Suchergebnisse

We experimentally test a rent seeking model under five levels of competition. At one extreme, a subject's probability of winning a prize is equal to her share of the total expenditures. At lower levels of competition, a subject's probability of winning is affected more by her own expenditures than by the expenditures of others. Predicted expenditure levels are positively associated with higher levels of competition. Consistent with previous rent seeking experiments, we find that subjects spend significantly more than the Nash equilibrium prediction at all levels of competition. However, expenditure patterns generally follow the Nash prediction; expenditures decrease as the level of competition decreases. Our experimental design also includes a lottery choice experiment to control for subjects' risk preference. We find that subjects who are more risk averse spend significantly less in the contest and this effect is particularly strong for female subjects. Adapted from the source document.

We test several predictions of Gradstein's (1995) rent-seeking model using an experimental design that includes a variable number of participants, cost heterogeneity, & an entry fee. Consistent with theoretical predictions, cost heterogeneity & the entry fee decrease the number of participants. Overall, participation is much lower than predicted. Also consistent with Gradstein's model, we find that rent-seeking expenditures increase with the number of competitors & decrease with the addition of an entry fee. Experimental results do not support the prediction that cost heterogeneity generally decreases expenditures in rent-seeking contests. 6 Tables, 1 Appendix, 14 References. Adapted from the source document.

In a model of simultaneous voting, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) consider the possibility that jurors vote strategically, rather than sincerely reflecting their individual information. This results in the counterintuitive result that a jury is more likely to convict the innocent under a unanimity rule than under majority rule. Dekel and Piccione (2000) show that those unintuitive predictions also hold with sequential voting. In this paper, we report paired experiments with sequential and simultaneous voting under unanimity and majority rule. Observed behavior varies significantly depending on whether juries vote simultaneously or in sequence. We also find evidence that subjects use information inferred from prior votes in making their sequential voting decisions, but that information implied by being pivotal in simultaneous votes does not seem to be reliably processed. ; publishedVersion ; Peer reviewed