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This article discusses the effects of standard corruption measurement, as used in comparativeresearch, for its accuracy in estimating and understanding corruption. Implicitly, standard measurementstreat corruption as a one-dimensional phenomenon (measured by a single score) that can varyin incidence between countries (or other geographical entities), but not in form. Such measurementsalso tend to equate corruption with bribery. This article argues that the degree to which onedimensionalbribery-focused measurements constitute a suitable proxy for corruption differs acrosscountries (i.e., the measurement discrepancy is not random across countries). In particular, thesemeasurements are ill-suited to capture corruption in established democracies with highly developedeconomies, where corruption is expected to center on gaining access to and influence within strongstate institutions rather than on bribery. Sweden, a "least-corrupt" case, is used to illustrate theeffects of relying on such measurements in such a setting, and to show that whereas bribery mightbe a relatively rare event, undue influence and interest conflicts can be a frequent occurrence. ; Trust and Corruption in Local Politics (Tillit och korruption i lokalpolitiken)

One of the main drivers of the rapid growth of corruption research the last 20 years is the easy access to empirical data via corruption rankings and composite indices that can be used for large-N analysis. It is also these indicators that mainly are used to place countries in the comparative literature (and elsewhere) and in analyses of the relationship between corruption and, among else, democracy, economic output and growth and institutional performance. Without doubt this literature has contributed to the field but there are also problems. In focus here are the effects of the habitual treatment of corruption as a single-dimensional phenomenon, and often tantamount to bribery, and as spatially constant within a country. I argue that the effects of this on our estimations and understanding of corruption are particularly well illustrated by established democracies with highly developed market economies placed in the category of "least-corrupt" countries (as manyWest European states), as corruption in these countries on theoretical grounds can be assumed not to centre on bribery. In the article I use Sweden, almost always referred to as a least corrupt case, to unveil what we see using various corruption indicators but also what we do not see when we employ the standard comparative measurements and legal data. Although we would expect corruption types other than bribery to be important in such a case (a least corrupt one), not least conflict of interest, this is missed out when we use the indicators that have become the standard in the literature. I conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for the accuracy of corruption measurement and by arguing for studies that nuance our picture of corruption, and also bring in conflict of interest.

In this dissertation I study corruption in the public sector in Sweden, a country which the literature regards as having few corruption problems. Sweden is therefore classified as a "least corrupt" case, and such countries are seldom studied in corruption research. My work is thus an effort to fill a gap in the literature. This research is also motivated by a conviction that such a case provides a fertile ground for studying danger zones for corruption. For example, this work allows me to explore how institutional and contextual changes impact on corruption and danger zones. Though the main focus of this work is on Sweden, I also have comparative ambitions. First, I locate Sweden in a cross-national context. I then study corruption in Sweden using a comparative methodology and with an eye to international comparisons. I apply a combined theoretical approach and a multi-method investigation based on several empirical sources and both quantitative and qualitative techniques. This research strategy enables me to capture a phenomenon (corruption) that is more difficult to identify in countries with relatively few obvious corruption scandals than it is in countries in which the phenomenon has traditionally been studied. Regarding danger zones for corruption, the results show that some of the zones identified in the international literature, such as public procurement, are also important in Sweden. For the Swedish case, my empirical research also identifies the types of corruption that occur, perceptions of danger zones and corruption, how corruption changes over time, and how corruption is fought. With regard to the latter, one conclusion is that ingrained (male) sub-cultures can be problematic and may need to be opened up using a combination of measures like promoting a more heterogeneous group of politicians, creating more transparent proceedings in decision groups and conducting more effective audits. The research also highlights the importance of adapting control measures to existing structures of delegation. For example, if delegation arrangements are changed to improve efficiency and cut costs, new accountability measures may be necessary. In general, delegation and control structures should be structured in such a way as to make the cost of shirking quite high. Finally, based on the results of this multi-method investigation, I conclude that one avenue for further corruption research is to connect our knowledge of danger zones to what we know about mechanisms effecting corrupt behaviour, and then to apply this to discussions of new models of the politics of management in multi-level governance.

This article studies two Swedish organizations with key roles in the facilitation and promotion of ethics management vis-à-vis other public-sector organizations. The study offers insights into how organizations combine and prioritize ethics management measures, involve submanagement employees, and consider external stakeholders, in contexts of democratic governance and public concern about corruption. Our findings suggest that these types of bird's-eye view organizations studied are important as they are in a position less prone to ad hoc scandal-driven responses. They can thus promote strategies that consider a combination of aspects and avoid a narrow rules-based focus.

This article studies two Swedish organizations with key roles in the facilitation and promotion of ethics management vis-à-vis other public-sector organizations. The study offers insights into how organizations combine and prioritize ethics management measures, involve submanagement employees, and consider external stakeholders, in contexts of democratic governance and public concern about corruption. Our findings suggest that these types of bird's-eye view organizations studied are important as they are in a position less prone to ad hoc scandal-driven responses. They can thus promote strategies that consider a combination of aspects and avoid a narrow rules-based focus.

The aims of this article are, first, to describe the Swedish authorities' strategy for dealing with the sudden onset of novel coronavirus in early 2020 and, second, to explain why that strategy differed markedly from those in nearly all other European countries. From an early stage, the Swedish government delegated decision making to the Public Health Agency, and its goal was to mitigate the effects of the virus rather than to suppress its spread. Society was never closed down in the same way as elsewhere. Using data from media reports and other publications, we argue that the agency was insulated from pressure to change course, even as the number of deaths associated with covid-19 rose far above those in Sweden's Nordic neighbours, by four conditions: (1) the structure of national public administration; (2) an outburst of nationalism in parts of the media; (3) the uneven impact of the virus; and (4) a political leadership that was willing to delegate responsibility for policy almost entirely. We conclude by briefly comparing the coronavirus strategy to previous episodes of Swedish policy exceptionalism. This emerging pattern, we suggest, raises normative questions about the functioning of Swedish democracy.

Much of the literature on political corruption is based on indices such as the ones presented by Transparency International, but the reliability and validity of these indices are questionable. The main alternative approach – qualitative case studies – often lacks a theoretical framework allowing for systematic empirical analysis. To remedy this shortcoming, this article places qualitative case studies into the framework of principal‐agent theory. The cases comprise two Swedish county councils (regional governments), both of which reorganised their administrations in similar ways in the 1990s. One experienced corruption scandals, but the other did not. In comparing them, the article links the propensity for corruption to institutional design – in particular, the mechanisms of delegation and control.