Suchergebnisse

La conoscenza è un bene economico fondamentale che può essere ricondotto alle caratteristiche di merce e in quanto tale prodotto e scambiato solo attraverso processi istituzionali particolari: la conoscenza è una merce speciale. Il mercato, inteso come meccanismo istituzionale di organizzazione dello scambio e quindi della produzione e allocazione delle risorse, è, in tutta evidenza, un meccanismo inadeguato a organizzare la produzione e lo scambio della conoscenza come merce. Integrazioni e correzioni sono indispensabili. La radicale sostituzione del mercato con meccanismi di governo pubblico pare del resto altrettanto insufficiente a organizzare una adeguata allocazione delle risorse e un'efficace direzione e coordinamento della produzione di conoscenza: lo scarto drammatico tra i successi della scienza prodotti dal sistema sovietico e la sua arretratezza tecnologica offre ampio materiale di riflessione. La nozione di regime di crescita Schumpeteriana consente di analizzare i processi di costruzione e funzionamento di quei meccanismi ibridi di coordinamento e stimolo alla produzione e valorizzazione della conoscenza che sono stati di volta in volta posti in essere nei sistemi economici nel corso del tempo.

Chapter 1: Introduction -- Chapter 2: The Economics of Knowledge -- Chapter 3: The New Direction of Technological Change -- Chapter 4: The Dynamics of Knowledge Governance: Schumpeterian growth regimes -- Chapter 5: The Political Economy of the Knowledge Growth Regime -- Chapter 6: Towards a New Knowledge Policy -- Chapter 7: Conclusions

Recommended readings (Machine generated): 1.MichaelSpence(2002),'SignalinginRetrospectandtheInformationalStructureofMarkets',AmericanEconomicReview,92(3),June,434-59 -- 2. George A. Akerlof (2002), 'Behavioral Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Behavior', American Economic Review, 92 (3), June, 411-33 -- 3. Joseph E. Stiglitz (2002), 'Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics', American Economic Review, 92 (3), June, 460-501 -- 4. John G. Riley (2001), 'Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling', Journal of Economic Literature, XXXIX (2), June, 432-78 -- 5. Kenneth J. Arrow (1996), 'The Economics of Information: An Exposition', Empirica, 23 (2), June, 119-28 -- 6. W. Bentley MacLeod (2007), 'Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement', Journal of Economic Literature, XLV (3), September, 595-628 -- 7. Bengt Holmström (1999), 'Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective', Review of Economic Studies, Special Issue: Contracts, 66 (1), January, 169-82 -- 8. Jeffrey C. Ely and Juuso Välimäki (2003), 'Bad Reputation', Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXVIII (3), August, 785-814 -- 9. Johannes Hörner (2002), 'Reputation and Competition', American Economic Review, 92 (3), June, 644-63 -- 10. Mathias Dewatripont and Jean Tirole (2005), 'Modes of Communication', Journal of Political Economy, 113 (6), December, 1217-38 -- 11. Richard Rogerson, Robert Shimer and Randall Wright (2005), 'Search-Theoretic Models of the Labor Market: A Survey', Journal of Economic Literature, XLIII (4), December, 959-88 -- 12. Dean Karlan, Markus Mobius, Tanya Rosenblat and Adam Szeidl (2009), 'Trust and Social Collateral', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124 (3), August, 1307-61 -- 13. Abhijit V. Banerjee (1992), 'A Simple Model of Herd Behavior', Quarterly Journal of Economics, CVII (3), August, 797-817 -- 14. Yannis M. Ioannides and Linda Datcher Loury (2004), 'Job Information Networks, Neighborhood Effects, and Inequality', Journal of Economic Literature, XLII (4), December, 1056-93 -- 15. Matthew O. Jackson (2014), 'Networks in the Understanding of Economic Behaviors', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 28 (4), Fall, 3-22 -- 16. H. Peyton Young (2009), 'Innovation Diffusion in Heterogeneous Populations: Contagion, Social Influence, and Social Learning', American Economic Review, 99 (5), December, 1899-924 -- 17. Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer and Ivo Welch (1992), 'A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades', Journal of Political Economy, 100 (5), October, 992-1026 -- 18. Roland Benabou and Guy Laroque (1992), 'Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility', Quarterly Journal of Economics, CVII (3), August, 921-58

Contents: Part I Endogeneous innovation as a creative response. A reappraisal of the Schumpeterian legacy -- 1. Standing on giants' shoulders -- 2. Innovation as a creative response -- 3. Towards an evolutionary complexity of endogenous innovation -- 4. Innovation as an emergent system property -- Part II New frontiers in the economics of knowledge. The appropriability trade off reconsidered -- 5. A bird's view of the economics of knowledge -- 6. The derived demand for knowledge -- 7. The knowledge appropriability trade-off -- 8. Digital knowledge generation and the appropriability trade-off -- 9. Knowledge governance, pecuniary knowledge externalities and total factor productivity growth -- 10. A new framework of innovation and knowledge policy -- Part III Endogenous knowledge and technological congruence -- 11. Technological congruence and the economic complexity of technological change -- 12. A Schumpeterian approach to endogenous specialization in international trade -- 13. Schumpeterian growth: the creative response to diachronic knowledge externalities -- 14. References -- Index.

The ongoing process of revising and rethinking the foundations of economic theory leads to great complexities and contradictions at the heart of economics. 'Economics of innovation' provides a fertile challenge to standard economics, and one that can help it overcome its many criticisms.This authoritative book from Cristiano Antonelli provides a systematic account of recent advances in the economics of innovation. By integrating this account with the economics of technological change, this exceptional book elaborates an understanding of the effects of the introduction of new technologies.This

This book elaborates a new path dependent and localized growth theory based upon knowledge externalities by making two important contributions. Firstly, it elaborates the hypothesis that total factor productivity growth stems from pecuniary knowledge externalities that consist in the access to localized external knowledge, at costs that are below equilibrium levels. Secondly, it implements the economic analysis of complex dynamic systems with a novel approach to understanding the role of knowledge interactions and knowledge governance mechanisms in the generation of new technological knowledge