Alleviating COVID-19's fallout on the most affected will require improving welfare delivery well into an increasingly digital age. How can digital welfare policies achieve these ends while avoiding pitfalls?
Negotiations for a multilateral tax treaty are ongoing, even as the pandemic diverts political energy and provides pretext for delay. Can countries cobble together a consensus, and in what ways will agreement be meaningful?
Boasting an increasingly wired and growing middle class, as well as a wealth of data stemming from a 642-million-strong population, ASEAN's digital economy is ripe for the picking. By 2025, it will be worth an estimated US$240 billion. The prospects of market dominance and significant data pools to be mined for developing future technologies, combined with ASEAN's geostrategic location, have lured greater major power interest into the region's digital economy. Though global tech titans are more visible players in ASEAN's digital space, greater government-to government cooperation is emerging as economics and security become increasingly intertwined. What then might this mean for ASEAN?
As progress in global governance fora decelerates, minilateralism is increasingly pushed to the fore as a complement, and more provocatively, as an alternative to multilateralism. In contrast to the multiple interests of an expanding and diverse membership, as well as the geopoliticisation of governance issues stemming from escalating US-China tensions, minilaterals offer an edge vis-à-vis informality, select membership, and a narrower issue based focus. Despite this promise, however, minilateralism has a mixed track record given factors, both external and internal, to minilaterals themselves. Considering a recent slew of recommendations for greater minilateral participation on the part of ASEAN members, and more broadly, countries within the Indo-Pacific, this report examines opportunities for and challenges to enhancing the effectiveness of minilateralism in a post-COVID-19 era, with an eye towards strengthening multilateral governance.
The Belt and Road Initiative, and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, have new dimensions and new players. But how are these concepts unfolding, and will they move past existing pitfalls?
Studies on renewable energy (RE) policies and policy making have generally focused on the Global North. This article homes in on how trust, an underexamined concept in the multi‐level governance literature, affects RE trajectories in Malaysia and Indonesia. Through comparative analysis, we find that different levels of trust result in similar degrees of RE policy support, but dissimilar degrees of engagement between state and societal actors in RE policy making. Negative expectations of the social grievances engendered by RE transitions contribute to reluctant, though legitimized, pursuits of clean energy production and consumption. Meanwhile, trust in actors' nationalism—that is, in opposing a Global North environmental agenda and demonstrating constitutionally aligned resource management in Malaysia and Indonesia, respectively—facilitates more inclusive policy making. Due to greater nationalism, Indonesia's state‐society engagement in RE governance is stronger and leads to a civil RE movement that outpaces Malaysia's overall.Related ArticlesAsh, John. 2010. "New Nuclear Energy, Risk, and Justice: Regulatory Strategies for an era of Limited Trust." Politics & Policy 38 (2): 225‐284. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2010.00237.xKhodr, Hiba, and Isabella Ruble. 2013. "Energy Policies and Domestic Politics in the MENA Region in the Aftermath of the Arab Upheavals: The Cases of Lebanon, Libya, and KSA." Politics & Policy 41 (5): 656‐689. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12033Wood, Steve. 2009. "Energy Security, Normative Dilemmas, and Institutional Camouflage: Europe's Pragmatism." Politics & Policy 37 (3): 611‐635. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2009.00187.x
introduction Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) was declared a global pandemic as of 11 March 2020 [1]. Immediately, the Malaysian government initiated a nationwide Movement Control Order (MCO) of various phases (starting 18 March 2020) to stop the spread of this potentially deadly infection. Having adequate knowledge regarding COVID-19 is paramount, especially for healthcare workers (HCWs). This study aims to assess COVID-19 knowledge, attitude and practice (KAP) among HCWs in Perlis and recognize the challenges they faced while working during the MCO period. Materials and Methods Study design: Multicentric cross-sectional web-based survey. Study population: HCWs in Perlis • Data collection period: 29th May to 27th July 2020 • Study site: Government and private healthcare facilities in Perlis. Data collection tool: A 4 knowledge, 9 attitude and 4 practice item validated questionnaire (Cronbach's alpha=0.71, 0.72, 0.72 respectively). 14 items assessed the MCO challenges. The survey consists of 6 sections (Table 1). Links to the online questionnaire were later generated and shared to WhatsApp groups of HCWs in Perlis. Each eligible and consenting participant completed an online informed consent form before answering the questionnaire. Data analysis: Using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software version 20.0 [2]. Descriptive analysis focused on frequencies and percentages. Chi-square and Fisher's exact test used to determine association between selected demographic variables and KAP scores. Statistical significance level was set at p<0.05. Results 373 respondents (Table 2) were included in the final analysis, of which 48.0% (n=179) were nurses, 14.8% (n=55) doctors, 10.7% (n=40) administrative staffs and others (26.5%, n=99). HCWs from various government and private health sites participated. • Pearson's chi-square test indicated significant association between KAP scores and occupational status (p 10 years of working experience; n=179 (48.0%). KAP scores: Majority of HCWs (69.7%, ...