Crime and International Tourism
In: Journal of labor research, Band 35, Heft 1, S. 1-14
ISSN: 1936-4768
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In: Journal of labor research, Band 35, Heft 1, S. 1-14
ISSN: 1936-4768
In: International review of law and economics, Band 32, Heft 1, S. 145-157
ISSN: 0144-8188
In: Journal of labor research, Band 45, Heft 1, S. 58-110
ISSN: 1936-4768
In: Journal of labor research, Band 38, Heft 1, S. 100-121
ISSN: 1936-4768
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 123, Heft 573, S. 1130-1167
ISSN: 1468-0297
Prior to July 2009, salaries of the members of the European Parliament were paid by their home country and there were substantial salary differences between parliamentarians representing different EU countries. Starting in July 2009, the salary of each member of the Parliament is pegged to 38.5% of a European Court judge's salary, paid by the EU. This created an exogenous change in salaries, the magnitude and direction of which varied substantially between parliamentarians. Parliamentarians receive per diem compensation for each plenary session they attend, but salaries constitute unearned income as they are independent of attendance to the Parliament. Using detailed information on each parliamentarian of the European Parliament between 2004 and 2011 we show that an increase in salaries reduces attendance to plenary sessions and an increase in per diem compensation increases it. We also show that corruption in home country has a negative effect on attendance for seasoned members of the Parliament.
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Prior to July 2009, salaries of the members of the European Parliament were paid by their home country and there were substantial salary differences between parliamentarians representing different EU countries. Starting in July 2009, the salary of each member of the Parliament is pegged to 38.5% of a European Court judge's salary, paid by the EU. This created an exogenous change in salaries, the magnitude and direction of which varied substantially between parliamentarians. Parliamentarians receive per diem compensation for each plenary session they attend, but salaries constitute unearned income as they are independent of attendance to the Parliament. Using detailed information on each parliamentarian of the European Parliament between 2004 and 2011 we show that an increase in salaries reduces attendance to plenary sessions and an increase in per diem compensation increases it. We also show that corruption in home country has a negative effect on attendance for seasoned members of the Parliament.
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w21438
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Working paper
In: NBER Working Paper No. w17949
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w17329
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w15994
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 4930
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 5949
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In most countries Parliamentary immunity protects lawmakers from civil or criminal charges while in office, and it shields them from prosecution for their political speech or political actions. This paper presents the first empirical analysis in the literature of the impact of Parliamentary immunity on the behavior and performance of politicians. Leveraging a Constitutional Amendment, the adoption of which lifted the immunity of 132 of the 550 members of the Turkish Parliament, we find that immunity from prosecution impacts how the Members of the Parliament (MPs) act and perform their duties in the Parliament. Losing immunity (and the resultant presumed fear of prosecution) pacifies the MPs of the opposition parties. They become less diligent in the Parliament (drafting fewer pieces of legislation, initiating fewer investigation inquiries, delivering fewer and shorter speeches) and become less aggressive (interrupting other MPs less frequently). They also reduce their tendency to cast dissenting votes against the government. MPs of the opposition parties who lose their immunity are less likely to get re-nominated by their parties in the next election, and they are less likely to get re-elected. We find no evidence that more outspoken and active opposition MPs or those who are more valuable for their parties have been targeted for immunity revocation. There is no evidence that the MPs, who retained immunity, have increased their Parliamentary efforts in reaction to their same-party colleagues losing immunity. We find that laws are passed faster after the Constitutional Amendment was adopted, possibly as a consequence of reduced opposition and deliberation. Using Eurobarometer surveys, we find that citizens' reactions to the revocation of MP immunity are polarized. An individual's trust in the Parliament is decreased or increased based on whether an MP from the individual's province lost immunity and if that MP subscribes to the same or opposing ideology as the individual.
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 10923
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