Suchergebnisse

The ASEAN-Australia leaders' summit in Melbourne offers the opportunity for Australia to embrace ASEAN's 'inclusive regionalism' and the organisation's centrality in mediating the Indo-Pacific struggle between the great powers. With the Albanese government's $2bn ...

A decade ago there was talk of the "end of history". Francis Fukuyama assured us that no ideology, even Islamic ideology, could challenge the universalist claims of liberal democracy. Influential analysts spoke of an international convergence of value systems as well as economies. Today some have gone to the other extreme and accept the idea of a "clash of civilizations". At the very least, we can say history has returned with a vengeance.When commentators of a decade ago assumed change w

This article is a revised and expanded version of the author's keynote address for the inaugural International Conference on Politics and International Studies (ICPIS) 2018, held in Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia. The title reflects the official theme of the said scholarly congregation, which deliberates on the contested notions of globalisation and the phenomenon's related outcomes, including its much touted hegemonic, universal liberal qualities, which have elicited a backlash that has seen the revival of nationalism and identity politics during the last few decades. That globalisation has arrived at a crossroads and the thought of what might lie ahead is what this paper seeks to ponder, through the prism and critique of both recent as well as older works by the likes of Francis Fukuyama, Charles Taylor, Wang Gungwu and Samuel P. Huntington. More specifically, it critically explores the evolution and progress of globalisation from both historical and international relations (IR) perspectives, explicating watershed eras in the long cycle of modern international history that had as much facilitated as hindered the realisation of a universal liberal consensus, or liberal triumph. Although concluding that globalisation has been stopped in its tracks, the article nevertheless, expresses concerns regarding the limitations of Western-oriented IR as a discipline in comprehensively grasping the complexities of post-globalisation dynamics shaped by cultural-ideational specificities, not to mention, the fallacy of overemphasising on "identity politics" as a "master concept" in explaining all that is happening in contemporary world politics. Instead, it contends on the need to review existing analytical frameworks, while exploring new "logics" in the quest to construct new paradigms to help make sense of a post-globalisation, post-liberal, probably post-Western era.

Before considering how best to reposition Indonesia in the world - and I will be looking, in particular, at Indonesia's current Indo-Pacific initiative - we need to ask how the world itself has been repositioned. The terms of reference for this conference go straight to this second question. They immediately highlight the theme of globalization, noting how it has promoted "growing connectivity among states" and "revolutionized human interaction". How then has this region been reconfigured over the last decades? Until the mid-20th-century the entire Asian region was either under European colonial rule or strong Western imperial influence. That is how the region was structured - with the great centres of power in London, Paris, The Hague and Washington. After the extraordinary conquests by Japan, which effectively ended the Western imperial project, Asia was quickly drawn into the Cold War. Countries lined up as Communist or Anti-Communist, and some tried to sustain a degree of neutrality or equi-distance. At the end of the Cold War, in the last decade or so of the 20th-century, as is often commented, there was a unipolar moment - an America-dominated world with a sense of globalization not merely being economic, but also a globalization of ideas. One commentator wrote of the 'end of history' - the US had won, he said, with its liberal democratic ideology. Communism had been annihilated, and Western liberalism had the "wind in its hair". This said, there were still objections. Dr Mahathir in Malaysia and a number of bright Foreign Ministry intellectuals in Singapore spoke of "Asian values". They said you had to understand Asian values to explain the great economic transformation taking place in Asian countries - and there was also a need to respect Asian values in the political arena, and not just insist that all societies must develop in the same way. The democracy, human rights, and other supposed responsibilities of government which Westerners have tended to advocate, it was argued, are not necessarily universal norms.

The Najib government continued to consolidate its political hold on Malaysia in 2017. Various factors, including a moderately improved economic situation and a relatively generous 2018 budget, suggested that it had good prospects for winning the next election, to be held at the latest in August 2018. Beyond party politics, however, there were indications of deep change taking place in Malaysian society—deep enough to raise questions about the nation's identity.

In 2016 Prime Minister Najib overcame challenges that many predicted would destroy him. The crisis, however, has helped to deepen many of the fault lines in Malaysian politics and society, and to promote public apprehension. Much will now depend on the resilience of the country's institutions and economy.