Suchergebnisse

Este trabalho classifica os diferentes tipos existentes de rankings na educação, bem como aponta problemas encontrados e apresenta contribuições para resolução dos mesmos. Sobre os principais rankings oficiais brasileiros conclui-se que: (i) O MEC tem uma política distinta para o ranking no Ensino Superior vis-à-vis ao do Ensino Médio - no primeiro ele estima o valor adicionado e preocupa-se em inibir comportamentos oportunísticos; (ii) foco nos resultados do Enem/Enade pode levar a um alvo diferente da qualidade da educação; (iii) a escolha ad hoc dos pesos componentes do ranking da graduação torna questionável a sua utilização; (iv) é importante o fornecimento dos intervalos de confiança dos valores adicionados estimados.

This paper compares theoretically three alternative university systems: the current one adopted in Brazil, in which students who perform better in the entering exam obtain the right to attend the public university without paying the full tuition; a system of affirmative action quotas in public universities, to benefit low income students; and a targeted vouchers system that can be used either to pay private or public university tuiton. The comparison indicates that the last system leads to: (i) a higher quality of the labor force; (ii) a more efficient allocation of resources; and (iii) a greater social mobility.

An alternative to the education policy in Brasil: School accountability. This paper examines the school accountability (SA) policies adopted in the US. Significant impacts on the quality of education occur when the SA incorporates a set of sanctions and rewards to schools based on their students' performance. In comparison with other policies, it is also more efficient. Potential problems of adopting the SA (bias toward cognitive ability, gaming and difficulty in measuring the school contribution) can be overcome. The analysis suggests that the SA should be considered as an alternative to improve the quality of education in Brazil. (Rev Econ Polit/GIGA)

This paper analyses the most important experiences with school accountability policy (SA) in Brazil. The analysis suggests that their impacts on the quality of education are not significant due to the fact that: (i) either it does not incorporate a system in which the school is responsible for the students' performance; (ii) or the incentive schemes are not appropriately designed. Finally, it discusses the main barriers to the adoption of an efficient SA at the national level in Brazil. (Rev Econ Polit/GIGA)

This paper analyzes theoretically the effects on the quality of the labor force of the introduction of the program called ProUni (Programa Universidade para Todos), adopted by the Brazilian government in 2005. This program consists of giving tax exemptions to private universities that provide scholarships to students coming from low income families. The analysis suggests that the quality of the labor force can either increase or decrease depending on two crucial variables: the shape of the university sector's supply curve and the level of preparation to face university studies of the students who are targeted by the program vis-à-vis the non-targeted ones.

Este trabalho analisa, teoricamente, os efeitos do Programa Universidade para Todos (ProUni), introduzido pelo governo federal do Brasil no ano de 2005, sobre a qualidade da força de trabalho formada nas universidades privadas. Esse programa concede isenção fiscal para as universidades privadas que, em contrapartida, fornecem bolsas de estudo para alunos provenientes de famílias de baixa renda. A análise sugere que a qualidade da força de trabalho pode aumentar ou diminuir dependendo de duas variáveis-chave: o formato da curva de oferta do setor universitário e o nível de preparação para cursar a universidade dos bolsistas vis-à-vis aos não-bolsistas. ; This paper analyzes theoretically the effects on the quality of the labor force of the introduction of the program called ProUni (Programa Universidade para Todos), adopted by the Brazilian government in 2005. This program consists of giving tax exemptions to private universities that provide scholarships to students coming from low income families. The analysis suggests that the quality of the labor force can either increase or decrease depending on two crucial variables: the shape of the university sector's supply curve and the level of preparation to face university studies of the students who are targeted by the program vis-à-vis the non-targeted ones.

RESUMO Este artigo compara o grau de transparência do Banco Central do Brasil (Bacen) com o verificado em outros Bancos Centrais (BCs) selecionados. Seguindo a metodologia desenvolvida em Hann e Eijffinger (2000), construímos um indicador de transparência baseado em: (i) quão claros os BCs estão com relação a seus objetivos de política monetária, e (ii) como os BCs são transparentes na implementação de sua política monetária. O Bacen tornou-se mais transparente após a adoção do regime de metas para a inflação em 1999. No entanto, esses procedimentos mais transparentes não fazem parte da lei que regulamenta o Bacen, indicando que eles podem ser facilmente substituídos.

This paper compares the degree of transparency of the Brazilian Central Bank (Bacen) with the one verified in other selected Central Banks (CBs). Following the methodology developed in Hann and Eijffinger (2000), we constructed an indicator for transparency based on: (1) how clear the CBs are with respect to their monetary policy objectives, and (2) how transparent the CBs implement their monetary policy. The Bacen has become more transparent after adopting the inflation targeting regime in 1999. However, these more transparent procedures are not part of the law that regulates the Bacen, indicating that they can be easily replaced. (Rev Econ Pol/DÜI)

We use a random-effects model to find the factors that affect the student evaluation of teaching (SET) scores. Dataset covers 6 semesters, 496 undergraduate courses related to 101 instructors and 89 disciplines. Our empirical findings are: (i) the class size affects negatively the SET score; (ii) instructors with more experience are better evaluated, but these gains reduce over time; (iii) participating in training programs, designed to improve the quality of teaching, did not increase the SET scores; (iv) instructors seem to be able to marginally 'buy' a better evaluation by inflating students' grade. Finally, there are significant changes in the rankings when we adjust the SET score to eliminate the effects of variables beyond instructors' control. Despite these changes, they are not statistically significant.