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Theories of policymaking often focus on subsystems within a larger, overarching governance system. However, subsystem identification is complicated by the complexity of governance systems, characterized by multiple, interrelated issues, multi‐level interactions, and a diverse set of organizations. This study suggests an empirical, bottom‐up methodology to identify subsystems. Subsystems are identified based on bundles of similar observed organizational activity. The study further suggests a set of three elementary criteria to classify individual subsystems. In order to prove the value of the methodology, subsystems are identified through cluster analysis, and subsequently classified in a study of Swiss water governance. Results suggest that Swiss water governance can be understood as a network of overlapping subsystems connected by boundary penetrating organizations, with high‐conflict and quiet politics subgroups. The study shows that a principled analysis of subsystems as the interconnected, constituent parts of complex governance systems offers insights into important contextual factors shaping outcomes. Such insights are prerequisite knowledge in order to understand and navigate complex systems for researchers and practitioners alike.

This thesis undertakes a tour d'horizon of Swiss water governance. What can be said overall after it? In sum, three key insights stand out. These are the high potential for fragmentation among high-visibility, high-conflict issues surrounding agriculture, biodiversity and hydropower, the key integrative role of administrative agencies, especially on the cantonal level, and the essential role of local level implementation. All three articles in this thesis provide evidence that Swiss water governance has two distinct modes of operation in terms of visibility and conflict. On the one hand, a lot of water governance is "quiet politics'' related to the implementation and upkeep of water supply, waste water management and flood prevention measures and infrastructure. These areas are highly technical and relatively uncontroversial among the self-selecting set of actors involved. On the other hand, there is a second mode of more controversial issues, which are also more strongly reflected in media attention. At the heart of the matter lies the unwelcome fact that there are zero-sum games surrounding some water issues. Protecting aquatic biodiversity cannot avoid clashing with a reliance on agricultural methods based on pesticide use. Freeing up riverbeds and streams at some point comes at the cost of agricultural land. Large-scale hydropower concepts cannot be built outside of the landscape they are situated in and completely without impacting the dynamics of aquatic ecosystems. To overcome conflicts in these areas, administrative agencies have emphasized synergies to resolve the perception of zero-sum games. Revitalization projects are the prime example of this strategy. Arguments in favor of such projects sometimes go to great lengths in emphasizing how they do not only serve nature protection purposes, but can also improve flood prevention and increase the quality of life for residents by creating an inspiring landscape for recreational purposes. However, strategies of highlighting synergies can only go so far. Tellingly, many revitalization projects in Switzerland have tackled not necessarily areas where ecological improvements would have been maximized, but areas of least resistance, which in the Swiss context often means areas of a minimum amount of confrontation with agricultural interests. In the future, such areas will become more scarce. A key challenge for integration will thus relate to integrating agricultural organizations into the water governance system. In order to further improve the situation of aquatic habitats in Switzerland, any other way seems unrealistic. As agricultural interests are deeply entrenched within the political system, a more confrontational approach is only likely to lead to a stalemate and a patchwork of ecological improvement measures. Interestingly, also the first mode of operation in Swiss water governance, the more technocratic area of water supply and waste water management has been in more flux recently. It will need to find answers to the two key challenges of drought and micropollution in the future. Both require integration, sometimes involving an engagement with more controversial issues. How the challenges posed by increasing drought risks and micropollution are addressed in the future will thus be informative in order to judge the adaptive capacity of the Swiss water governance system, and the area of "quiet politics'' identified in this thesis will be crucial in this regard. There is good reason to be optimistic about this capacity for adaptation, not least due to the entrenched role of reputed cantonal level administrators and the presence of low-conflict local level networks within the areas of water supply and wastewater management. In overcoming fragmentation, cantonal level administrators emerge time and time again as a key player in Swiss water governance. They stand out as a hub connecting lower-level actors such as municipalities and regional service providers either to other lower-level actors or higher-level ones such as federal administrators. However, this thesis also shows that the networks of local level actors consisting of municipalities, service providers, and engineering and consulting firms are key in getting things done in the end. The studies assembled within this thesis indicate that they are part of distinct governance subsystems, integrate issues through their often generalist approaches to water governance within their territory, and show remarkable capacity for self-organization. The preceding three key points about Swiss water governance harbour theoretical insights for natural resource governance systems elsewhere. Much of natural resource governance is implementation and "quiet politics'', such as the water supply and flood control subsystems in Swiss water governance. In these non-adversarial areas, phenomena such as actor coalitions based on belief differences or "devil shifts'' are not likely to occur. Instead, as the regional water supply management network studied in the third article of this thesis shows, actors have a high capacity to organize and overcome fragmentation in such areas. In dealing with such subsystems, it thus seems advisable to establish conditions that retain a maximum amount of agency for organizations to self-organize. The most compelling argument for anarchy as a model for network governance thus somewhat ironically applies to cases where a degree of order in terms of a non-conflictive subsystem exists. Another general insight of this thesis is that integration comes in different forms. On the actor level, it can range from explicit coordination to providing bridges between different communities and access to outside knowledge. On an institutional level it can range from legislative, administrative or executive action, such as policy integration, to organizing venues for exchange, such as policy forums. If integration comes in different forms, the same can be said about fragmentation. Some of it is caused by the slow speed of adaption of a governance system to new challenges or lack of knowledge about relations between issues. Such fragmentation is easier to address. The more problematic kind of fragmentation has a root in more fundamental conflicts of values and interests. Setting up more institutional venues and disseminating knowledge can only go so far in overcoming it. In the end, there is no other legitimate and long-term effective way of resolving such fragmentation than the appropriate level of democratically legitimate debate and decision-making procedure. Social science based on complexity thinking can play an important role in this by informing debates and empowering actors based on an understanding of social systems appropriate to their nature.

AbstractThe exchange of information among organizations is the lifeblood of governance networks. It is a necessary condition for successful governance. Political divides between organizations often impede information exchange. We ask which organizations are most likely to broker information across political divides. We consider survey (n = 312) evidence of technical information exchange in Swiss water governance. Bayesian exponential random graph modeling results show that scientific organizations play crucial roles for cross‐divide brokerage. To a lesser extent, this also holds for higher‐level governmental agencies. Participation in policy forums is associated with a higher likelihood of brokering across political divides. There is however no clear benefit to participating in more than two or three forums. We conclude that an active role played by scientific organizations is the most promising avenue to increase information flow across political divides. Beyond this, we suggest setting up carefully constructed exchange forums and selectively engaging moderate members of subgroups.

This article explores how beliefs affect preferences leading to policy instrument choices of elite actors. Beliefs are general attitudes regarding a given policy field, for example toward the role of the state or the urgency of a problem. Both beliefs and preferences are central for applications of Sabatier's Advocacy Coalition Framework, but their interrelationship has remained undertheorized. Understanding how beliefs and preferences are linked can provide important insights into policy instrument choice, while improving the comparability of studies across policy subsystems. The article compares the relative contribution of beliefs to shaping instrument choices of elite actors in the domain of Swiss renewable energy policy. Results suggest that beliefs are likely to play a prominent role in shaping instrument choice. We find that policy core beliefs translate into preferences through a process involving two main pathways. First, some policy beliefs primarily influence the preferred characteristics of the overall instrument mix. Second, some policy beliefs are primarily associated with preferences for specific instruments. Some policy beliefs are influential via both pathways. These, therefore, emerge as especially important factors shaping the policy process. Our results offer insights for policymakers into how potential future conflicts in negotiations can be attenuated.

Structural characteristics of social networks have been recognized as important factors of effective natural resource governance. However, network analyses of natural resource governance most often remain static, even though governance is an inherently dynamic process. In this article, we investigate the evolution of a social network of organizational actors involved in the governance of natural resources in a regional nature park project in Switzerland. We ask how the maturation of a governance network affects bonding social capital and centralization in the network. Applying separable temporal exponential random graph modeling (STERGM), we test two hypotheses based on the risk hypothesis by Berardo and Scholz (2010) in a longitudinal setting. Results show that network dynamics clearly follow the expected trend toward generating bonding social capital but do not imply a shift toward less hierarchical and more decentralized structures over time. We investigate how these structural processes may contribute to network effectiveness over time.

AbstractSustainability governance in polycentric systems needs to ensure both effectiveness and procedural justice. Effectiveness and procedural justice are intricately linked to power dynamics in governance. To assess polycentric sustainability governance, understanding different types, sources, and effects of power is key. Here, we investigate network‐derived bonding and bridging social capital of actors as specific sources of power in polycentric sustainability governance. We ask two questions: How does bridging and bonding social capital translate into power? And: How is the power associated with satisfaction with inclusion? We relate levels of bonding and bridging social capital to power and satisfaction with inclusion in governance processes for 299 actors in 10 cases of Swiss wetlands governance. Using a Bayesian multi‐level regression model, we find that especially bonding social capital is a source of power for actors. Further, network‐derived power but also nonnetwork‐derived power by design translates into satisfaction with inclusion. Research and practice of sustainability governance need to be careful to account for power in nuanced ways, acknowledging its sources and relation to procedural justice.

AbstractIn polycentric governance systems, decisions that influence a given policy issue are often made across a series of forums: venues where actors meet to resolve collective action problems. Here, we examine who does and does not participate in forums, and the factors driving that participation. We analyze forum participation patterns of 307 actors involved in Swiss water governance, who could participate in water governance forums. We find that the majority of actors do not participate in any forums. Results from a Bayesian multilevel logistic regression model show that especially those concerned with a broader range of policy issues and those that have more organizational resources at their disposal are more likely to participate. To a lesser extent, this also holds for organizations that represent policy beliefs consistent with median beliefs in the system. A belief that increased cross‐sectoral coordination is needed to promote more effective governance does not have a discernible impact on participation. These results question the integrative characteristics often attributed to forums in polycentric governance more generally.

Fragmentation across scales in natural resource governance can impede coordinated action and decrease innovation capacity. Bridging actors who connect others within governance networks help to overcome this challenge. This paper analyzes two bridging positions for actors in governance networks. First, periphery connectors integrate otherwise unconnected actors and provide access to new knowledge. Second, central coordinators efficiently connect actors at the center of the network and thus facilitate coordinated action. The paper proposes a way to identify periphery connectors and central coordinators within governance networks and formulates expectations about types of actors that are likely to occupy these positions. An analysis of three actor networks in the water supply sector in Switzerland suggests that periphery coordinator positions are more likely to be occupied by organizations at higher jurisdictional levels. Central coordinator positions are more likely to be occupied by governmental actors as compared to non-governmental actors. Thus, in addressing challenges of fragmentation, higher-level governmental actors continue to play an important role, even when they delegate competences to lower-level and private actors.