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AbstractThis article contends that sexism plays a fundamental role in the electoral rise of the far right, both as a predisposition and as a changing attitude. Using panel data from Spain, we show that modern sexism is indeed among the most important attitudinal predictors of voting for the far‐right party Vox. The results also show that internal individual changes in levels of modern sexism impact far‐right voting. Backlash attitudinal change, defined as increases in sexism occurring in a context of feminist momentum, contributed significantly to the recent emergence of the radical right. Our findings indicate that sexism is not a crystalized attitude but rather susceptible to showing short‐term changes with important political consequences. This highlights the importance of understudied context‐dependent individual dynamics of gender backlash in far‐right voting.

New parties pose a challenge to the claim that time is an essential element in the construction of partisanship. By definition, new parties have not been around for much time, so the opportunities for the construction of meaningful attachments could be considered limited. In this paper, we test this expectation, unpacking the dynamics and implications of the attachment to new parties. Using panel data collected in Spain during a period of profound party system change, we estimate the extent to which partisanship with new parties is stable and strong, works as a heuristic for preference formation, and predicts vote choice. Our data suggest that attachments to new parties can be as meaningful as those that citizens have with old parties. These findings seem particularly relevant in a context where new parties are on the rise.

Social movements often face tactic diversification. In otherwise nonviolent movements, some groups or radical flanks may resort to violent actions such as street rioting. This article analyzes the impact that these violent episodes can have on popular support for the movement as a whole. To estimate the causal effect of violence, it exploits an unexpected riot outbreak that occurred during the fieldwork of a face-to-face survey in Barcelona in May 2016, led by a squat group linked to the anti-austerity movement known as the 15-M or indignados that emerged during the financial crisis. By comparing respondents interviewed before and after the riots, it finds that the street violence episode reduced support for the 15-M movement by 12 percentage points on average. However, the magnitude of the effect is highly conditional on the respondents' predispositions towards the movement. Core supporters, that are expected to share the frame of the movement in justifying violent actions, are the least affected by the violent outbreak. On the other extreme, weak supporters, opposers, and non-aligned citizens reduce their support to a larger extent. Results are robust to different specifications and a wide range of robustness checks. These findings have potentially important implications for movements concerned with broadening their support base.

We examine the visibility of the European Union (EU) in the national public spheres of nine European countries during the period 2008‐14, inquiring whether the impact of the recent economic crisis and the austerity policies have advanced the presence of the EU, its member states, and European concerns, or not. Using political claims analysis, we map the visibility of collective actors in the main national newspapers of France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Despite the overall limited presence of the EU and European subjects, we find meaningful differences among countries. First, Germany's leading position conveying visibility to European claims, followed by Greece, Italy, and France. In contrast, negligible levels of visibility of the EU in the United Kingdom and Switzerland along with general low levels in the remaining selected countries, even in those most severely hit by the recent economic crisis and under EU surveillance.Related Articles in this Special Issue

Zamponi, Lorenzo, and
Lorenzo Bosi. 2016. ." Politics & Policy 44 (): 400–426. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/polp.12156/abstract


Lahusen, Christian,
Maria Kousis,
Johannes Kiess, and
Maria Paschou. 2016. "." Politics & Policy 44 (): 525–552. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/polp.12162/abstract


Cinalli, Manlio, and
Marco Giugni. 2016. "" Politics & Policy 44 (): 427–446. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/polp.12159/abstract
Related Media

de Vreese, Claes. 2014. "Understanding the Role of Mass Media and Interpersonal Discussion in Shaping Today's European Citizenship." European Public Sphere Conference April 10‐11. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZkCkFVCxIJs&feature=youtu.be

. 2016. News. Arts & Culture. Series: Research Spotlight. Accessed on March 17, 2016. http://www.city.ac.uk/news/spotlight-on-research/context-matters

Direct estimates based on election returns show that corruption is mildly punished at the polls. A large majority of survey respondents, however, often tend to state that they do not like corruption and will not support corrupt politicians. This has been interpreted as a product of social desirability bias: interviewees prefer to report socially accepted attitudes (rejection of corruption) instead of truthful responses (intention to vote for their preferred candidates regardless of malfeasance). We test to what extent this is the case by using a list experiment that allows interviewees to be questioned in an unobtrusive way, removing the possible effects of social desirability. Our results show that the great majority of respondents report intentions to electorally punish allegedly corrupt candidates even when asked in an unobtrusive way. We discuss the implications of this finding for the limited electoral accountability of corruption.

AbstractThis article addresses the psychological dynamics between internal political efficacy, emotions and support for populism. Contrary to the extended idea that populism is associated with low levels of political competence, it is argued that individuals' self‐competence beliefs enhance populist attitudes. Individuals who conceive themselves as able to understand and participate effectively in politics are more critical towards politicians and more prone to consider that citizens could do a better job. The article also hypothesises that internal efficacy enhances the likelihood of experiencing anger, which in turn promotes populist attitudes. Experimental and comparative observational evidence shows robust direct effects of internal efficacy over populism, as well as a smaller indirect impact via feelings of anger. These findings raise important questions regarding the nature of populism and how to fight it in our emancipated and information‐intensive democratic systems.