Suchergebnisse

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, which came to power in 2002, has increasingly been using aid as an instrument of foreign policy, including in the Arab world. This increased with the Arab uprisings and has peaked with the ongoing civil war in Syria, reaching $2 billion in 2012. Despite substantial changes in the amount and geographical coverage of aid after the 'Arab Spring', there are also substantive continuities in Turkey's aid policy. The AKP has been focused on security and stability, and on consolidating power among new regimes. The direction of aid has thus followed that of regional foreign policy, and the government's interests have been given an ideational framing through notions of historical and cultural affinity and responsibility.

This article aims to analyze the implications of the Arab uprisings on the Rentier State Theory (RST). Initial conceptualization of rentier state was based on the impact of externally generated oil revenues on the economic development as well as the nature of the state and state-society relations. Especially since 2000s the literature has been largely dominated by the study of relationship between rentier states and democratization. Based on the observations of the earlier literature, most of the studies argued that there was a strong correlation between rentierism and lack of democracy. There were also few studies that challenged this argument. The Arab uprisings should lead to the revisiting of the arguments of the RST. In only two of the rentier states, namely Bahrain and Libya, has there been a widespread uprising. Both ended through outside intervention, one in support of the regime, the other against it. In other rentier states, limited protests did not lead to uprisings. Therefore, the question is twofold: First, what do the full-scale uprisings in two rentier states tell us? Second,what does it tell us that with the exception of these two states, all other rentier states have been able to maintain stability?

This article aims to analyze the implications of the Arab uprisings on the Rentier State Theory (RST). Initial conceptualization of rentier state was based on the impact of externally generated oil revenues on the economic development as well as the nature of the state and state-society relations. Especially since 2000s the literature has been largely dominated by the study of relationship between rentier states and democratization. Based on the observations of the earlier literature, most of the studies argued that there was a strong correlation between rentierism and lack of democracy. There were also few studies that challenged this argument. The Arab uprisings should lead to the revisiting of the arguments of the RST. In only two of the rentier states, namely Bahrain and Libya, has there been a widespread uprising. Both ended through outside intervention, one in support of the regime, the other against it. In other rentier states, limited protests did not lead to uprisings. Therefore, the question is twofold: First, what do the full-scale uprisings in two rentier states tell us? Second,what does it tell us that with the exception of these two states, all other rentier states have been able to maintain stability?

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, which came to power in 2002, has increasingly been using aid as an instrument of foreign policy, including in the Arab world. This increased with the Arab uprisings and has peaked with the ongoing civil war in Syria, reaching $2 billion in 2012. Despite substantial changes in the amount and geographical coverage of aid after the 'Arab Spring', there are also substantive continuities in Turkey's aid policy. The AKP has been focused on security and stability, and on consolidating power among new regimes. The direction of aid has thus followed that of regional foreign policy, and the government's interests have been given an ideational framing through notions of historical and cultural affinity and responsibility.

The Middle East has been increasingly factoring into the relations between Turkey and the USA since the end of the cold war. Ironically, the issues related to this region simultaneously intensify and erode the bilateral relations. For the USA, the significance of Turkey has always related to some extent to the Middle East. For Turkey, on the other hand, during the cold war years this connection was not always welcomed. In the aftermath of the cold war, the Middle East became one of the most significant elements of the alliance, a development that was accepted by both sides. The changes in the international arena, such as the end of bipolarity and post-9/11 developments as well as regional changes, particularly the Iraqi crises, Iranian nuclear issue, the Arab uprisings and changes in the regional balance of power, had an impact on the evolution of AmericanTurkish relations and created both convergence and divergence of interests. Finally, domestic politics, especially the ideology and policies of state actors, had a bearing on bilateral relations in the context of the Middle East. As Turkey became more active and developed particular interests in the Middle East, the crises in TurkeyUSA relations began to occur more frequently and led to bargaining processes between the two allies.

AbstractTurkish foreign policy in the Middle East has become highly contested in the last two decades. The changes in the international and domestic environment have led to the emergence of competing ideas as to the elements of Turkish foreign policy in this region. This article argues that these ideas ultimately represent worldviews as they start with different assumptions about what Turkey is, what the basis of Turkey's interest and involvement should be in this region, to what extent Turkey should engage the Middle East, and what the threats and/or opportunities emanating from the region are. Each of these worldviews has been institutionalized to some extent. I conclude that these worldviews continue to co-exist and compete with each other in Turkish foreign policy today.