Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction
In: Mathematical social sciences, Volume 125, p. 1-10
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In: Mathematical social sciences, Volume 125, p. 1-10
In: Mathematical social sciences, Volume 98, p. 26-38
In: Mathematical social sciences, Volume 83, p. 44-57
In: Public choice, Volume 155, Issue 3, p. 355-371
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Public choice, Volume 155, Issue 3-4, p. 355-371
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Public choice, Volume 144, Issue 1, p. 239-252
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Public choice, Volume 144, Issue 1-2, p. 239-251
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Public choice, Volume 167, Issue 1-2, p. 21-35
ISSN: 1573-7101
A high court has to decide whether a lawis constitutional, unconstitutional, or interpretable. The voting system is runoff. Runoff voting systems can be interpreted both, as social choice functions or as mechanisms. It is known that, for universal domains of preferences, runoff voting systems have several drawbacks as social choice functions. Although in our setting the preferences are restricted to be singlepeaked over three alternatives, these problems persist. Runoff mechanisms are not well-behaved either: they do not implement any Condorcet consistent social choice function in undominated subgame perfect Nash equilibria. We show, however, that some Condorcet consistent social choice functions can be implemented in dominant strategies via other simple and natural mechanisms.
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