In science we (dis)trust: technocratic attitudes, populism, and trust in science during the COVID-19 pandemic
In: European political science: EPS
ISSN: 1682-0983
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In: European political science: EPS
ISSN: 1682-0983
In: European political science review: EPSR, Band 15, Heft 4, S. 641-658
ISSN: 1755-7747
AbstractTrust in national and local institutions is an essential component of democracy. The literature has dealt mainly with the former, while less attention has been given to the latter. This paper advances a novel theoretical approach to inquire about trust in local institutions, which is also used to test national ones. We posit that trust is affected by the perceptions individuals have of the physical space where they live. Both a) the perceived quality of life in the neighbourhood where individuals live and b) the neighbourhood (perceived) peripherality are hypothesized to affect trust in local (and to a lesser extent) national institutions. We test our hypotheses in Italy, over a large representative sample of more than 40.000 respondents. We show that both variables are crucial predictors of local trust, but only the perceived quality of life predicts national trust. Equally important, social, cultural and economic individual capital does not modify the relation.
In: Contemporary Italian politics, Band 15, Heft 1, S. 5-23
ISSN: 2324-8831
In: Swiss political science review: SPSR = Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft : SZPW = Revue suisse de science politique : RSSP, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 41-60
ISSN: 1662-6370
AbstractIn the aftermath of the Euro crisis, EU issues have increasingly affected electoral behaviour, explaining a sizable shift in votes from the Europhile to Eurosceptic parties. This paper advances the argument that EU issue voting is not entirely encompassed in a divisive (pro‐/anti‐) EU dimension, testing the hypothesis that a EU valence voting is currently conditioning electoral behaviour. In particular, we posit that voters support parties evaluating their credibility in achieving not only EU positional goals ('leave/remain' in the EU), but also EU valence ones (i.e., making the country count more in Europe). Furthermore, we assess which parties – pro‐/anti‐EU – are more likely to be supported on the basis of this valence issue. Based on survey data from France (2017) and Italy (2018), we found that the EU valence issue is an important voting predictor, with pro‐EU parties mainly benefitting from it.
In: West European politics, Band 46, Heft 1, S. 122-147
ISSN: 1743-9655
In: South European society & politics, Band 26, Heft 3, S. 303-327
ISSN: 1743-9612
In: European Union politics: EUP, Band 21, Heft 1, S. 64-86
ISSN: 1741-2757
The Common Security and Defense Policy of the European Union has recently come to the forefront as a potential force of integration. This study explores the consequences (if any) of such a move, investigating how likely it is for Common Security and Defense Policy to be politicized and become a new area of dissent. The article explores conditions of politicization at three different levels of analysis: (a) the systemic level, where Common Security and Defense Policy position in a bi-dimensional political space (left–right and anti-pro EU) is discussed; (b) the party level, where potentially successful issue entrepreneurs of Common Security and Defense Policy are identified; (c) the individual voter level, where the probabilities of being mobilized by issue entrepreneurs of Common Security and Defense Policy are assessed. Our analysis suggests that although Common Security and Defense Policy is prone to be politicized and right-wing parties are the most likely group to do so, this move may backfire as right-wing voters are less likely to be mobilized on Common Security and Defense Policy compared to their left-wing counterpart. We discuss the implications of these results for the conceptualization of politicization and European integration.
In: Government & opposition: an international journal of comparative politics, S. 1-25
ISSN: 1477-7053
Abstract
In this article, we examine party positions on sovereignty issues in European countries based on an analysis of party supply. First, we develop an index of sovereignism reflecting the multidimensional articulation and differentiated emphasis put by parties on sovereignist issues. By applying the index to Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data, the analysis maps all EU member states. Second, we integrate in the analysis party- and country-level data (including the orientations of domestic public opinion). Through multivariate regression analysis we show how party ideology, contextual factors and public mood favoured the spread of party-based sovereignism in European countries.
In: Political studies: the journal of the Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom
ISSN: 1467-9248
Previous studies have extensively demonstrated that young people vote less than older ones. However, the magnitude of this age-related gap varies across different contexts: While in some countries, the gap is remarkable and increasing over time, in others, it is quite modest, and it has remained constant. This article investigates some of the factors that might explain this variability. In particular, it examines the impact of different types of representation (descriptive and substantive) on the age-related gap in turnout. It does so by relying on a dataset that combines individual-level data with information concerning the age composition of national parliaments and party system emphasis on specific issues. Overall, the dataset covers 57 elections and 19 West European countries. Results show that when young people are descriptively represented, the age-related gap in turnout is significantly reduced. The same effect occurs when party systems place relatively more emphasis on postmaterialist issues.
In: Contemporary politics, S. 1-21
ISSN: 1469-3631
In: Frontiers in political science, Band 4
ISSN: 2673-3145
In: South European society & politics, Band 27, Heft 3, S. 385-405
ISSN: 1743-9612
In: Italian Political Science Review: IPSR = Rivista italiana di scienza politica : RISP, Band 50, Heft 3, S. 314-333
ISSN: 2057-4908
AbstractOver recent years, a new transnational conflict has been deemed to be structuring political conflict in Europe. Several scholars have posited the emergence of a new 'demarcation' vs. 'integration' cleavage, pitting the 'losers' and 'winners' of globalization against each other. This new conflict is allegedly structured along economic (free trade and globalization), cultural (immigration and multiculturalism), and institutional [European Union (EU) integration] dimensions. From an empirical viewpoint, it is still a matter of discussion whether this conflict can be interpreted as a new cleavage, which could replace or complement the traditional ones. In this context, the European Parliament (EP) elections of 2019 represent an ideal case for investigating how far this new cleavage has evolved towards structuring political competition in European party systems. In this paper, by relying on an original dataset and an innovative theoretical and empirical framework based on the study of a cleavage's lifecycle, we test whether a demarcation cleavage is structuring the European political systems. Moreover, we assess the evolution of this cleavage across the 28 EU countries since 1979 and the role it plays within each party system. The paper finds that the demarcation cleavage has emerged in most European countries, mobilizing over time a growing number of voters. In particular, this long-term trend has reached its highest peak in the 2019 EP election. However, although the cleavage has become an important (if not the main) dimension of electoral competition in many countries, it has not reached maturity yet.
In: Italian Political Science Review: IPSR = Rivista italiana di scienza politica : RISP, Band 50, Heft 3, S. 334-349
ISSN: 2057-4908
AbstractAre European Parliament (EP) elections still second-order? In this article, we test the classical model at the individual level in contrast to an alternative 'Europe matters' model, by investigating the relative importance of domestic vs. European Union (EU)-related issues among voter-level determinants of aggregate second-order effects, that is, individual party change. We do so by relying on an original, CAWI pre-electoral survey featuring a distinctively large (30) number of both domestic and EU-related, positional and valence issues, with issue attitudes measured according to the innovative ICCP scheme (De Sio and Lachat 2020) which includes issue positions, issue priorities and respondents' assessment of party credibility on both positional and valence goals. Leveraging the concept of 'normal vote', we estimate multivariate models of electoral defections from normal voting separately for general and European elections, based on issue party credibility. This allows us to assess: (a) the distinctiveness of the two electoral arenas in terms of issue content; and (b) the relative impact of EU-related and domestic issues on defections of Italian voters. Our findings show that although second-order effects are still relevant in accounting for results in EP elections, vote choice in the latter is also partly due to specific effects of certain policy issues, including some related to the European dimension. This indicates that EP elections have their own political content, for which Europe matters even after controlling for the importance that EU-related issues have acquired in national elections.
Self-reports are conventionally used to measure political preferences, yet individuals may be unable or unwilling to report their political attitudes. Here, in 69 participants we compared implicit and explicit methods of political attitude assessment and focused our investigation on populist attitudes. Ahead of the 2019 European Parliament election, we recorded electroencephalography (EEG) from future voters while they completed a survey that measured levels of agreement on different political issues. An Implicit Association Test (IAT) was administered at the end of the recording session. Neural signals differed as a function of future vote for a populist or mainstream party and of whether survey items expressed populist or non-populist views. The combination of EEG responses and self-reported preferences predicted electoral choice better than traditional socio-demographic and ideological variables, while IAT scores were not a significant predictor. These findings suggest that measurements of brain activity can refine the assessment of socio-political attitudes, even when those attitudes are not based on traditional ideological divides.
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