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Leveraging, according to David M. Anderson and his colleagues, is both a basic principle of human conduct and the most dominant strategy in recent years that individuals, organizations and countries use to pursue their ends. Although many scholars agree that a crisis of "over-leveraging" caused the financial crisis of 2008-2010, it has not been appreciated that an "over-leveraging" crisis has existed in American politics and the American family system as well. This book addresses the need for a "Leverage Mean" (falling between the extremes of too much leverage and too little leverage) in the economy, politics, family life, and international relations. It identifies three different kinds of leveraging-bargaining, resource, and investment and provides an explanatory and normative theory which draws on the fields of economics, political science, sociology, history, psychology, international relations, law, and philosophy. Moreover, it shows how the dissolution of the Cold War, the dismantling of the modern family, and the rise of the Internet along with the deregulation of the financial services industry led to the diffusion of power which has made leveraging of the first importance for everyone. This book should be of interest to social scientists, philosophers, political theorists, public policy makers and politicians. David Anderson and his colleagues are the first to characterize and assess one of the major instruments of power of the contemporary era. This volume represents the best work on leverage since Archimedes and will be widely read and discussed. Benjamin Ginsberg, David Bernstein Professor of Political Science and Chair, Center for Advanced Governmental Studies, Johns Hopkins University Leverage might literally be the operative word of the 21st century. Anderson's volume is a wide-ranging and illuminating study of this fundamental and dynamic concept. Parag Khanna, Senior Fellow, New America Foundation, author of The Second World: How Emerging Powers Are Redefining Global Competition in the Twenty-first Century

In fighting Mau Mau rebels in Kenya between 1952 and 1956, the British armed and deployed an African militia, known as the Kikuyu Home Guard. This article considers the role played by these allies in the counter-insurgency war, looking specifically at amnesty and surrenders. The British held secret talks with Mau Mau leaders in 1954, and again in 1955, to organize rebel surrenders. The politics of surrenders split the Mau Mau movement, and also raised massive opposition amongst white settlers. Amnesty and impunity were inducements to Mau Mau surrenders, but were offered primarily to prevent disaffection and desertion among loyalist Kikuyu African militia allies who feared prosecution for abuses and atrocities carried out during counter-insurgency operations. Loyalist Africans also feared the consequences of rebels returning to their home communities. Amnesty and promises of impunity thus shaped the character of Kenya's counter-insurgency campaign and the decolonization that followed. This was determined by the need for the British to secure the continued support of African allies up to Kenya's independence in 1963, and beyond.

AbstractThe article examines the history of the violent 1955 Perfect Circle strike to join the growing body of labor history scholarship that rejects the existence of a postwar "labor-management accord." Contrary to previous depictions of a postwar "class peace," the small-town industrial Midwest stood as a key battleground between unionized workers and competitive-sector employers such as the Indiana-based Perfect Circle Corporation, a small, family-owned manufacturer, a model welfare capitalist firm, and one of the nation's leading automotive parts producers. Driven by their desire to hold down labor costs and their own antistatist ideology, Perfect Circle's owners had opposed the New Deal and, by the late 1930s, had shed their previous provincialism to join the national political coalition of business conservatives in the National Association of Manufacturers to secure the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. During the Cold War era, even while they were extending their political reach and expanding their operations overseas, Perfect Circle's owners sought to forge labor-management unity by promoting a quaint vision of "heartland consensus," a conservative civic identity that management was convinced would render unions unnecessary. As with many business conservatives, Perfect Circle owners tried to rid their plants of unions by tapping into an interlocking network of well-financed right-wing policy groups to mount an extensive employee educational program and public relations campaign in defense of "free enterprise." Despite Perfect Circle's vigorous efforts to undercut unionization, by 1953 the majority of workers at all four of its east-central Indiana plants voted to affiliate with the United Auto Workers (UAW). Conflict between labor and management culminated in the violent 1955 strike, in which Perfect Circle handed the UAW a decisive defeat while enjoying widespread support from the regional and national press. The strike became a conservativecause célèbreduring the 1957 national "right-to-work" campaign and a centerpiece of the Senate's 1958 McClellan "Labor Rackets" hearings, which launched Barry Goldwater's bid for the 1964 presidency. The article concludes that Perfect Circle and many other employers not only continued to contest unions in the 1950s but also played a neglected but important role in the formation of the New Right.

Since the ending of colonial rule, the struggle for independence in Kenya has been seen as a triumph for the nationalist politics of the Kenya African National Union (KANU), the party that was victorious in the 1963 elections and held power until 2002. This article returns to the party politics of decolonization to reconsider the alternative vision of Kenya's future then promoted by KANU's rival party, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). KADU supported majimboism (regionalism), a proposal for decentralization in which six or more provinces would each have equal status. In the heated politics of the early 1960s, majimboists were derided by KANU as tribalists. Under the de facto one-party state of Kenyatta's KANU government, the majimboist cause was obscured by the nationalist project. This article returns to the forgotten history of majimboism to argue that the debates of the early 1960s remain relevant in contemporary Kenya. It outlines the politics of the majimbo debate of the 1960s to argue that regionalism was rooted in a colonial system of political mobilization. Those who supported majimboism were minorities, both African and European, fearing economic domination because of the underdevelopment of their regions, or political exclusion in a nation state dominated by more populous ethnic groups. The electoral politics of region and nation took shape within KADU and KANU respectively. The article goes on to analyse the importance of the Regional Boundaries Commission of 1962 in consolidating public support behind the two parties. The conclusion examines the revival of majimboism in the re-emergence of multi-party politics during the 1990s. Many of the constitutional claims made by KADU in the early 1960s are now again under consideration by the National Rainbow Coalition (NaRC) government, and majimboist ideas can be heard from KANU, now in opposition. Majimboism reflects a fundamental tension between region and nation that was not adequately addressed in the independence settlement. Its current revival highlights the limitations of the colonial model of government that Kenya retained. For that reason, regionalism may yet be a more enduring political project than was nationalism.