Suchergebnisse

Le concept de policing renvoie à une dimension spécifique du contrôle social, et désigne l'existence d'opérations de surveillance couplées à la menace de sanctions en cas de déviance. En appelant à surveiller les transactions financières pour lutter contre la criminalité et le terrorisme, l'action publique internationale contre l'argent sale a légitimé et généralisé au cours de ces dernières décennies une nouvelle forme de policing . Celle-ci implique des acteurs majeurs du capitalisme qui ne sont pas à proprement parler des entreprises de sécurité privée. À l'instar d'initiatives du même ordre plus récentes, elle repose sur l'articulation d'univers relevant, d'une part, de l'économie et de la finance, d'autre part, du pénal et de la sécurité. Comment cette articulation s'opère-t-elle, et avec quels effets, tant sur le fonctionnement de ces univers sociaux que sur l'exercice du policing contemporain ? Pour répondre à ces questions, nous situons l'analyse sur un plan sociotechnique, en étudiant la mise en algorithmes des opérations de surveillance. Figure montante dans le domaine de la sécurité, les algorithmes sont omniprésents au sein du policing financier. En tant qu'objets-frontières, ils constituent un point d'entrée crucial pour étudier les relations entre « économie » et « sécurité » sur lesquelles repose une partie croissante du policing à l'heure des big data .

Abstract
This article aims to question the birth, and subsequent search for recognition, of a new type of intelligence agency, which appeared in the early 1990s and is now institutionalised in a vast majority of states across the world: "Financial intelligence units". It sheds light for the first time on the modalities of access of one of these agencies to the field of security. Following Pierre Bourdieu's field theory, it thus raises the question of the "right of entry" of a new actor to a specific social universe, e.g. "the conditions and modalities for access to a particular 'field' at a given time in its history". Understanding how such intelligence agencies take shape, function and interact with the security-related recipients of their intelligence is crucial for at least two reasons, regarding the policing of illicit capital and associated crimes, and the use of intelligence in contemporary strategies of social control.

AbstractWhen and how did the laundering of 'dirty' money become an object of public concern, debate, and ultimately policy at the intersection of finance and security? This article sheds light on the social construction of money laundering as a public problem in the context of the U.S. War on Drugs during the 1970s and 1980s. By doing so, the article also stresses the heuristic value of questioning the finance-security nexus through an analytics of public problems. Its aims are to: (1) avoid interdisciplinary debates around the finance-security nexus becoming trapped in a zero-sum game between the 'securitization of finance' and the 'financialization of security'; and (2) understand better the emergence, re-configuration, and internal tensions of social spaces at the interface of finance and security.

This article examines dynamics of financial surveillance and risk-based regulation in the context of ongoing activities to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. Close analysis of the situation in the UK reveals entangled forms of co-regulation and ultimately co-production of surveillance that challenge 'institutional boundaries' of the state regarding policing and intelligence practices. It is argued that ongoing transformations in the anti-money laundering field reveal a dual movement that combines forms of indirect administration with a process of 'neoliberal bureaucratization'. The article aims to show how current policies against 'dirty money' still paradoxically work on the basis of heterogeneous goals and misapprehensions between 'professionals of security' and 'professionals of finance'.