Search results

AbstractWe examine the licensing decision of a non-producer innovator with a new technology that enables the manufacture of a saleable product. The technology is licensed and each user privately knows its innovation-related production cost, whereas the licensor only knows, with a certain probability, that this cost may be low (the user is efficient) or high (the user is inefficient). When a single licence is granted through separating contracts, only the contract intended for the inefficient user involves a per-unit royalty, but when two licences are granted through separating contracts, the contracts intended for the inefficient and efficient users both feature a per-unit royalty. However, screening is less likely as the number of licences increases, to the point that the licensor does not screen users when granting three licences. Additionally, whereas the diffusion of the innovation is socially insufficient under symmetric information, with asymmetric information it may be socially optimal. Finally, when licensing with contracts involving an ad-valorem royalty is also feasible the licensor finds it less attractive than licensing with a per-unit royalty.

Correcting fiscal imbalances and reducing public debt is a priority among the peripheral countries of the Eurozone (the so-called GIPSI countries). However, there is no consensus about which is the most appropriate policy mix to achieve it: the debate on fiscal austerity vs. growth is bitter now among researchers and international policymakers. In this paper we review the effects of different fiscal consolidation policies on macroeconomic performance. We also provide an empirical analysis that complements the recent study performed by the IMF regarding the sustainability of public debt for GIPSI countries in different scenarios of grpwth inflation, and fiscal and monetary policies. Finally, a policy mix is offered that would be suitable for these five countries to achieve both fiscal consolidation and economic growth ; Corregir los desajustes fiscales y reducir la deuda pública son dos objetivos prioritarios para los países periféricos de la Eurozona, si bien no existe consenso sobre la política más adecuada para alcanzarlos. En este artículo repasamos los efectos que las diferentes políticas de consolidación fiscal tienen sobre los agregados macroeconómicos y ofrecemos un análisis empírico que complementa el reciente estudio del FMI sobre la sostenibilidad de la deuda pública en los citados países en diferentes escenarios de crecimiento, inflación, y políticas fiscales y monetarias. Asimismo, describimos la política que consideramos más deseable para los países de la periferia de la Eurozona al objeto de alcanzar la consolidación fiscal y el crecimiento económico ; Acknowledges financial aid received from the Galician Regional Government (Xunta de Galicia) through Grant GPC2013-045

We examine the strategic role of horizontal subcontracting through option contracts by a downstream dominant firm competing with a fringe. Downstream production requires an input from imperfectly competitive suppliers. We show that the dominant firm outsources downstream production from fringe firms to gain bargaining clout in the input market. Option contracts are preferred to forwards, because leverage against suppliers is gained at lower contract prices. With no market uncertainty, option contracts do not alter final prices beyond changes caused by unavoidable market power. Whenever demand is uncertain, however, option contracts increase final prices and are therefore harmful for consumers.

We analyse a two‐period licensing game in which a non‐producing upstream patent holder licenses an innovation that lasts for two periods to either one or two downstream users. Licensing is made through a payment based on a two‐part tariff, namely a fixed fee plus a royalty per output unit. Regarding the innovation value when commercialized by each user (high or low), we compare a symmetric information context where such value is publicly known with a situation in which users have private information about the value, but with their period‐1 output signalling that value. We find that the patent holder is more likely to prefer to grant two licenses under signalling than under symmetric information, which highlights the benefits of resorting to market competition between users to reduce the amount of informational rents.

Intro -- TAXING A POLLUTING MONOPOLY WITH PRIVATE INFORMATION -- TAXING A POLLUTING MONOPOLY WITH PRIVATE INFORMATION -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION -- Chapter 2 THE MODEL -- Chapter 3 RESULTS -- 3.1. THE IMPACT OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION ON TAXES -- 3.2. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND WELFARE -- 3.3. TAXES AND MARGINAL DAMAGE: THE ROLE OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION -- 3.4. A REGULATOR THAT WORRIES MORE ABOUT PRODUCTION AND LESS ABOUT THE ENVIRONMENT -- Chapter 4 CONCLUDING REMARKS -- ACKNOWLEDGMENT -- APPENDIX A -- REFERENCES -- INDEX

This paper overviews the theoretical and empirical research on behavioral biases and their influence in the literature. To provide a systematic exposition, we present a unified framework that takes the reader through an original taxonomy, based on the reviews of relevant authors in the field. In particular, we establish three broad categories that may be distinguished: heuristics and biases; choices, values and frames; and social factors. We then describe the main biases within each category, and revise the main theoretical and empirical developments, linking each bias with other biases and anomalies that are related to them, according to the literature.

Waiting time for elective surgery is a key problem in the current medical world. This paper aims to reproduce, by a Monte Carlo simulation model, the relationship between hospital capacity, inpatient activity, and surgery waiting list size in teaching hospitals. Inpatient activity is simulated by fitting a Normal distribution to real inpatient activity data, and the effect of the number of beds on inpatient activity is modelled with a linear regression model. Analysis is performed with data of the University Multi-Hospital Complex of Santiago de Compostela (Santiago de Compostela, Spain), by considering two scenarios regarding the elastiticity of demand with bed increase. If demand does not grow with an increase on bed capacity, small changes lead to drastic reductions in the waiting lists. However, if demand grows as bed capacity does, adding additional capacity merely makes waiting lists worse.