS TO DEAL MORE RIGOROUSLY WITH POLITICS IN COUNTRIES WITH TRADE-DEPENDENT ECONOMIES, AND IN PARTICULAR WITH THE POLICY CONSEQUENCES OF OILEXPORTING IN INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES. MODELS DRAWN FROM ECONOMICS AND FINANCE SHOW HOW MUCH OF BRITAIN'S RECENT UNEMPLOYMENT RESULTS FROM NORTH SEA OIL, AT FIRST THROUGH SPECULATION IN STERLING IN RAPIDLY-GROWING INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY MARKETS AND MORE RECENTLY THROUGH THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. IN NORWAY, BY CONTRAST, SPECULATION WAS DETERRED BY A VARIETY OF POLICIES ON FIXING EXCHANGE RATES, AND THE UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEM CONTAINED BY BETTER-PLANNED AND EXECUTED EMPLOYMENT SUBSIDY PROGRAMMES. THESE POLICY VARIATIONS ARE EXPLAINED BY DIFFERENCES IN AVAILABLE IDEAS, INSTITUTIONS AND, ULTIMATELY, STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS.

This article replicates and extends earlier work on the politics of macroeconomic policy by considering political effects on unemployment in 14 western industrial nations between 1960 and 1983. Changes of party control of government display broadly the expected effects, namely that unemployment falls under left-wing governments and rises under right-wing governments. However, the principal conclusions of this article are that partisan effects on unemployment in open economies (that is, economies heavily dependent on trade with other countries) can only be satisfactorily estimated relative to the constraint imposed by the level of world economic activity, and that in addition to politicians' strategic incentives, political institutions and economic regime constraints also determine whether partisan effects on unemployment will be sustained, transitory, or absent. With respect to the latter, on the whole no effects are found where no such effects were promised by the new government before taking office; where one-party or dominant-partner coalitions form, the effect on unemployment is transitory, whereas where broad coalitions form, it is sustained or absent. Finally, ceteris paribus, any partisan effects are more likely where governments secure parliamentary majorities.