Suchergebnisse

Scholars are divided on the merits of ethnofederalism as an institutional approach to the management of ethnically divided societies. For some, ethnofederalism is a potentially workable compromise between the demands for independence of territorially concentrated ethnic groups and the desire of a common state to preserve its territorial integrity; for critics, it is a short-cut to secession and ultimate state collapse. The argument of critics is theoretically plausible, but an examination of the universe of post-1945 states with ethnofederal arrangements, both failures and successes, shows that ethnofederalism has succeeded more often than it has failed. Within this universe of cases, moreover, ethnofederalism has demonstrably outperformed institutional alternatives, and where ethnofederal systems have failed, they have failed where no institutional alternatives could plausibly have succeeded. The increasing enthusiasm among policymakers and practitioners for prescribing federal solutions to ethnic problems is both understandable and defensible in light of these findings.

The current struggle to define the basic contours of Iraq's political system pits those who support a loose federal arrangement against advocates of a return to centralized rule. Increasingly, this struggle is being defined in ethnic terms, with (mainly) Kurds defending the constitutional status quo against concerted efforts on the part of (Arab) Iraqi nationalists to reconfigure the balance of power between the center and the regions. The March 2010 election seems certain to strengthen the latter at the expense of the former. This paper outlines an alternative approach to Iraq's federalism dilemma. Using the exemplar case of the Åland it is argued that a strongly centralized Arab Iraq is not inherently incompatible with an autonomous Kurdistan Region, and that by anchoring the Kurds' autonomous status in international law, a destructive descent towards violent ethnic conflict can be avoided. (Ethnopolitics)

The choice between a proportional representation (PR) or plurality-based electoral system is commonly assumed to involve a trade-off. The former is assumed to provide fairer representation but at a cost in terms of stability and effectiveness. Recent work by Lijphart and others suggests that not only are PR-based (consensus) systems more democratic than plurality-based (majoritarian) systems but they are also more effective in terms of macroeconomic performance. This article offers a critical reexamination of these claims. The author provides empirical evidence that the superior performance of consensus democracy on two important macroeconomic indicators—inflation and unemployment—is driven largely by corporatism and central bank independence. After controlling for these, the results indicate that the core elements of consensus democracy are associated with higher rates of both inflation and unemployment. Whereas corporatism and independent central banks are claimed as elements of a broader concept of consensus democracy, the author argues that neither can be comfortably accommodated within the consensus framework depicted by Lijphart.

My research focuses on the effectiveness of granting territorial autonomy to compact ethnic groups (ethnofederalism) as a means of easing ethnic tensions in divided societies. The general consensus among scholars is that ethnic autonomy is an unwise institutional choice because it increases the likelihood that dissatisfied ethnic groups will separate from a parent state. However, few critics seem willing to offer and defend convincing alternatives to ethnofederalism that are both politically feasible to implement and that can plausibly succeed in cases where ethnofederalism fails. In a recent journal article, I evaluated alternatives to ethnofederalism using the logic of a same-systei` comparative approach, applied to a medium-N universe of cases. This case study examines the difficulties involved in the systematic comparison of political institutions when the number of relevant cases is too small for statistical analysis but too large for detailed case studies. I then outline the logic of a same-system design, which compares the same state at two different points in time and under different institutions, and highlight the benefits and limitations of this approach.

Exploring five distinct models of federal arrangement, this book evaluates the relative merits of each model as a mechanism for managing relations in ethnically divided societies. Two broad approaches to this issue, accommodation and denial, are identified and, from this, five distinct models of federal arrangement are derived. The models; ethnic, anti-ethnic, territorial, ethno-territorial, and federacy, are defined and then located within their broader theoretical tradition. Detailed case studies are used to evaluate the strengths and weakness of each model and highlight pat.