Suchergebnisse

Abstract
Global banks and interconnected national banking sectors have been a main characteristic of the modern international financial systems over the last half century. After a sluggish wake up in the early postwar years, international banking took off in the 1970s as the Euromarkets gained traction and strongly developed in the lead up to the international debt crisis of 1982. This article examines the birth of bank globalization in Latin America, a region of the developing world at the centre of global finance and Euromarket developments during this period. It shows that, like their counterparts in industrial countries, leading banking institutions from the region also went international, expanding their presence overseas and their participation in the Euromarkets. The world leading financial centres of London and New York were the main destinations, but they also settled in offshore centres in the Caribbean and other US financial districts from where they conducted international business on their own or in collaboration with other banks. The presence in Germany along with the joint business between Latin American and German banks in the Euromarkets are explored as well. While assessing the extent and scope of early Latin American bank globalization for the first time, the article also provides insights on the evolution and changing nature of this process over the following period.

AbstractThe recent European debt crisis has renewed interest as to why debtor countries honour their foreign debts and subscribe to respectively burdensome rescheduling conditions. While the cost of defaulting in a domestic financial system has been recognised as a main motive for repayment, the factors that cause sovereign states to refrain from debt repudiation are not fully understood. This article investigates the reasons behind the repayment decision and weak negotiating position of the Mexican government following the 1982 debt crisis. It shows that leading commercial banks had considerable amounts of external loans in their books, and that Mexican policymakers lacked the foreign exchange access they needed to secure the stability of the domestic banking system. The high exposure of domestic banks to Mexican debt and their heightened dependence on foreign capital worked as mechanisms that allowed international creditors to enforce their claims and deterred Mexico from declaring a unilateral default.

AbstractThis article explores the international expansion of Mexican banks and its implications for the domestic banking system during the decade leading up to the 1982 debt crisis. In contrast to the prevalent focus in the literature on profitability and performance, I examine the asset and liability structure of the banking sector and show that there were clear signs of deterioration in its financial condition well before the onset of the crisis. Financial statement analysis reveals that the banks engaged in international lending and foreign funding were the ones with the greatest propensity to be adversely affected by this problem. The international expansion of Mexican banks emerged and developed as an exit option to domestic funding problems and increasing competition from foreign bank loans, in a context of growing needs for financing and foreign exchange in Mexico.

Large foreign lending and heavy indebtedness of developing countries are main features of international finance in leading to the debt crisis of the 1980s. The high exposure of the commercial banking sector from industrial countries to external debt in the developing world by the time of the Mexican default in August 1982 is well known. However, although importantly involved in foreign finance and the petrodollar recycling process, the condition of commercial banks from debtor countries themselves has been much less recognized and explored. This paper shows that the health and financial position of the Mexican commercial banking sector significantly deteriorated in the years preceding the debt crisis, and that internationalization was an exit option to domestic fundraising difficulties. Economic and financial analysis of the banks' asset and liability structure demonstrate that banks involved in international business had greater risk levels than those operating only in the domestic market, which puts international banking at the heart of the problem. The paper provides new insights into the domestic and international political economy of a lending-borrowing mechanism that led to what was perhaps the largest global financial crisis since the Great Depression.

The Great recession has brought back to foreground the link between trade credit, international trade and economic growth. Scholars have recently found that the effects of the fall in trade finance are strong and accurately explain the recent fall in international trade. We argue that the lost decade that followed Latin America's debt crisis is a useful comparative benchmark to recognize the scope of impact on international trade stemming from a sharp decline in trade finance. The years that followed the Mexican debt default of 1982 experienced a decrease in the financial flows to the region. However, the lending policies adopted by export agencies had a countercyclical effect. They reacted to defaults by suspending their cover activities for exports to defaulting countries, but soon reintroduced them once governments entered into a credit program from the IMF. This paper is the first to estimate the impact of trade finance on international trade in the aftermath of Latin America's debt crisis.