Suchergebnisse

This paper examines the evolving political dynamics of regional financial cooperation in East Asia since the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis, examining in particular the factors contributing to the growing momentum behind the recent Asian bond market initiative being pursued by the Association for Southeast Asian (ASEAN) nations plus Japan, China and South Korea (referred to collectively as 'ASEAN+3'). The paper argues that this initiative is making rapid progress because it resonates positively with the domestic political agendas of many leaders in the region, is an initiative that numerous countries can claim at least partial 'ownership' of, and elicits considerable support from actors outside the region.

This paper examines the political dynamics surrounding the Japanese government's initial proposal for the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) in 1997 and the arrangements that have emerged in its place. Specifically, the paper delves into why Japan attempted to embark on regional institution building independent of the United States and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1997 but has since supported the close linkage to the IMF of a network of bilateral currency swap arrangements in the region. The findings reveal the formidable difficulties Japan faces in circumventing the activities of US-dominated multilateral institutions to play a greater leadership role in financial crisis management in Asia.

This article examines the case of institutional inertia in Japanese financial regulation, focusing on the reasons why institutions centered on informal modes of organization and interaction proved particularly 'sticky.' The Japanese case serves as a particularly tough test for theories of institutional adaptation and change because even crisis – a time when the costs of inaction tend to far exceed the benefits – failed to produce timely institutional change. The paper argues that informal, exclusionary and opaque relational ties served as a functional substitute for formal regulation and promoted cooperative government-bank relationships in an earlier period. Yet, when the informal attributes of the system began to impede the sound functioning of the financial system, the very opacity of these ties and the informational dynamics underlying them meant that the Diet and the general public were less than fully aware of the extent of dysfunction present as time went on.

At the beginning of the 1990s, a massive speculative asset bubble burst in Japan, leaving the nation's banks with an enormous burden of nonperforming loans. Banking crises have become increasingly common across the globe, but what was distinctive about the Japanese case was the unusually long delay before the government intervened to aggressively address the bad debt problem. The postponed response by Japanese authorities to the nation's banking crisis has had enormous political and economic consequences for Japan as well as for the rest of the world. This book helps us understand the natur.

Japan Inc was once used to describe the powerful political and economic system that delivers Japan's transformation to an industrial power. This book is about the breakdown and failure of policy coherence in Japan in the 1990s and how the political economy of Japan has changed in response. The essays in the volume seek to identify where change has occurred, as well as where things have not changed and why. The issue of policymaking transparency is accorded particular attention.The book covers a wide range of Japanese institutions and policy areas, including the political party s

This interdisciplinary book gathers contributions from experts in political science, economics, law and Japanese studies to give a deeper understanding of how Japan's political economy and policymaking processes are working today.

The article provides an overview of the politics of postal savings reform in Japan. Although reform of the system has been a subject of debate over the last twenty years, the ascension of Koizumi Jun'ichiro to the prime minister's post in 2001 raised the issue to the forefront of Japanese politics. However, in the course of the past two decades the terms of debate have radically shifted. The key consideration that we analyze is how the nature of political conflict over privatizing the postal savings system has changed over time. Forces opposing reform are at their weakest level in the postwar period while forces in favor of reform are clearly stronger. Yet, particular economic impediments to full-blown privatization are greater than ever. The path to reforming the system is mined with political and financial hazards. (Asian Perspect/DÜI)

A cartoon in the Asahi Shinbun dated 11 August 1993 shows the leaders of the seven political parties participating in the Hosokawa coalition government formed two days before. They are wielding samurai swords and standing triumphant on the inert body of a dinosaur labeled 'single party control'. One of the leaders is holding a banner that reads: 'Next is political reform', and the caption to the cartoon expresses the following sentiment: 'By launching [the new Cabinet], "One Great Task" has been completed' ( Asahi Shinbun, 11 August 1993). At the time it was easy to regard the formation of the first non-Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Cabinet for nearly 38 years as a heroic event. A party mired in corruption, preferring backstage deals to open government and massively influenced by irresponsible bureaucrats and self-serving interest groups had been vanquished by a coalition of far-sighted reformers. These reformers were proposing a coherent programme to democratise and modernise the political, economic and social systems and practices of Japan. As happens following most revolutions, however, what ensued was far more messy and confusing, the politics more murky and the achievements more ambiguous than the initial mood of euphoria would have predicted. Indeed, within a mere nine months of losing office, the LDP dinosaur had revived, and though much less powerful than before, was taking its first steps on the road to regaining its dominant political position. The Hosokawa Cabinet adumbrated a reform agenda whose principal elements were deregulation, decentralisation, economic reforms and a radical change to the electoral system for the House of Representatives. In the event, partly because the tenure of office of his government was so brief, Hosokawa's only solid achievement in the area of political reform was a wholesale rewriting of the electoral law for the Lower House. Although, however, this was arguably the one really major political change that took place in the 1990s, to gauge its effects is far more problematic. Indeed, it is a central argument of this paper that the effects of changing the Lower House electoral system have been quite limited, and that the causes of the most crucial political changes of the 1990s must be sought largely elsewhere. (It is possible, of Pacific Economic Papers course, that the new electoral system may produce more substantial effects in the future, but in any case we cannot assume that the new system will not be further revised in the next few years.)