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PurposeCorporate governance principles are living a positive momentum in light of the megatrends reshaping the world. An effective company based on sound governance principles can prevent issues and corporate scandals as the company ensures greater transparency and accountability. Accordingly, this paper aims to investigate the relationship between shareholder-oriented corporate governance mechanisms, value and performances in the real estate sector.Design/methodology/approachThis paper investigates the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms, performance and value in a sample of 111 USA real estate firms. After collecting data from 2014 to 2018, this paper tests the research hypothesis using the linear fixed-effect model.FindingsThe results demonstrate a positive impact of shareholder-oriented corporate governance mechanisms on performance and value. In particular, firms with no chief executive officer (CEO) duality and staggered board mechanisms and recognizing excess variable compensation to the firms' executive have a significantly higher Tobin's Q, return on assets (ROA) and price-to-book performance.Practical implicationsThe implications are twofold: on the one hand, this motivates shareholders to establish new corporate control mechanisms to maximize value, attract more capital and improve operating performance. On the other hand, this allows investors to direct the investors' resources toward real estate firms with effective corporate governance mechanisms that may return higher performance and value.Originality/valueFocusing on the real estate industry, where governance is expected to have a lower impact due to solid regulation, especially in real estate investment trusts (REITs), the research allows the formulation of industry-specific inferences that may be generalized for the general market.