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Laws governing electoral issues (hereinafter electoral laws) are vital to representation in a democracy and its existence. This short post outlines why and how electoral laws should be subject to higher approval requirements and heightened judicial review.

Abstract
Courts having the ability to invalidate procedurally correct constitutional amendments for violating core democratic or constitutional values is a growing practice in global constitutionalism. However, this power is generally exercised by courts on a whim and very often without any textual basis. Such actions raise serious legitimacy concerns and can undermine efforts towards regular constitutional change. In extreme cases, this power has been wielded by courts in ways that contribute to democratic backsliding rather than its prevention. Few solutions to police this power of courts and prevent net negatives exist. These solutions either fall short of addressing the challenges of courts invalidating procedurally correct constitutional amendments or rely heavily on judges' restraint and good faith, qualities which we struggle to see in many jurisdictions where courts exercise this power. In turn, this article outlines a template for courts to use when evaluating the validity of procedurally correct constitutional amendments. This article's suggested template hopes to prevent courts from misusing their powers while still leaving sufficient room for them to act to prevent threats to a polity's democratic and/or constitutional project. It aims to do so by reducing the subjective discretion available to judges relative to other available templates.

AbstractThe constituent power theory, which served critical functions for several years, has outlived its utility as the preeminent yardstick to measure the normative legitimacy of a constitution. As the theory stands, it cannot apply on its own terms to most instances of modern constitution-making. At the same time, it is highly susceptible to being used to legitimize authoritarian outcomes. The scholarly literature that attempts to reimagine or expand the theory is scant and unable to overcome its problems. In response, this article develops an alternative standard: the theory of equitable elite bargaining. This theory provides that a constitution is normatively legitimate if it is the product of an equitable bargain between elites from most major political groups in society at the moment of constitution-making. The theory of equitable elite bargaining is applicable to the realities of modern constitution-making and makes it more difficult to legitimize authoritarian constitutions. Further, both representation-based and consequentialist arguments can justify a constitution drafted in accordance with the theory as normatively legitimate. The theory imposes a standard that can result in arduous constitution-making processes and moderated constitutional content. Additionally, its focus on elites poses challenging questions. However, this article will argue that the net benefits of this theory warrant its consideration as a new standard to assess normative constitutional legitimacy.

Globally, more than half the attempts at making a democratic constitution have failed to produce one. Another large number of constitutions have suffered the ignominy of having a draft made and implemented, but ultimately being rejected by the populace or political elites for failing to perform its intended functions. A curious case emerges in instances when would-be-autocrats draft authoritarian constitutions in democratic regimes. They do it rather successfully. Moreover, they do so without using force, with the consent of large sections of the society, and in ostensibly democratic ways. The question that then arises is how would-be-autocrats are more successful than their democratic counterparts in such ventures. Using three varied examples of authoritarian constitution-making from Hungary, Venezuela, and Turkey, this article will examine the 'method and madness' behind the success of would-be autocrat's constitution-making endeavors and these authoritarian constitutions' acceptance by the populace ; Globally, more than half the attempts at making a democratic constitution have failed to produce one. Another large number of constitutions have suffered the ignominy of having a draft made and implemented, but ultimately being rejected by the populace or political elites for failing to perform its intended functions. A curious case emerges in instances when would-be-autocrats draft authoritarian constitutions in democratic regimes. They do it rather successfully. Moreover, they do so without using force, with the consent of large sections of the society, and in ostensibly democratic ways. The question that then arises is how would-be-autocrats are more successful than their democratic counterparts in such ventures. Using three varied examples of authoritarian constitution-making from Hungary, Venezuela, and Turkey, this article will examine the 'method and madness' behind the success of would-be autocrat's constitution-making endeavors and these authoritarian constitutions' acceptance by the populace