Suchergebnisse

In this model, well-being depends on leisure, on an environmental renewable resource, and on a non-storable output, which can substitute for the environmental resource or can satisfy needs different from those satisfied by the resource. Individuals have free access to the environmental resource, which is subject to negative externalities: that is, is depleted by the production and consumption of the output. Individuals react to negative externalities by increasing their labour supply in order to produce substitutes for the diminishing resource. The increase in production and consumption that ensues generates further deterioration of the future quality or quantity of the free resource, thus giving rise to a self-reinforcing process. Multiple equilibria and 'critical mass effects' are consistent with the functioning of this economy and the resulting level of aggregate production may be higher than is socially desirable.

Social media have been credited with the potential of reinvigorating trust by offering new opportunities for social and political participation. This view has been recently challenged by the rising phenomenon of online incivility, which has made the environment of social networking sites hostile to many users. We conduct a novel experiment in a Facebook setting to study how the effect of social media on trust varies depending on the civility or incivility of online interaction. We find that participants exposed to civil Facebook interaction are significantly more trusting. In contrast, when the use of Facebook is accompanied by the experience of online incivility, no significant changes occur in users' behavior. These results are robust to alternative configurations of the treatments.

We set up an evolutionary game-theoretic model aimed at addressing the issue of local public good provision via direct commitment of voluntary forces (private donors and nonprofit providers) only. Two classes of agents are assumed to strategically interact within a 'double critical mass' model and we investigate the critical factors affecting the dynamic outcomes of such interaction. Further, we explore the conditions under which (what we term) 'evolutionary crowding-out/in' occurs, depending on agents' degree of opportunism, social comparison and positive selective incentives (such as subsidies given by the government to 'virtuous' citizens or nonprofits only). Adapted from the source document.