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The sudden and stunning fall of Kabul on 15 August 2021 to the Taliban raised many questions about the immediate and underlying causes of the state's collapse, the consequences of the US/NATO's retreat, and what the Taliban's military victory meant for Afghanistan, the region and beyond. This article focuses on the main causes of the collapse and attempts to offer an uncomplicated yet inclusive picture first by explaining the immediate overriding security and political triggers and then by examining the underlying strategic, structural and historical factors. A ground-level assessment of the situation indicated that the resumption of the Doha talks in late 2018 and its subsequent political, diplomatic and military repercussions building over months contributed to the precipitous collapse. However, a bird's eye-view analysis revealed that structural flaws in the design, process and implementation of the post 9/11 state-building efforts in Afghanistan such as a top-down, highly centralised and winner takes all system, and a weak public participation and accountability mechanism were among the underlying failure factors.

Peace processes offer opportune moments for social and political transformation in embattled nations. There is no perfect formula or peace recipe. As per the existing literature, the 'ripeness' of circumstances and timing of a peace process and pertinence of the 'substance' of settlements to the root causes of conflict are the main components of a viable peace agreement. In the past 30 years, Afghanistan experienced two unsuccessful peacemaking episodes: first after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and the second following the removal of the Taliban in 2001. While failure of the former is primarily attributed to the complexities of circumstance at the time, ineptness of the latter is linked to the primacy of imposed deadlines over inclusive consultations and inadequacy of contents of the Bonn Agreement. By briefly examining substantive characteristics of peacemaking processes in the context of Najibullah's National Reconciliation Policy and the Bonn process, this article argues that meaningful structural change in favour of an inclusive and participatory political system and institutionalization of a regional balance of interests in foreign relations remain central to enduring peace in Afghanistan.

This book analyzes the application of neutrality policies after the end of the Cold War with a focus on Eurasian states and international organizations. The 15 chapters discuss Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Serbia, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Mongolia, the UN, ASEAN, and several theoretical neutrality developments between 1991 and 2021.