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An Offer You Can't Refuse? Testing Undue Inducement
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6296
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The Ethics of Incentivizing the Uninformed: A Vignette Study
In: American economic review, Band 107, Heft 5, S. 91-95
ISSN: 1944-7981
Our recent working paper (Ambuehl, Ockenfels, and Stewart 2017) shows theoretically and experimentally that people with higher costs of information processing respond more to an increase in the incentive for a complex transaction, and decide to participate based on a worse understanding of its consequences. Here, we address the resulting tradeoff between the principle of informed consent and the principle of free contract. Respondents to our vignette study on oocyte donation overwhelmingly favor the former and support policies that require donors to thoroughly understand the transaction. This finding helps design markets that are not only efficient but also considered ethical.
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Interpreting the Will of the People - a Positive Analysis of Ordinal Preference Aggregation
In: CESifo Working Paper No. 9317
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Who Opts In? Selection and Disappointment through Participation Payments
In: Rotman School of Management Working Paper No. 3154197
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Working paper
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Working paper
Evaluating Deliberative Competence: A Simple Method with an Application to Financial Choice
In: American economic review, Band 112, Heft 11, S. 3584-3626
ISSN: 1944-7981
We examine methods for evaluating interventions designed to improve decision-making quality when people misunderstand the consequences of their choices. In an experiment involving financial education, conventional outcome metrics (financial literacy and directional behavioral responses) imply that two interventions are equally beneficial even though only one reduces the average severity of errors. We trace these failures to violations of the assumptions embedded in the conventional metrics. We propose a simple, intuitive, and broadly applicable outcome metric that properly differentiates between the interventions, and is robustly interpretable as a measure of welfare loss from misunderstanding consequences even when additional biases distort choices. (JEL D83, D91, G51, G53)
Evaluating Deliberative Competence: A Simple Method with an Application to Financial Choice
In: Global Financial Literacy Excellence Center Working Paper No. 2014-4
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What Motivates Paternalism? An Experimental Study
In: American economic review, Band 111, Heft 3, S. 787-830
ISSN: 1944-7981
We study experimentally when, why, and how people intervene in others' choices. Choice Architects (CAs) construct opportunity sets containing bundles of time-indexed payments for Choosers. CAs frequently prevent impatient choices despite opportunities to provide advice, believing Choosers benefit. They violate common behavioral welfare criteria by removing impatient options even when all payoffs are delayed. CAs intervene not by removing options they wish they could resist when choosing for themselves (mistakes-projective paternalism), but rather as if they seek to align others' choices with their own aspirations (ideals-projective paternalism). Laboratory choices predict subjects' support for actual paternalistic policies. (JEL C92, D12, D15)
Evaluating Deliberative Competence: A Simple Method with an Application to Financial Choice
In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15863
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More Money, More Problems? Can High Pay be Coercive and Repugnant?
In: American economic review, Band 105, Heft 5, S. 357-360
ISSN: 1944-7981
IRBs can disallow high incentives they deem coercive. A vignette study on MTurk concerning participation in medical trials shows that a substantial minority of subjects concurs. They think high incentives cause more regret, and that more people would be better off without the opportunity to participate. We model observers as judging the ethicality of incentives by partially using their own utility. The model predicts that payments are repugnant only to the extent that they affect the participation decision, and more so for larger transactions. Incentivizing poorer participants is more repugnant, and in-kind incentives are less repugnant than monetary incentives.
Evaluating Deliberative Competence: A Simple Method with an Application to Financial Choice
In: NBER Working Paper No. w20618
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