Suchergebnisse

Untersuchung der revolutionären Praxis in den vom FMLN kontrollierten Gebieten. Die dort entwickelten alternativen Strukturen werden vom Autor als Vorwegnahme des späteren Übergangs zum Sozialismus nach dem Sieg der Revolution interpretiert. Schon jetzt seien Ansätze einer sozialistischen Gesellschaft im Rahmen der politischen, ökonomischen und sozialen Beziehungen in den befreiten Zonen zu erkennen

AbstractWe consider a market for pollution emission permits in a model in which pollution, generated as by-product of firm's activity, is determined as the sum of firm-specific random shocks and each firm's abatement effort. In such a setting, an expected utility maximizing society demands an efficient abatement effort from each firm. We assume that the abatement effort is decided by each firm and is not observed by the environmental regulator. This leads to a moral hazard problem between firms (agents) and the regulator (principal). The regulator assigns contracts to each firm, each contract consisting of an amount of permits and a linear fine for over-polluting firms. We distinguish those policies where the regulator assigns a low number of permits (restrictive policies) and policies where the number of permits to distribute is high (permissive policies). We show that in a context of restrictive policies there exist policies that achieve efficiency and do not need to discriminate in terms of penalties among over-polluting firms when a market for permits is allowed to operate. We also find that the regulator can set up policies with low penalty levels for almost all firms. Finally, we show that in a context of permissive policies, the market leads to the same efficiency-inducing fine scheme than the corresponding one under autarky.

Abstract
We analyze emission permit auctions in a framework in which a dominant firm enjoys market power both in the auction and in the secondary market while its competitor behaves in a competitive way. We obtain linear equilibrium bidding strategies for both firms and a unique equilibrium of the auction, which is optimal ex-post for the dominant firm. Under specific distributional assumptions we conclude that the auction always awards less permits to the dominant firm than the cost-effective amount. Our results serve as a warning about the properties of auctioning under market power. Under interior solution the auction allocation is dominated by grandfathering in terms of aggregated cost with probability one. As a policy implication, the specific design of the auction turns out to be crucial for cost-effectiveness. The chances of the auction to outperform grandfathering require that the former is capable of diluting the market power that is present in the secondary market.

We compare auctioning and grandfathering as allocation mechanisms of emission permits when there is a secondary market with market power and the firms have private information. Based on real-life cases such as the EU ETS, we consider a multi-unit, multi-bid uniform auction, modelled as a Bayesian game of incomplete information. At the auction each firm anticipates his role in the secondary market, which affects the firms' valuation of the permits (that are not common across firms) as well as their bidding strategies and it precludes the auction from generating a cost-effective allocation of permits, as it would occur in simpler auction models. Auctioning tends to be more cost-effective than grandfathering when the firms' costs are asymmetric enough, especially if the follower has lower abatement costs than the leader and uncertainty about the marginal costs is large enough. If market power spills over the auction, the latter is always less cost-effective than grandfathering. One central policy implication is that the specific design of the auction turns out to be crucial for cost-effectiveness. The chances of the auction to outperform grandfathering require that the former is capable of diluting the market power that is present in the secondary market.

[ES] Este artículo se ha fundamentado en fuentes y métodos de trabajo dedicados a la vida política de las ciudades castellanas con voto en Cortes en la Edad Moderna. El estudio de una oligarquía urbana concreta —la murciana— en tiempos de las reformas llevadas a cabo por el Conde Duque de Olivares permite un acercamiento más al conocimiento de la sociedad castellana en lo que se refiere a su articulación en el interior de la entidad política superior que llamamos Monarquía Hispánica. Se constata la problemática de la selección de fuentes que determinará el desarrollo futuro de su estudio, en una doble dirección: bien analizando el caso particular de una ciudad, cabeza de provincia, bien una aproximación global que afecte a toda Castilla. En este trabajo se aborda el primer caso, esto es, la utilización especialmente de las Actas Capitulares y concretamente el análisis de las votaciones del cabildo municipal murciano entre 1621 y 1627 que aportan un índice más que fiable del ritmo político del colectivo murciano frente a la coyuntura que se plantea con la reformas de Olivares, ofreciendo en último término una nueva visión de la ruptura de la cohesión de la oligarquía murciana. ; [EN] ABASTRACT: This article has its foundations in sources and work methods devoted to the political life of those Castillian cities of the Modern Age which had the right to vote at the «Cortes». Th study of a specific urban oligarchy —that of Murcia— during the times of the reforms carried out by the Count-Duke of Olivares, provides another approach to our knowledge of Castillian society and, in particular, to its workings within higher politics, known as the Hispanic Monarchy. We lay out the difficults in source selection, which will determine the future development of the particular case of one provincial capital city, or through an overall approach applicable to the whole Castile. This paper follows the former course with special research of its study, in two ways; either through an anlysis of the Chapter Records ans a specific analysis of the votes of the Municipal Council of Murcia between 1621 and 1627. These provide a highly reliable measure of the political activity of that society in the light of the situation brought about by the Olivares reforms, and they lead us towards a new view of the breaking up of the Murcia Oligarchy.