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"Why has China grown so fast for so long despite vast corruption? In China's Gilded Age, Yuen Yuen Ang argues that not all types of corruption hurt growth, nor do they cause the same kind of harm. Ang unbundles corruption into four varieties: petty theft, grand theft, speed money, and access money. While the first three types impede growth, access money--elite exchanges of power and profit--cuts both ways: it stimulates investment and growth but produces serious risks for the economy and political system. Since market opening, corruption in China has evolved toward access money. Using a range of data sources, the author explains the evolution of Chinese corruption, how it differs from the West and other developing countries, and how Xi's anticorruption campaign could affect growth and governance. In this formidable yet accessible book, Ang challenges one-dimensional measures of corruption. By unbundling the problem and adopting a comparative-historical lens, she reveals that the rise of capitalism was not accompanied by the eradication of corruption, but rather by its evolution from thuggery and theft to access money. In doing so, she changes the way we think about corruption, not only in China but around the world."--

In China's one-party bureaucracy, central directives issued by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council are the most important instrument of formal policy communication, yet their language has rarely been studied. This study highlights three politically salient varieties of directives: grey (ambiguous about what can or cannot be done), black (clearly states what can be done) and red (clearly states what cannot be done). Grey directives encourage flexible policy implementation and experimentation, black ones strongly endorse and thereby scale up selected initiatives, while red ones forbid certain actions. Together, this mixture of ambiguous and clear directives forms a system of adaptive policy communication. Using automated text analysis, I classify nearly 5,000 central directives issued from 1978 through 2017 into the categories of grey, black and red. This first-of-its-kind measurement effort yields new insights into the patterns and evolution of central commands from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping.(China Q / GIGA)

AbstractIn China's one-party bureaucracy, central directives issued by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council are the most important instrument of formal policy communication, yet their language has rarely been studied. This study highlights three politically salient varieties of directives: grey (ambiguous about what can or cannot be done), black (clearly states what can be done) and red (clearly states what cannot be done). Grey directives encourage flexible policy implementation and experimentation, black ones strongly endorse and thereby scale up selected initiatives, while red ones forbid certain actions. Together, this mixture of ambiguous and clear directives forms a system of adaptive policy communication. Using automated text analysis, I classify nearly 5,000 central directives issued from 1978 through 2017 into the categories of grey, black and red. This first-of-its-kind measurement effort yields new insights into the patterns and evolution of central commands from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping.

The current system of multilateralism, borne out of circumstances after the Second World War, is no longer fit for purpose today. How should this system be reinvented, and what types of research can contribute to its reform? First, it is not enough to tell international organizations that they ought to do more of the same good things such as transparency and engagement; rather, we need contextually grounded and publicly engaged research that helps practitioners dispel tropes and elevate public discourse in a deeply politicized world. Second, being public in nature, international organizations cannot be expected to operate like private firms. Any prescription must take into account their political imperatives. Publicly engaged research on multilateralism should move in three directions: (a) take US-China great power competition as a necessary starting point; (b) support ethnographic and empirical research that sheds light on internal operations, political dynamics, and constraints within international organizations; (c) promote dialogues between academics and practitioners, as this special collection has done.

How do modern fiscal states arise? Perhaps the most dominant explanation, based on the European experience, is that democratic institutions that limited the extractive power of states-exemplified by the 1688 Glorious Revolution in England-paved the way for the rise of fiscal capacity and subsequent prosperity. Revisionist accounts, however, reveal that this dominant narrative is flawed. In fact, numerous factors converged to enable the rise of European fiscal states, and in England, debt and land were particularly salient factors. Building off this literature, I bring attention to the role of 'taxless public financing' (i.e. financing public infrastructure through means other than taxation) in the making of fiscal states in two seldom compared cases: 19th-century America and 21st-century China. Both countries relied heavily on taxless financing to launch an infrastructure boom that spurred rapid growth along with massive corruption and financial risks.

Corruption is conventionally measured in global indices as a one-dimensional problem—one score for every country—a practice that has profoundly shaped our conceptualization of corruption and its relationship with capitalism. What if we unbundle corruption into qualitatively distinct types and then measure them across countries? How will this approach change our understanding of corruption? This review article serves two purposes. First, it introduces a new framework for "unbundling corruption" into four varieties and highlights their differential economic effects. Based on this typology, I piloted a new cross-national measure of these four varieties of corruption in fifteen countries, using an expert, perception-based survey—the Unbundled Corruption Index (UCI)™. Second, I review six questions on corruption through the lens of unbundling corruption. Shifting our focus of corruption from its aggregated quantity to its quality not only changes our responses to commonly asked questions about corruption, it also prompts new questions.

This study illuminates the important yet under-studied phenomenon of industrial transfer in China: the migration of capital and investment from wealthy coastal areas into poorer central and western provinces, beginning in the 2000s. By 2015, the value of domestic investment in five central provinces alone was 2.5 times that of foreign investment throughout China. Compared to the original "flying geese" model of tiered production in Asia, China's experience is distinct in three ways: (1) industrial transfer occurred domestically, rather than across nations; (2) sub-national transfer followed cross-national transfer; and (3) industrial migration is accompanied by a delayed replication of government policies and practices. While coastal locales today resolve to expel low-end industries, inland governments cannot afford to be selective and have only recently adopted the aggressive investment promotion tactics that coastal cities abandoned years ago. Policy diffusion is delayed as policy adoption depends on economic conditions, which vary widely across China and change over time. (China Q/GIGA)