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In the current EU legislative framework for investment funds – UCITS Directive and AIFMD – credit funds have rightly been singled out as something quite unique. In fact, they stand at the crossroads of capital markets' and credit institutions' regulations, playing a role of both an investor in a particular asset class, and of a credit facility provider. They may also effectively perform other functions, such as those of securitization vehicles, or comparable to Asset Management Companies ("AMCs") for the management and processing of non-performing loans. They are, therefore, hybrid creatures, difficult to regulate and, sometimes, to understand. This is due not only to the absence of any specific product regulation in the context of the AIFMD, but also to the uncertainties surrounding the notion of "credit" and "credit granting" in EU law. Within the EU, legislation on credit funds developed, until now, in a haphazard manner. Absent a clear reference scheme, the result is unsatisfactory, and far from being able to integrate EU Markets in this respect. Further, more robust harmonization is therefore needed in this area, now more than ever in the context of the debate on the effects of the pandemic and the management of NPLs. The paper aims to provide sufficient evidence to support these assumptions, also taking into account the lively debate on the role of Asset Management Companies and the development of an efficient secondary market for loans in the EU.

The Weiss affair, culminating in the BVerfG ruling of 5 May 2020 ( Weiss II), marks a break-up point in the long-standing dialogue between the BVerfG and the CJEU. The judges in Karlsruhe refused to follow the decision rendered by the CJEU in a preliminary ruling ( Weiss I) and ordered EU institutions to provide further clarifications on the proportionality assessment of the Public Sector Purchase Programme. This paper claims that the principles applied by the BVerfG in Weiss I are quite similar to those employed in the Gauweiler and Landeskreditbank-Banking Union cases. Considering that background, it will be argued that the construction of the principles employed by the BVerfG for the judicial review of EU acts did not undergo dramatic changes over time. The different outcome of Weiss II is due to the fact that, according to the BVerfG, insufficient elements of explanation and justification were provided by the ECB and the CJEU. Therefore, the central problem of Weiss II ends up being a procedural question of allegedly insufficient statements of reasons. From Gauweiler to Weiss II, one also sees the development of the standards for the judicial review of the ECB's decisions, in the fields of both monetary policy and banking supervision.